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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-14831
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cr-00123-WTM-GRS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EMMANUEL SPRINGSTEEN,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(October 2, 2019)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, GRANT and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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The Government appeals Emmanuel Springsteen’s 54-month total sentence.
It contends the district court did not have the authority to sentence Springsteen
below the seven-year mandatory minimum for his conviction for using, carrying,
or brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and, although it did not object below, the district
court’s error was plain. After plain error review,1 we vacate and remand for
resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
Springsteen pled guilty to one count of interfering with commerce by
robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 1), and one count of using
carrying, or brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in
violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Count 2). The plea agreement stated
both parties would recommend a sentence of seven years or 84 months.
For Count 1, the PSI assigned Springsteen a total offense level of 17, which
when combined with a criminal history category of I, resulted in a Guidelines
1
The Government did not object to Springsteen’s sentence before the district court.
Ordinarily to preserve an issue for appeal, one must object. United States v. Straub,
508 F.3d
1003, 1011 (11th Cir. 2007). If one does not object, then we review for plain error.
Id. Plain
error occurs where: (1) there is an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and
(4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
United States v. Moriarty,
429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005). “Plain is synonymous with
clear or equivalently obvious.” United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). For an error
to affect substantial rights, “the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the
outcome of the district court proceedings.”
Id.
2
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range for Count 1 of 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment. However, as to Count 2, the
PSI noted the Guidelines sentence was the minimum term required by statute,
which was 7 years—84 months—and that sentence must be served consecutively
to any other sentence imposed.
At sentencing, the parties had no objections to the PSI. Accordingly, the
district court adopted the factual statements and Guidelines calculation contained
within the PSI. The district court determined Springsteen’s total offense level was
17 and his criminal history category was I, resulting in a Guidelines range of 24 to
30 months’ imprisonment. The court also acknowledged that, as to Count 2,
Springsteen was subject to an 84-month consecutive sentence.
After hearing arguments from the parties, both of whom asked for a total
sentence of seven years, and allocution from Springsteen, the district court
sentenced Springsteen to a total of 54 months’ imprisonment, which consisted of
24 months for Count 1 and only 30 months for Count 2, set to run consecutively,
followed by four years of supervised release. In support of this total sentence, the
district court explained Springsteen was only 20 years old, he had no criminal or
juvenile history, and there was no history in his background of him ever possessing
or using a firearm. The district court also explained Springsteen had a rough
childhood that involved an alcoholic father that had kidnapped him and who also
had been in and out of jail; that Springsteen had been diagnosed with “severe
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emotional disturbance since he was 13; he graduated high school; and, at the time
of the offense, Springsteen was homeless. Therefore, the court concluded the total
Guidelines sentence was greater than necessary after considering the sentencing
factors, and the total sentence it imposed was adequate deterrence for
Springsteen’s criminal conduct.
After pronouncing the total sentence, the district court asked the parties if
there were any objections to its findings of fact, conclusions of law, or the manner
in which the sentence was pronounced. Neither party objected. However,
following entry of judgment, the Government appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) provides the following:
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise
provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any
person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the
use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person
may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a
firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a
firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime
of violence or drug trafficking crime—
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years.
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(emphasis added). If a defendant is sentenced under this statute, his sentence
pursuant to this statute must be consecutive to all other sentences.
Id.
§ 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
“The sentencing guidelines make clear that where a guidelines range falls
entirely below a mandatory minimum sentence, the court must follow the
mandatory statutory minimum sentence.” United States v. Clark,
274 F.3d 1325,
1328 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing U.S.S.G § 5G1.1). Therefore, where the “relevant
statutorily authorized mandatory minimum sentence[] exceeded the relevant
sentencing guidelines range,” the mandatory minimum sentence “plainly [takes]
precedence.” Id. This remains true even after United States v. Booker,
543 U.S.
220 (2005). United States v. Castaing-Sosa,
530 F.3d 1358, 1362 (11th Cir. 2008).
Although a mandatory minimum sentence takes precedence over the applicable
Guidelines range, the district court may depart from the mandatory minimum
sentence in two circumstances: (1) when the government files a substantial
assistance motion pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 or
(2) when the defendant falls within the safety valve terms of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
Id. at 1360. Safety-valve relief only applies when a defendant violates one of
several named controlled substance offenses. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
Additionally, to qualify for safety-valve relief, the defendant must not have
possessed a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connection with the offense.
Id.
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§ 3553(f)(2). However, absent these two circumstances, “[i]t is well-settled that a
district court is not authorized to sentence a defendant below the statutory
mandatory minimum.” Castaing-Sosa,
530 F.3d at 1360.
In Clark, the United States conceded at sentencing the district court had the
authority to depart downward from the mandatory minimum sentence, but
otherwise argued the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure.
274
F.3d at 1327. The district court granted a departure and sentenced the defendant to
90 months below the mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment.
Id. at 1328. The government appealed and argued the district court plainly erred
by sentencing the defendant below the mandatory minimum sentence without it
filing a motion for a departure based on substantial assistance and because the
defendant was not entitled to safety-valve relief.
Id. We agreed with the
government. Applying plain error review and relying on the reasoning of the Sixth
Circuit, we stated the government can show that its substantial rights were violated
“if the error affects the outcome of the district court proceedings.”
Id. at 1329
(quoting United States v. Barajas-Nunez,
91 F.3d 826, 833 (6th Cir. 1996)). We
further stated the following: “the district court’s imposition of a sentence that is
less than two-thirds of the statutorily-required minimum shows a disregard for
governing law, diminishes the fairness of the criminal sentencing scheme by
allowing disparate sentences to be imposed on similarly-situated defendants, and
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undermines the integrity and public reputation of the judicial system.”
Id.
Accordingly, we vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded with instructions
for the district court to sentence the defendant to the statutory minimum sentence
of 240 months. Id. at 1330.
As Springsteen concedes, “the law is not on [his] side in this Appeal.” The
district court plainly erred by sentencing Springsteen to 30 months for his
conviction on Count 2, despite the mandatory minimum sentence being 84 months’
imprisonment. It is well-settled that district courts do not have the discretion to
sentence a defendant below the statutory mandatory minimum sentence absent a
motion from the government for substantial assistance or the defendant qualifying
for safety-valve relief. See Castaing-Sosa,
530 F.3d at 1360; Clark,
274 F.3d at
1328. However, in this case, neither exception was present, as the Government did
not file a motion to depart from the mandatory minimum sentence and Springsteen
did not commit a controlled substance offense. Therefore, the district court’s error
was plain. Furthermore, had the district court not erred, then the outcome of the
district court proceedings would have been different, because the district court
would have sentenced Springsteen to at least 84 months’ imprisonment on Count 2,
not 30 months. Thus, the Government’s substantial rights were violated. See
Clark,
274 F.3d at 1329. Finally, the district court sentencing Springsteen to less
than half of the 84-month mandatory minimum without proper justification,
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“diminishes the fairness of the criminal sentencing scheme by allowing disparate
sentences to be imposed on similarly-situated defendants, and undermines the
integrity and public reputation of the judicial system.”
Id. Accordingly, we vacate
Springsteen’s total sentence and remand for resentencing.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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