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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-11130
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-00477-MHT-GMB
DOREN T. WATKINS,
Registered Nurse, Nurse Supervisor,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
versus
ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH,
a.k.a. Montgomery County Health Department,
Defendant–Appellee,
SCOTT HARRIS,
Dr., et al.,
Defendants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
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(October 18, 2019)
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Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Doren Watkins, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit against her employer, the
Alabama Department of Public Health (“ADPH”), alleging retaliation and hostile-
work-environment claims under Title VII. After she twice amended her complaint,
a magistrate judge prepared a report recommending that the district court grant
ADPH’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a plausible claim to relief. The district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation over Watkins’s objections and
dismissed the action. Watkins now appeals, arguing that the court erred by relying
on the magistrate judge’s report, which, in Watkins’s view, inaccurately presented
her factual allegations and cited to “sections of filings that don’t exist.” After careful
review, we affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. Edwards v. Prime, Inc.,
602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
which, accepted as true, states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Evans
v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp.,
850 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017). We liberally construe the
filings of pro se parties.
Id.
In a report recommending dismissal of Watkins’s second amended complaint,
the magistrate judge thoroughly summarized Watkins’s factual allegations. We
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briefly review the allegations here. Broadly speaking, Watkins is a nurse who
alleges that she “began to receive numerous frivolous reprimands” and was subject
to “unfair treatment” by her superiors, which has escalated over time, after she filed
a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) in 2004.
Watkins’s second amended complaint focuses on three incidents in particular.
First, she alleges that on July 15, 2015, she was given a frivolous reprimand for
refusing to administer intravenous treatment to a tuberculosis patient, at the direction
of the former State Nursing Director, John Hankins, because the treatment was
outside her training and knowledge. She grieved the reprimand, explaining that she
should not have been disciplined for following protocol and acting justifiably in the
patient’s best interest. But as a result of the reprimand, she was taken off certain
work duties, and the incident caused her to receive an “unsatisfactory” rating for
“Compliance with Rules” during her performance appraisal in November 2015.
Second, Watkins alleges that on July 31, 2017, she received another frivolous
reprimand for failing to promptly notify her superiors that other employees had
cheated on an exam. In fact, according to Watkins, she notified her supervisor of
the cheating the day after she found out. Two of her supervisors then attempted to
coerce her into signing the reprimand by threatening her with further disciplinary
action. Watkins reported her supervisors for failing to follow proper disciplinary
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procedures and fabricating disciplinary documents, but nothing came of it. Of the
three individuals involved in the cheating incident, one was fired and one was
allowed to resign, but one was promoted. Watkins believes that ADPH promoted
one of the cheaters, an African-American woman, to have a defense against any
discrimination claim later brought by Watkins, who is also African-American.
Third, Watkins alleges that she was prevented from filing comments in
opposition to a poor performance appraisal she received from her supervisors in
November 2017, before that document was sent to the state personnel department.
Watkins believes that the individuals involved—including supervisors about whom
she had previously complained—intended to place a disparaging appraisal in her file
without giving her an opportunity to respond.
Watkins claims that, as a result of the frivolous reprimands, her standing in
the “merit ranking has taken a substantial hit,” and she has consistently been passed
over for promotions. Additionally, the poor performance evaluations have
negatively impacted the raises she received.
Analyzing these facts, the magistrate judge recommended that Watkins’s
second amended complaint be dismissed. The magistrate judge concluded, in
relevant part, that (1) any retaliation claim based on the July 2015 reprimand was
time-barred; (2) the record contained no evidence that any retaliation within the
actionable time period was causally connected to the 2004 EEOC charge; and
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(3) Watkins’s claim of a retaliatory hostile work environment likewise failed for lack
of proof of causation. The district court agreed and dismissed the action.
On appeal, Watkins does not challenge the specific reasons offered for
dismissing her Title VII claims. Instead, the only argument she presents is that “[b]y
basing its decision on inaccurate facts that were presented by the Magistrate Judge
in the Report and Recommendation, the Court erred in making its ruling to grant the
defendant’s motion to dismiss.”1 Accordingly, we must conclude that, despite the
liberal reading we afford pro se filings, she has abandoned any challenge to the
district court’s reasons for dismissing her claims. Timson v. Sampson,
518 F.3d 870,
874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]ssues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed
abandoned.”).
In support of her sole argument on appeal, Watkins lists 24 allegedly
erroneous citations contained within the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation. For all but two of the alleged errors, Watkins claims that “[t]he
reference cited” by the magistrate judge for a specific factual statement “does not
exist.” As to the other alleged errors, Watkins claims that, contrary to the report and
1
Watkins arguably abandoned any challenge along these lines when she failed to object to
the report and recommendation on this ground before the district court. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (“A
party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report
and recommendation . . . waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for
objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object.”). At best, we would review for
plain error, but the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise.
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recommendation, “John Hankins did not reprimand the Plaintiff nor did the Plaintiff
name[] John Hankins” and that she made “no mention of the result of [her] 2004
EEOC complaint filing.”
Here, the district court did not err by relying on the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation. First, while the report incorrectly identifies Hankins—who
was clearly named in the second amended complaint—as involved in Watkins’s
reprimand, that fact does not alter the conclusion that Watkins failed to establish a
causal connection between any retaliation and her 2004 EEOC charge. Second,
contrary to Watkins’s assertion, she alleged the result of her 2004 EEOC charge on
page 3 of her second amended complaint: “[T]he racial discrimination claim that I
filed in 2004 did not end favorably for me.” Finally, as to the remaining 22 alleged
errors, we have checked each of the disputed citations and find the magistrate judge’s
presentation of Watkins’s factual allegations to be both accurate and thorough. It
appears that Watkins may be confused by the magistrate judge’s citation format. In
citing to “Doc. 25 at 2,” for example, the magistrate judge was referring to page 2 of
Watkins’s second amended complaint, which was the 25th document entered on the
district court’s docket. Likewise, “Doc. 26 at 12” refers to page 12 of ADPH’s
motion to dismiss that complaint, the 26th docket entry. In sum, Watkins has not
shown that the district court erred in dismissing her lawsuit.
AFFIRMED.
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