Case: 19-12581 Date Filed: 11/04/2019 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-12581
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-03043-TWT
DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS,
as trustee for Fifteen Piedmont Center,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER M. HUNT, SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(November 4, 2019)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 19-12581 Date Filed: 11/04/2019 Page: 2 of 3
I.
Deutsche Bank filed a dispossessory proceeding against Christopher M.
Hunt Sr., a Georgia state resident, in Georgia state court. The state court granted
Deutsche Bank a writ of possession. Rather than post the supersedeas bond
required by the superior court to appeal that ruling, Hunt removed the
dispossessory action to federal court. He sought a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”) against the state court’s ruling. The District Court denied the TRO, and
Hunt appealed that interlocutory ruling. We affirm.
II.
We must first determine whether we have appellate jurisdiction over this
case. We conclude that we do.
The denial of a preliminary injunction is an appealable interlocutory order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). In contrast, ordinarily, the denial of a TRO is not
appealable. See AT&T Broadband v. Tech Commc’ns, Inc.,
381 F.3d 1309, 1314
(11th Cir. 2004). However, in certain circumstances, we treat the denial of a TRO
as the denial of a preliminary injunction, and therefore we have jurisdiction to
review the interlocutory order. AT&T Broadband,
381 F.3d at 1314. We may
review a TRO if three conditions are satisfied: “(1) the duration of the relief sought
. . . exceeds that allowed by a TRO (ten days), (2) the notice and hearing sought . .
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. suggest that the relief sought was a preliminary injunction, and (3) the requested
relief seeks to change the status quo.”
Id.
Here, appellate jurisdiction exists to review the TRO because it is
sufficiently similar to a preliminary injunction. Specifically, (1) the duration of the
relief Hunt sought would have exceeded ten days, (2) the notice referred to a
preliminary injunction and alleged irreparable harm—the dispossession would be
catastrophic for Hunt’s home-based business, and (3) the relief sought would have
changed the status quo, namely the right to possession of Hunt’s home.
Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
III.
We next must consider whether the District Court properly concluded that
Hunt was not entitled to the TRO that he sought. We conclude that it did.
Hunt is a resident of Georgia and Deutsche Bank brought an action in a
Georgia state court against him. Therefore, Hunt’s removal of the action to federal
court was improper.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (a defendant in a diversity case cannot
remove the case to federal court if any defendant is “a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought”). As such, the District Court properly held that he was not
entitled to any relief in federal court.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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