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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-11583
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cv-00932-VMC-AAS
DAVID EVERETT JONES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(May 31, 2019)
Before TJOFLAT, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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David Everett Jones, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254, on the grounds that it was untimely. On appeal, Jones argues that
his motion to correct his sentence under Fla. R. Crim Pro. 3.801 resulted in a new
judgment sufficient to trigger a new one-year limitations period for filing his
§ 2254 petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
We “review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas petition as
untimely.” Chavers v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
468 F.3d 1273, 1274 (11th Cir.
2006).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28
U.S.C. § 2254 petitions are governed by a one-year statute of limitations that
begins to run on the latest of four triggering events:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created
by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such
State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). To determine whether a petition was timely filed within
one year after the conviction became final, the court must determine: (1) when the
prisoner filed the federal collateral petition, and (2) when the prisoner’s judgment
of conviction became final. Adams v. United States,
173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th
Cir. 1999). The one-year federal limitation period is statutorily tolled during times
in which a properly filed application for state post-conviction relief is pending. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). State post-conviction proceedings filed after the expiration of
the AEDPA’s limitation period do not toll or reset the limitation period. Sibley v.
Culliver,
377 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004).
For purposes of determining timeliness under AEDPA, there is one
judgment, comprised of both the underlying conviction and the most recent
sentence authorizing the petitioner’s detention. Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr.,
755 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014). Because the AEDPA’s limitation
provisions focus on the judgment holding the petitioner in confinement, a
resentencing will result in a “new judgment” that effectively restarts the limitation
period.
Id.
However, not all changes to a sentence render an order a “new judgment.”
Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
849 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2017) (en
banc). In determining whether a new judgment has been entered, the relevant
question is whether the judgment authorizes the petitioner’s confinement, rather
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than the magnitude of change in the sentence.
Id. at 1326-27. In Patterson, we
held that the petitioner’s original judgment of conviction and sentence of life
imprisonment plus chemical castration was the only judgment allowing the Florida
Department of Corrections to imprison him, and that the subsequent order granting
his motion to correct his sentence to remove the requirement that he undergo
chemical castration was not a new judgment because it imposed no sentence and
gave the Department no authority.
Id. at 1326. We explained that the subsequent
order was not transformed into a judgment authorizing the petitioner’s custody
merely due to the fact that the Department of Corrections would have to read both
orders together to determine the scope of his confinement.
Id.
The district court properly dismissed Jones’s § 2254 petition as untimely.
The granting of Jones’s Rule 3.801 motion did not result in a new judgment
sufficient to trigger a new limitations period because the trial court’s order did not
authorize Jones’s confinement, but instead corrected a clerical error regarding the
amount of time-served credit owed to him. See
Patterson, 849 F.3d at 1326.
Specifically, the trial court never entered a new judgment or order that authorized
Jones’s confinement after it granted his Rule 3.801 motion. Instead, it amended
the incorrect portion of the original judgment to reflect the correct credit for time-
served calculation, but the portion of the judgment authorizing Jones’s
confinement for two life sentences remained unchanged. Additionally, the trial
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court issued a form to the Florida Department of Corrections, directing it to adjust
its records to reflect the new credit for time-served calculation, but that form, like
the amendment to the judgment, also did not authorize Jones’s confinement. Thus,
the only judgment that authorized Jones’s confinement was the original judgment
entered when he was convicted in 2011. See
Patterson, 849 F.3d at 1326.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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