Simp McCorvey v. Jack B. Weaver ( 2015 )

Case: 15-10470 Date Filed: 10/02/2015 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-10470
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-00377-WS-C
SIMP MCCORVEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JACK B. WEAVER,
LESTON STALLWORTH,
RODERICK MCCORVEY, III,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(October 2, 2015)
Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Simp McCorvey, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his complaint filed against Roderick McCorvey, Leston Stallworth, and Judge Jack
Weaver (collectively, Appellees). On appeal, McCorvey argues that the district
court erred in granting Judge Weaver judicial immunity and in holding that the
Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine precluded its review as to all three Appellees.
However, after consideration of the arguments and upon review of the record on
appeal, we affirm the district court.
McCorvey avers that the district court erred in holding that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine precluded its review because he was prevented from attending
the state-court hearing, the state-court ruling was not a final judgment on the
merits, he did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claims in state
court, and his federal issues were not inextricably intertwined with the state-court
judgment. We review a district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine de novo. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1069–70 (11th
Cir. 2013). The doctrine precludes jurisdiction in “‘cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.’” Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262
1
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S.
413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983), and provides that, as a general matter, federal district courts lack
jurisdiction to review a final state court decision.
2
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(11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521–22 (2005)). It applies when the issues presented
to the district court are “inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment so
that (1) the success of the federal claim would effectively nullify the state court
judgment, or that (2) the federal claim would succeed only to the extent that the
state court wrongly decided the issues.” Id. at 1262–63 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, the district court correctly dismissed McCorvey’s complaint as to all
three Appellees because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. McCorvey was a “state-
court loser,” requesting that the federal court review and reject the state-court
order, which was rendered before the federal proceedings commenced. See id. at
1264. Further, despite what McCorvey argues, he was not prevented from
attending the state-court hearing, as he admits that he was told on September 3 that
trial was set for September 11; the state-court ruling was a final judgment on the
merits regardless of whether he was present; and he had the opportunity to raise his
claims in state court, as evidenced by the numerous motions that he filed therein.
Finally, his federal issues were inextricably intertwined with the state-court
judgment, as he was asking that the district court rescind the state order, which
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would “effectively nullify the state court judgment.”2 See id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
For the reasons stated above, the district court’s dismissal of McCorvey’s
complaint is AFFIRMED.
2
The district court correctly dismissed McCorvey’s complaint as to Judge Weaver for an
additional reason—Judge Weaver was entitled to absolute judicial immunity because he did not
act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, and his actions were made while acting in his judicial
capacity. See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
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