Ralph J. Penley v. Donald F. Eslinger ( 2010 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 3, 2010
No. 09-13092
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00310-CV-ORL-31-KRS
RALPH J. PENLEY,
DONNA PENLEY,
as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of
Christopher David Penley, Deceased; and as natural
parents of Christopher David Penley,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
DONALD F. ESLINGER,
as Sheriff of Seminole County,
MICHAEL W. WEIPPERT,
individually,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(May 3, 2010)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, MARTIN and COX, Circuit Judges.
MARTIN, Circuit Judge:
Christopher David Penley, a fifteen-year-old boy, modified a plastic air
pistol to look like a real weapon and brought it to school. School officials called
the police and, during the ensuing standoff, Lieutenant Michael W. Weippert fired
a single shot, striking Mr. Penley in the head. The wound proved fatal. Ralph J.
Penley and Donna Penley, acting as personal representatives of their son’s estate,
filed suit, seeking relief under both federal and state law. They alleged that under
the circumstances lethal force was unnecessary and excessive, and, therefore, that
Lieutenant Weippert had deprived their son of his Fourth Amendment rights. The
district court disagreed, finding Lieutenant Weippert’s decision reasonable and
granting Lieutenant Weippert and his co-defendant, Sheriff Donald F. Eslinger,
summary judgment.
The loss of such a young life is an undeniable tragedy. However, with their
suit, the Penleys ask us to conduct precisely the sort of 20/20 hindsight inquiry
against which the Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly cautioned. We
therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
2
I.
On January 13, 2006, Mr. Penley, a fifteen-year-old student at Milwee
Middle School, brought a pistol to campus. Eventually his teacher learned that he
was armed, and, as students fled from the classroom, Mr. Penley briefly held
hostage at least one classmate. By the time police officers arrived, that student had
escaped and Mr. Penley had left the classroom, making his way through campus.
When an officer of the Seminole County Sheriff’s Office confronted Mr.
Penley, commanding that he drop his weapon, the boy held the gun under his own
chin, responded that he was going to die one way or another, and “slithered” into a
bathroom. The bathroom had only one entrance, an overhead, roll up style door
which remained open throughout the standoff that followed.
As police began to arrive on the scene, Sheriff’s Deputy Christopher
Maiorano took up a position approximately sixty-five feet from the entrance to the
bathroom. He attempted to communicate with Mr. Penley, but was only able to
elicit the boy’s name. Mr. Penley walked back and forth from one side of the
bathroom to the other, pointing his weapon alternately in Deputy Maiorano’s
direction and at his own chin. In an effort to get Mr. Penley to drop his weapon,
Deputy Maiorano holstered his own and showed Mr. Penley his hands. Instead of
dropping the weapon, Mr. Penley pointed his gun directly at the officer. In his
3
deposition, Deputy Maiorano testified: “When he did that, I hugged the wall. I
didn’t want to get shot. [I] [g]rabbed back for my weapon. At that point I never
put my weapon back in the holster.” In a sworn statement, Deputy Maiorano also
acknowledged that “when [Mr. Penley] drew down on me . . . I was scared,
noticeably scared.” Operating under the belief that the weapon was real, Deputy
Maiorano announced “to everyone on scene” that Mr. Penley was wielding a large
semiautomatic pistol.
Meanwhile, Sergeant Kevin Brubaker, a trained hostage negotiator, took up
a position in front of the bathroom door. Sergeant Brubaker was still negotiating
with the boy when Lieutenant Weippert fired the fatal shot. But, because Sergeant
Brubaker had slid into a safer position, he was unable to see Mr. Penley at the
moment the fatal shot was fired. Over the course of the negotiation, Mr. Penley
had only once responded to Sergeant Brubaker’s questions—revealing his name
and age—and had refused to comply with the sergeant’s repeated requests that he
put down the gun. Sergeant Brubaker testified that not once during the negotiation
did Mr. Penley point his weapon at the sergeant, nor did the sergeant feel
threatened by the boy.
Lieutenant Weippert, a member of the SWAT team since 1989 and firearm
use and defensive tactics instructor at Seminole Community College, was called to
4
the scene. Shortly after arriving, he moved to assist Deputy Maiorano. Armed
with a scoped semiautomatic rifle, Lieutenant Weippert observed Mr. Penley as the
boy moved across the frame of the open bathroom door three times. Each time,
Mr. Penley aimed his gun at Lieutenant Weippert and Deputy Maiorano.
On Mr. Penley’s third pass, Lieutenant Weippert “began to conclude” that
the boy posed a danger to the lieutenant himself, “to others and to the children that
were exposed to that open area.” At approximately 10:20 a.m., Mr. Penley began
to make another lateral pass across the threshold of the open door, pointing his gun
at Lieutenant Weippert and Deputy Maiorano. Serving as spotter, Deputy
Maiorano gave a signal and Lieutenant Weippert fired a single shot, striking Mr.
Penley in the head. It was not until after the shot was fired that police entered the
bathroom and discovered that the gun was not real. Mr. Penley died two days later.
According to Lieutenant Weippert, during the incident, he was concerned
not only with assisting Deputy Maiorano, who was under the lieutenant’s
protection, but also with assuring the safety of the children whom he believed
occupied the surrounding classrooms. For instance, the bathroom was adjacent to a
portable classroom. This classroom, though occupied by children for at least a
portion of the standoff, was at some point evacuated. However, as Lieutenant
Weippert made his way to Deputy Maiorano, he was under the impression that
5
there were children in the room and believed that they had been instructed to stay
in that room. Once he was situated beside Deputy Maiorano, his concern turned to
children in rooms with exposed windows. The presence of children in at least
some of the surrounding buildings is corroborated by the sworn statement of
Sergeant Thomas Johnson of the Seminole County Sheriff’s Office. Sergeant
Johnson, who was positioned above the bathroom during the standoff, saw children
moving about behind the windows of several classrooms located to the rear of the
officers. He saw these students lifting up the window blinds and peering out.
Sergeant Johnson also observed the silhouette of a person behind the glass doors of
another classroom.
Following the death of their son, the Penleys filed a Complaint in the Circuit
Court of Seminole County, Florida, which Defendants Sheriff Eslinger and
Lieutenant Weippert removed to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida. With their Amended Complaint, the Penleys sought relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Florida Wrongful Death Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 768.16–.26. They
allege that Lieutenant Weippert used excessive force when he shot Mr. Penley,
depriving the boy of his Fourth Amendment rights. Meanwhile, they claim that
Sheriff Eslinger, and through him Seminole County, caused Mr. Penley’s Fourth
Amendment deprivation by promulgating a use of force policy that allowed
6
officers to use deadly force without giving a warning. Furthermore, they argue that
Sheriff Eslinger, as Lieutenant Weippert’s employer, should be found liable under
Florida law for his employee’s tortious conduct.
Sheriff Eslinger and Lieutenant Weippert filed separate motions for
summary judgment. The district court granted both, holding that Lieutenant
Weippert had not violated the Fourth Amendment and was not liable under state
law. The Penleys appeal, insisting that genuine issues of material fact preclude
resolution of their claims at this stage.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment and apply
the same legal standards that governed the district court’s analysis. Capone v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 592 F.3d 1189, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010).
Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the pleadings, the discovery
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). In determining the relevant set of facts at the
summary judgment stage, we must view all evidence and make any “reasonable
inferences that might be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.” Rine v. Imagitas, Inc., 590 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th Cir. 2009).
7
However, we draw these inferences only “to the extent supportable by the record.”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 n.8 (2007) (emphasis
omitted). Thus, the requirement to view the facts in the nonmoving party’s favor
extends to genuine disputes over material facts and not where all that exists is
“some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). In other
words, once a moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), “the
non-moving party must produce substantial evidence in order to defeat a motion
for summary judgment.” Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir.
2009). A dispute over a fact will only preclude summary judgment if the dispute
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). A court
must deny summary judgment “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.In the context of qualified immunity analysis, the Supreme Court has
cautioned that if a court were “to deny summary judgment any time a material
issue of fact remains on the excessive force claim,” it might “undermine the goal of
qualified immunity to ‘avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the
resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.’” Saucier v. Katz,
8
533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982)), abrogated in part by Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). With this in mind, we have
explained:
When a district court considers the record in [the light most favorable
to the party asserting the injury], it eliminates all issues of fact. By
approaching the record in this way, the court has the plaintiff’s best
case before it. With the plaintiff’s best case in hand, the court is able
to move to the question of whether the defendant committed the
constitutional violation alleged in the complaint without having to
assess any facts in dispute. Thus, because material issues of disputed
fact are not a factor in the court’s analysis of qualified immunity and
cannot foreclose the grant or denial of summary judgment based on
qualified immunity[,] we decline to entertain [a plaintiff’s] arguments
concerning the allegedly disputed facts.
Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005). In other words,
“[a]t the summary judgment stage, . . . once we have determined the relevant set of
facts and drawn all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent
supportable by the record, the reasonableness of [the officer’s] actions . . . is a pure
question of law.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8, 127 S. Ct. at 1776 n.8 (citations
omitted).
9
III.
The Penleys argue that Lieutenant Weippert used excessive force when he
shot Mr. Penley, depriving the boy of a clearly established constitutional right.
Therefore, they contend that they are entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
They also argue that Sheriff Eslinger is liable under § 1983 for implementing and
maintaining a use of force policy that did not require Lieutenant Weippert to warn
Mr. Penley before firing, as they believe Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.
Ct. 1694 (1985), mandates. They then argue that Lieutenant Weippert violated
state law and, because he acted in bad faith and for a malicious purpose, any state
privilege is negated. Finally, they maintain that under Florida law Sheriff Eslinger
is liable as Lieutenant Weippert’s employer.
A.
In civil rights actions brought under § 1983, the doctrine of qualified
immunity “offers complete protection for government officials sued in their
individual capacities if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow, 457
U.S. at 818, 102 S. Ct. at 2738). This Court adopts a multi-step, burden shifting
qualified immunity analysis:
10
In order to receive qualified immunity, the public official must first
prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary
authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. . . . Once the
defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary
authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified
immunity is not appropriate.
Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). In evaluating whether a plaintiff has met his burden,
“[t]he threshold inquiry . . . is whether [the] plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish
a constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736, 122 S. Ct. 2508,
2513 (2002) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S. Ct. at 2156 ).1
The Penleys claim that, when he shot their son, Lieutenant Weippert used
excessive force, in violation of Mr. Penley’s Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizure. See Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197. But, “Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory
stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or
threat thereof to effect it.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865,
1871–72 (1989). However, the level of force applied must not exceed that which a
“‘reasonable officer would believe . . . is necessary in the situation at hand.’”
1
We recognize that we are no longer required to analyze whether Lieutenant Weippert
deprived Mr. Penley of his constitutionally protected rights before asking if those rights were
clearly established. See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818. However, in this case we will follow the
traditional approach.
11
Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lee,
284 F.3d at 1197).
The Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard supplies the
test to determine whether the use of force was excessive. Crenshaw v. Lister, 556
F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, courts must “careful[ly]
balanc[e] . . . the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court has distilled from Supreme Court jurisprudence several factors to aid
our effort to “slosh . . . through the factbound morass of [this] ‘reasonableness’”
analysis. Scott, 550 U.S. at 383, 127 S. Ct. at 1778. We highlight three factors set
out by Graham v. Connor:
The analysis requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances
of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether [the suspect] . . . actively resist[ed]
arrest or attempt[ed] to evade arrest by flight.
Crenshaw, 556 F.3d at 1290 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A
mechanical application of these factors, however, is not appropriate. See Scott,
550 U.S. at 383, 127 S. Ct. at 1777–78. Instead, we must be careful to evaluate the
reasonableness of an officer’s conduct “on a case-by-case basis ‘from the
12
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision
of hindsight.’” Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 1872), modified, 14 F.3d 583(11th Cir. 1994). Further, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]he calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97, 109 S. Ct. at 1872.
Use of deadly force indisputably implicates weighty individual interests.
See Garner, 471 U.S. at 9, 105 S. Ct. at 1700. For over twenty years, Tennessee v.
Garner has guided courts’ Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis where
officers used lethal force. However, the Supreme Court has explicitly cautioned
against an interpretation of Garner as “a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid
preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force.’” Scott, 550
U.S. at 382, 127 S. Ct. at 1777. Instead, “Garner was simply an application of the
Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ test to the use of a particular type of force
in a particular situation.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, as set out in Garner,
the use of deadly force is more likely reasonable if: the suspect poses an
immediate threat of serious physical harm to officers or others; the suspect
13
committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious harm,
such that his being at large represents an inherent risk to the general public; and the
officers either issued a warning or could not feasibly have done so before using
deadly force. See 471 U.S. at 11–12, 105 S. Ct. at 1701. But, once again, none of
these conditions are prerequisites to the lawful application of deadly force by an
officer seizing a suspect. Scott, 550 U.S. at 382, 127 S. Ct. at 1777.
To satisfy the objective reasonableness standard imposed by the Fourth
Amendment, Lieutenant Weippert must establish that the countervailing
government interest was great. See Crenshaw, 556 F.3d at 1290. As noted above,
analysis of this balancing test is governed by (1) the severity of the crime at issue;
(2) whether Mr. Penley posed an immediate threat to the officers or others; and (3)
whether he actively resisted arrest. See id. In this case, the reasonableness
analysis turns on the second of these factors: presence of an imminent threat.
Both the first and third factors weigh in Lieutenant Weippert’s favor.
Bringing a firearm to school, threatening the lives of others, and refusing to
comply with officers’ commands to drop the weapon are undoubtedly serious
crimes. As the Penleys themselves concede, they “have never taken the position
that because the gun turned out to be a toy, the situation was any less serious.” The
third factor favors a finding of reasonableness as well. While the Penleys argue
14
that Mr. Penley did not attempt to run from the bathroom, they do not contest that
their son refused to comply with repeated commands to drop his weapon. Non-
compliance of this sort supports the conclusion that use of deadly force was
reasonable. See Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1168–69 (concluding that refusal to
comply with repeated commands to show one’s hands, to drop a cell phone, and
then to drop the weapon pointed at the suspect’s own head together justified
officers’ “escalation into deadly force”).
Though a closer call, the second factor also supports Lieutenant Weippert’s
argument that he acted reasonably. The government has a weighty interest in
protecting members of the public and police officers from the threat of force. See
id. at 1166. Thus, “[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others,”
use of deadly force does not violate the Constitution. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105
S. Ct. at 1701 (noting that this is the case even where an officer uses deadly force
merely to prevent the suspect’s escape); see also Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259,
1268 (11th Cir. 2003). As this Court has clarified, the second factor can be
reduced to a single question: “whether, given the circumstances, [the suspect]
would have appeared to reasonable police officers to have been gravely
dangerous.” Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1281 (11th Cir. 2002).
15
Mr. Penley demonstrated his dangerous proclivities by bringing to school
what reasonable officers would believe was a real gun. He refused to drop the
weapon when repeatedly commanded to do so. Most importantly, he pointed his
weapon several times at Lieutenant Weippert and Deputy Maiorano. We have held
that a suspect posed a grave danger under less perilous circumstances than those
confronted by Lieutenant Weippert. See, e.g., Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 581
(11th Cir. 2007); Pace, 283 F.3d at 1281.2
2
In Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2002), we found no violation of the
Fourth Amendment when a high speed chase that followed a traffic violation ended with four
police vehicles cornering the suspect’s car in a cul-de-sac. Id. at 1277. The suspect had stopped
his car, which faced the curb, and was still in the vehicle. Id. The officers shouted to get out of
the car, then, “[w]ithin a moment of [the suspect’s] car stopping (at most, a very few seconds),
[one deputy]—from a position in front of [the suspect’s] car—fired two shots . . . through the
front windshield.” Id. at 1278. This Court found that because the suspect drove recklessly,
never left his automobile, and never turned off its engine, reasonable police officers would have
“probable cause to believe that [the car] had become a deadly weapon with which [the suspect]
was armed.” Id. at 1281–82. So, despite the fact that the suspect “did not try to run over the
deputies and that [the suspect], in the cul-de-sac, did not aim the car at the deputies,” id. at 1282,
we concluded that the suspect “would have appeared to reasonable police officers to have been
gravely dangerous,” id. at 1281. This Court decided that use of deadly force was, therefore,
constitutionally permissible.
Mr. Penley’s case is factually analogous to Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158 (11th
Cir. 2009), in which we found no violation of the Fourth Amendment where officers employed
lethal force to seize a suicidal suspect who repeatedly refused to drop his gun and swung the
weapon from his own head in the direction of the officers. Id. at 1168. We held that “[t]he
officers reasonably reacted to what they perceived as an immediate threat of serious harm to
themselves. This [wa]s exactly the type of ‘tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving’ crisis
envisioned by the Supreme Court.” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S. Ct. at 1872).
In fact, we concluded that the use of lethal force would have been reasonable even if the suicidal
man had not pointed his weapon in the officers’ direction. Id. at 1169. We noted that “the fact
that Garczynski did not comply with the officers’ repeated commands to drop his gun justified
the use of deadly force under these particular circumstances.” Id. Similarly, here, Mr. Penley
refused to comply with commands to drop his weapon, was unresponsive to negotiation efforts,
and repeatedly pointed his weapon at police officers.
16
The Penleys’ reliance on Sergeant Brubaker’s statement that he did not feel
threatened is misplaced. The relevant question is whether a reasonable officer in
Lieutenant Weippert’s shoes would have believed that Mr. Penley was gravely
dangerous. As the Penleys themselves emphasize, Graham v. Connor requires an
evaluation of “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them.” 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S. Ct. at
1872. Whether Lieutenant Weippert’s conduct was objectively reasonable must be
evaluated from the perspective of “‘a reasonable officer possessing the same
particularized information as the subject officer.’” Carr, 338 F.3d at 1269 n.19
(quoting McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1994)) (alteration
omitted); see also Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1166–67 (conducting Fourth
Amendment analysis based on information known to the subject officers without
imputing knowledge known to colleagues positioned elsewhere). Sergeant
Brubaker’s perspective was far from identical to that of Lieutenant Weippert.
Uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that Mr. Penley never pointed his weapon
at Sergeant Brubaker. At various times during his negotiations with Mr. Penley,
Sergeant Brubaker lost sight of the weapon and could not see at whom or what Mr.
Penley aimed. In fact, at the moment that Lieutenant Weippert shot Mr. Penley,
the sergeant could not see Mr. Penley at all. Accordingly, Sergeant Brubaker’s
17
subjective lack of fear sheds little light on whether Lieutenant Weippert’s conduct
was objectively reasonable.3
The bulk of the Penleys’ appeal amounts to a challenge to the district court’s
conclusion that no issues of fact preclude summary judgment. However, we find
no error in the district court’s decision that summary judgment was warranted. The
Penleys argue that Lieutenant Weippert knew that the buildings around him had
been evacuated. But, the deposition of Sergeant Vincent Kauffman, the portion of
the record to which the Penleys cite, does not support this contention. Instead it
indicates no more than that one of the nearby classrooms was evacuated. Sergeant
Kauffman’s testimony suggests neither that all surrounding classrooms were
evacuated nor that Lieutenant Weippert was aware of any evacuation.
Furthermore, in a portion of Sergeant Kauffman’s deposition not cited by the
Penleys, he testified that “we had a whole campus full of students. Albeit they’re
in lockdown, some of them were just behind glass.” This testimony does not
contradict Lieutenant Weippert’s own statement that when he moved to join
Deputy Maiorano, there were children—or at least he believed that there were
3
It is worth noting that Deputy Maiorano, the officer in closest proximity to Lieutenant
Weippert, reported in a sworn statement, “from where I was standing, that was a big gun, . . .
when he . . . drew down on me—I’ve been in a lot of situations—I was scared, noticeably
scared.” In fact, he testified that he would have made the same decision as Lieutenant Weippert:
“Based on [Mr. Penley’s] previous mannerisms and behavior towards me and the fear that I felt
that day, I would have shot him myself.”
18
children—in the portable classroom immediately adjacent to the bathroom.
Lieutenant Weippert also testified about his concern for the students located in the
classrooms behind the deputies, whose presence was corroborated by the sworn
statement of Sergeant Johnson. Though factual inferences are made in the
Penleys’ favor, this rule applies only “to the extent supportable by the record,”
Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8, 127 S. Ct. at 1776 n.8, and here the record supports the
district court’s finding that children occupied at least one other classroom behind
Lieutenant Weippert’s position.
Furthermore, even absent the presence of students, Lieutenant Weippert
would have been justified in using deadly force because he had “probable cause to
believe that his own life [was] in peril.” See Robinson, 415 F.3d at 1256. Mr.
Penley was not responding to the negotiator’s questions; he did not comply with
commands to drop his weapon; and he pointed his weapon at Lieutenant Weippert
and Deputy Maiorano. Though the Penleys question Lieutenant Weippert’s
credibility, they offer no evidence to contradict these material facts.4 In fact,
4
The Penleys claim that a jury could find that “the physical evidence is not consistent
with Lt. Weippert’s version [of the event].” They imply, for instance, that Mr. Penley was not
pointing his weapon at Lieutenant Weippert when he was killed, but, instead, was walking away
from the door with his back to the officer.
However, the record does not support the position that Mr. Penley was walking away
from Lieutenant Weippert when he was shot. The deposition and report of the Medical
Examiner, to which the Penleys cite, describe Mr. Penley’s wound, but do not shed light on how
the boy’s head and arms were positioned at the time he was shot. In fact, the wound is not
inconsistent with Lieutenant Weippert’s testimony about the last moments of this tragic standoff.
19
Deputy Maiorano confirmed that Mr. Penley pointed his gun at the officers. In
light of these conditions and his experience as an officer, Lieutenant Weippert
reasonably concluded that Mr. Penley posed an imminent threat, that Lieutenant
Weippert’s “life and certainly those lives around [him] were in danger,” and that he
could not “let [Mr. Penley] shoot . . . first.”5
As set forth above, when examining whether an officer’s use of deadly force
is reasonable, we recognize that “police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S. Ct. at 1872. So, “[w]e are loath to second-guess
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Weippert and Sheriff Eslinger presented an expert report that explained
that the wounds sustained were actually consistent with Mr. Penley’s independent movements.
Furthermore, Deputy Maiorano’s testimony corroborates Lieutenant Weippert’s version of the
story. Consequently, the evidence to which the Penleys cite does not create a fact issue
sufficient to alter our evaluation of Mr. Penley’s posture towards Lieutenant Weippert and
Deputy Maiorano and, therefore, does not preclude summary judgment.
5
The Penleys also contend that because the officers had adequate cover and Mr. Penley
was contained in the bathroom, any threat posed by Mr. Penley was “eliminated or significantly
reduced,” and, therefore, the use of deadly force was unreasonable and excessive.
However, the fact that Mr. Penley was surrounded would not have prevented him from
firing a weapon at Lieutenant Weippert, Deputy Maiorano, other officers, or students behind
windows in neighboring buildings. Even with all possible inferences construed in the Penleys’
favor, the district court correctly concluded that the Penleys failed to demonstrate a genuine
issue of material fact based on the issue of containment and cover. As we have noted in the past,
where officers fear that delaying action would “risk a ‘running gun battle’ with an armed man
who was potentially suicidal,” Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1163, the Constitution does not require
“[t]he officers . . . to wait and see if [the suspect] remained stationary, or rely on . . . surrounding
police officers to deter him should he suddenly become mobile,” id. at 1167. “We think the
police need not have taken that chance and hoped for the best.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 385, 127 S. Ct.
at 1778.
20
the decisions made by police officers in the field.” Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d
1323, 1331 (11th Cir. 2003). At bottom, the Penleys have asked us to question
with 20/20 hindsight vision the field decision of a twenty-year veteran of the police
force. The relevant inquiry remains whether Lieutenant Weippert “had probable
cause to believe that [Mr. Penley] posed a threat of serious physical harm.” See
Robinson, 415 F.3d at 1256. In other words, would Mr. Penley “have appeared to
reasonable police officers to have been gravely dangerous”? See Pace, 283 F.3d at
1281.6 Under the tragic circumstances of this case and in light of this Court’s
6
The Penleys dedicate a significant portion of their briefs to the argument that Garner
mandated Lieutenant Weippert to issue a warning before shooting Mr. Penley. Their argument
fails for several reasons. First, as this Court has noted, “Garner says something about deadly
force but not everything.” Long, 508 F.3d at 580. The Supreme Court has also observed that
“[w]hatever Garner said about the factors that might have justified shooting the suspect in that
case, such ‘preconditions’ have scant applicability to [a] case[] which has vastly different facts.”
Scott, 550 U.S. at 383, 127 S. Ct. at 1777. The facts of this case are readily distinguishable from
those of Garner. As summarized by the Supreme Court,
Garner held that it was unreasonable to kill a “young, slight, and unarmed”
burglary suspect, by shooting him “in the back of the head” while he was running
away on foot, and when the officer “could not reasonably have believed that [the
suspect] . . . posed any threat,” and “never attempted to justify his actions on any
basis other than the need to prevent an escape.”
Id. at 382–83, 127 S. Ct. at 1777 (citations omitted). Unlike in Garner, Lieutenant Weippert had
probable cause to believe the suspect posed a real threat to the lives of officers and others. Mr.
Penley was armed and not fleeing; he repeatedly refused to drop his weapon; and, at the moment
Mr. Penley was shot, evidence demonstrates that he was pointing his weapon at Lieutenant
Weippert.
We have “‘decline[d] . . . to fashion an inflexible rule that, in order to avoid civil
liability, an officer must always warn his suspect before firing—particularly where . . . such a
warning might easily have cost the officer his life.’” Carr, 338 F.3d at 1269 n.19 (quoting
McLenagan, 27 F.3d at 1007) (emphasis omitted). In this case, Mr. Penley had his weapon
trained on Lieutenant Weippert, who believed that the boy was going to fire. Particularly in light
21
binding precedent, we must answer this question in the affirmative. We therefore
hold that Lieutenant Weippert did not violate Mr. Penley’s constitutional rights,
thereby ending our qualified immunity analysis. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121
S. Ct. at 2156.
B.
The Penleys have sued Sheriff Eslinger in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Seminole County.7 “Official-capacity suits . . . generally represent only another
way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105 (1985) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Absent a deprivation of federal rights,
Sheriff Eslinger cannot be liable in his official capacity under § 1983. See
Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1170; Rooney v. Watson, 101 F.3d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir.
1996). Because we hold that Lieutenant Weippert did not deprive Mr. Penley of a
constitutional right, it is unnecessary for us to evaluate the constitutionality of
Sheriff Eslinger’s use of force policy.
of various officers’ repeated commands that Mr. Penley drop his weapon and the fact that the
officers had their own guns pointed at Mr. Penley, Lieutenant Weippert’s failure to explicitly
warn Mr. Penley does not alter our conclusion that the use of lethal force was objectively
reasonable. See id.7
Though they originally brought suit against Sheriff Eslinger both as an individual and in
his official capacity, the Penleys abandoned their claims against the sheriff as an individual and
amended their Complaint accordingly.
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C.
The Penleys brought state law claims against both Lieutenant Weippert and
Sheriff Eslinger, pursuant to Florida’s Wrongful Death Act, Fla. Stat.
§§ 768.16–.26. In its Amended Order, the district court deemed Lieutenant
Weippert’s conduct justifiable in light of the imminent threat posed by Mr. Penley
and noted that the Penleys failed to present any evidence that would negate the
lieutenant’s privilege. It therefore granted summary judgment to Lieutenant
Weippert and Sheriff Eslinger as to the Penleys’ state law claims.
Under Florida law, “[a] person who uses force as permitted in § 776.012 . . .
is justified in using such force and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil
action for the use of such force.” Fla. Stat. § 776.032(1). Section 776.012 of the
Florida Statutes in turn establishes that individuals have no duty to retreat before
using deadly force. Id. § 776.012. However, the statute limits the justifiable use of
deadly force to specific circumstances, such as when the actor “reasonably believes
that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to
himself or herself or another.” Id. § 776.012(1).
As discussed at length above, Lieutenant Weippert’s conduct was
objectively reasonable and he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Penley posed
a threat of great bodily harm to the lieutenant and others. Even when viewed in the
23
light most favorable to the Penleys, the evidence reveals no genuine issues of
material fact as to whether Lieutenant Weippert’s use of force was reasonably
necessary. Under Florida law, Lieutenant Weippert had no duty to retreat and his
use of force was justifiable. See State v. Rivera, 719 So. 2d 335, 337–38 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1998) (holding that after being chased by a car-full of angry men, it would
have been reasonable for Mr. Rivera, a private citizen, to believe that deadly force
was necessary, even if only a single, unarmed pursuer had approached his now-
stopped car, “because [the pursuer] and his friends had already threatened Rivera’s
life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a high-speed chase and
throwing deadly missiles,” namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna); see also
Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 (11th Cir. 2006) (relying on “facts and
reasoning set forth” in Fourth Amendment analysis to evaluate whether, under
Florida law, an officer’s use of force was excessive).8
Because the use of force was justifiable, the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment on the state law claims.
8
Florida law also provides sovereign immunity to law enforcement personnel carrying
out their duties, unless their actions were committed “in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in
a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla.
Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). Ordinarily, “a presumption of good faith attaches to an officer’s use of
force in making a lawful arrest and an officer is liable for damages only where the force used is
clearly excessive.” City of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). The
Penleys have presented no evidence that Lieutenant Weippert’s actions were committed in bad
faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human
rights.
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IV.
Even with all facts viewed in a light favorable to the Penleys, Lieutenant
Weippert’s use of force was objectively reasonable and the Penleys’ claims fail. In
so holding, we do not mean to minimize the tragic nature of this case. However,
no reasonable juror could find that the evidence on record calls into question:
whether Mr. Penley pointed his weapon at Lieutenant Weippert and Deputy
Maiorano; whether Lieutenant Weippert reasonably believed that children
remained in the vicinity of the standoff; or whether Mr. Penley refused to comply
with repeated commands to drop his weapon. Accordingly, Lieutenant Weippert
did not violate either the Constitution or Florida law when he shot Mr. Penley and
the district court properly granted summary judgment.
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.9
9
Defendants have filed a motion to supplement the record on appeal. Their motion is
DENIED as moot.
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