United States v. Barrington George Gillings , 467 F. App'x 872 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-14033 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 22, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cr-00146-JSM-TGW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BARRINGTON GEORGE GILLINGS,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(June 22, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Barrington George Gillings, a previously deported alien, was convicted on a
plea of guilty to reentry of a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and
sentenced to a prison term of 46 months, a term at the low end of the sentence
range prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines. He appeals his sentence, raising
one issue: whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. We
affirm.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct.
586, 591, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). We will set aside a sentence if left with a
“definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence
that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the
case.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation
omitted).
A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court properly
calculated the Guidelines sentence range, treated the Guidelines as advisory,
considered the § 3553(a) factors, did not select a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, and adequately explained the chosen sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at
51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. We find no procedural error in this case. The district court
allowed both parties to present arguments as to the appropriate sentence. The
court stated for the record that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, the
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presentence investigation report, and Gillings’s arguments, including Gillings’s
argument made in support of a downward variance—that he would be in danger if
imprisoned. The court considered that argument in fashioning Gillings’s sentence,
as evidence by its notice to the Bureau of Prisons. As for the § 3553(a) factors,
although the court did not address the factors individually and explicitly on the
record, its explanation for the sentence imposed indicates that it took the factors
appropriately into account.
A sentence is substantively reasonable if it is “sufficient, but not greater
than necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the
need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide
just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public
from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). To
impose a sentence that is substantively reasonable, the court must also consider the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable Guidelines sentence
range, the pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, the
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, and the need to provide restitution
to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
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Given the record before the district court, we conclude that Gillings’s
sentence is substantively reasonable. It was within the Guidelines sentence range,
and, considering Gillings’s extensive criminal history and his prior deportation, a
sentence within that range was needed to promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment, and deter him from further criminal activity.
AFFIRMED.
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