United States v. Arthur Brent Stanley ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15811 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 28, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00037-SPM-AK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ARTHUR BRENT STANLEY,
a.k.a. Stan Yates,
a.k.a. Stanley Yates,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(October 28, 2011)
Before BARKETT, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Arthur Brent Stanley appeals his total 240-month sentence for receipt and
distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) and
(b)(1), and possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). On appeal, Stanley argues that the district court erred in
applying a two-point sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Stanley also argues that the court erred in denying a two-point
sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
I.
We review a district court’s findings of fact under a clear error standard.
United States v. Jordi, 418 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 2005). “For a factual
finding to be clearly erroneous, this court, after reviewing all of the evidence, must
be left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134, 1137 (11th Cir. 2004)(quotation
omitted). The government bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of
the evidence any facts necessary to support a sentence enhancement. United States
v. Askew, 193 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 1999).
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Section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines states that the base offense level is
increased by two points if the defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded, or
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing” of the charged conduct. U.S.S.G.
§ 3C1.1. According to the application notes, this includes instructing another to
destroy or conceal material evidence and providing materially false information to
the court. Id., comment. n.4(D), (F). The comments define “material” as any
evidence, fact, or information that “would tend to influence or affect the issue
under determination.” Id., comment. n.6.
In this case, the government offered sufficient evidence for the court to find
by a preponderance of the evidence that Stanley engaged in multiple instances of
obstructive behavior. Stanley misrepresented himself as “Stanley Yates” after his
arrest, using the false name during his initial appearance and in documents filed
with the court. Stanley also instructed another person to check if his camper had
been searched by the police and to remove items. Lastly, Stanley falsely indicated
on the financial affidavit that he filed with the court that he owned no real estate,
automobiles, or other valuable property.
Alternatively, any error is harmless because the district court sentenced
Stanley below the guideline range and explicitly stated that its resolution of
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Stanley’s objection did not affect the total sentence imposed. Even if both of the
matters addressed on appeal had been resolved in Stanley’s favor, the high-end of
his guideline range would have been 210 months (adjusted offense level 35 and
168-210 months being the amended range). Stanley does not contend that his
sentence was unreasonably severe, and the record does not show that a 30-month
variance would be unreasonable.
II.
We review a district court’s findings of fact under a clear error standard.
United States v. Jordi, 418 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 2005). We have held that,
“[b]ecause demonstration of whether or not the defendant has personally accepted
responsibility for his criminal conduct requires a consideration of both objective
factors and subjective considerations of the defendant's demeanor and sincerity,
the district court's determination will not be overturned unless it is without
foundation.” United States v. Castillo-Valencia, 917 F.2d 494, 500 (11th Cir.
1990). The defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the factual basis for a sentence reduction. United States v. Askew, 193
F.3d 1181, 1183 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999).
Section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines states that the base offense level is
decreased by two points if the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of
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responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G § 3E1.1(a). The application notes explain
that conduct resulting in an obstruction of justice enhancement “ordinarily
indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility.” Id., comment. n.4.
However, there may be “extraordinary cases” in which both adjustments are
appropriate. Id.
In this case, the district court had a rational foundation for denying the
adjustment, particularly in light of the obstruction of justice enhancement. The
court found, both independently and by accepting the factual allegations in the
PSI, that Stanley had engaged in multiple instances of obstructive behavior.
Alternatively, as in Issue One, any possible error is harmless. The district
court discussed both Stanley’s objection to the obstruction of justice enhancement
and his objection to the denial of an acceptance of responsibility reduction as a
single objection. Accordingly, the court’s explicit statement that its resolution of
Stanley’s objection did not affect the total sentence imposed encompassed this
issue as well.
AFFIRMED.
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