Gilmore Estate of Gilmore v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc. ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15480 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 27, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 2:10-cv-00099-JES-SPC
RONALD GILMORE,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of Vera Gilmore,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC.,
LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., OF TENNESSEE,
LEE COUNTY MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC,
agent of Life Care Center of Estero,
Defendants - Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(October 27, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Life Care Centers of America, Inc. (Life Care) appeals the district court’s
denial of its motion to compel arbitration in a nursing home negligence suit
brought by Ronald Gilmore on behalf of the estate of his mother, Vera Gilmore.
Life Care claimed arbitration was required because Vera Gilmore signed a two-
page Voluntary Agreement for Arbitration upon her arrival at the Life Care
facility. Ronald Gilmore asserted that his mother lacked capacity to enter into the
arbitration agreement, and the agreement was therefore void. Following an
evidentiary hearing at which it heard testimony from Ronald Gilmore and accepted
exhibits from both sides, the district court concluded Vera Gilmore lacked the
capacity to enter into the arbitration agreement. The court therefore denied Life
Care’s motion to compel arbitration. Having carefully considered the record and
the briefs, we affirm.
In reviewing a district court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration,
this Court “accepts the district court’s findings of fact that are not clearly
erroneous.” Multi-Financial Secs., Corp. v. King, 386 F.3d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir.
2004).
As the district court explained in its Oct. 7, 2010, order, we look to Florida
contract law to determine whether Vera Gilmore had the capacity to enter into the
arbitration agreement in this case. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
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514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (explaining that courts generally apply ordinary state-
law contract principles in deciding whether the parties have agreed to arbitration).
Under Florida law, a contracting party is presumed competent unless it is shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that the party could not comprehend the nature
and effect of the transaction. Saliba v. James, 196 So. 832, 835 (Fla. 1940). The
testimony of a lay witness may be competent evidence of a party’s capacity, even
when contradicted by medical testimony. In re Estate of Hammerman, 387 So. 2d
409, 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
The evidence presented by the Ronald Gilmore showed that he was not
present when his mother arrived at the Life Care facility and did not participate in
the intake process. One month earlier, however, when Vera Gilmore was admitted
to another facility and asked to sign a similar set of intake paperwork, she was
deemed incapable of making her own healthcare decisions, and Ronald Gilmore
signed the paperwork as her legal representative. An intake evaluation completed
by a nurse upon Vera Gilmore’s arrival at Life Care’s facility shows that the nurse
had originally checked that Ms. Gilmore’s cognitive status was “oriented,” but
then crossed that out. Ronald Gilmore testified that at the time his mother was
admitted to the Life Care facility, she was in and out of lucidity, had
hallucinations, and could not understand anything very complex. She had been
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diagnosed with dementia and prescribed an anti-psychotic medication. Medical
records submitted by the plaintiff indicated that Vera Gilmore had been declining
into a state of dementia for several years. An evaluation by a physician’s assistant
less than two weeks after Vera Gilmore signed the arbitration agreement indicated
that Ms. Gilmore was “distraught, anxious, frail” and suffering dementia. Her
mental status was listed as “oriented to person, confused.”
Life Care, on the other hand, relies on evidence that when a psychologist
interviewed Vera Gilmore six days after her admission to Life Care, he found her
capable of making medical decisions and questioned the need for her anti-
psychotic medication.
Given the facts before the district court, we cannot say the district court
clearly erred in determining that Vera Gilmore lacked capacity to enter into the
arbitration agreement. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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