Campbell v. Secretary for Department of Corrections , 370 F. App'x 5 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-11950 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MARCH 11, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 98-02088-CV-DLG
JAMES BERNARD CAMPBELL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(March 11, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Bernard Campbell, a Florida prisoner serving consecutive life
sentences for murder, attempted murder, and robbery, appeals the district court’s
denial of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) motion, in which he sought relief from a
magistrate judge’s paperless order denying a previous Rule 60(b) motion that
sought to vacate a dismissal of his federal habeas petition. Campbell contends that
his due process rights were violated when the magistrate judge entered a final order
denying his motion, because the magistrate judge only had authority to issue a
report and recommendation for final disposition by the district court.
Campbell is a serial litigant who over the past fifteen years has filed seven
federal habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and has made numerous other
collateral attacks on his 1988 state convictions.1 Because his first habeas petition
was denied on the merits in 1994, each of his later petitions was dismissed as
successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). This Court has repeatedly denied
Campbell’s applications for leave to file successive habeas petitions, which has not
stopped Campbell from filing them anyway. On June 25, 2008, Campbell filed a
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In addition to seven § 2254 petitions, Campbell has kept the district court busy with
three motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(4), one “All Writs Petition,” several
motions to reopen previously dismissed habeas cases, at least one petition for mandamus, and
multiple § 1983 suits against judges on this Court and on the Florida Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, in state court, he has filed at least three petitions for postconviction relief under Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.850, and at least two state habeas petitions. All of these filings raise essentially the
same issue, a challenge to the validity of the warrants that led to his arrest. That issue was
resolved against him on the merits in his direct appeal nearly twenty years ago. See Campbell v.
State, 571 So.2d 415, 417 (Fla. 1990).
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motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(4), asking the district court to
vacate its January 15, 1999 order in which the court had dismissed Campbell’s
second habeas petition as successive. Campbell amended the motion on July 11,
2008. The district court referred Campbell’s amended motion to the magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, and instructed her to “take all necessary and
proper action as required by law.” On September 2, 2008, the magistrate judge
issued a paperless order denying Campbell’s amended motion. On the same day,
Campbell filed a second amended motion asserting essentially the same grounds
for relief. Although Campbell made multiple requests for a written report and
recommendation on his first amended motion, none was provided.
On February 13, 2009, after conducting an independent review of the record,
the district court denied Campbell’s second amended motion on the ground that
“[n]othing in his current pleadings presents a basis for relief.” On March 6, 2009,
Campbell filed a third Rule 60(b)(4) motion, this time arguing that his due process
rights were violated when the magistrate judge issued a final order on his first
amended motion instead of providing a written report and recommendation for
disposition by the district court. The district court treated this motion as a request
for reconsideration of its earlier decision, and denied it. We granted a certificate of
appealability on a single issue: whether the district court erred by referring
Campbell’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to the magistrate judge for a final order.
3
Under Rule 60(b)(4), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or
order if the judgment is void. A judgment is void for Rule 60(b)(4) purposes “if
the rendering court was powerless to enter it.” Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260,
1263 (11th Cir. 2001). Generally, we review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for
an abuse of discretion, but the denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is subject to de
novo review “because the question of the validity of a judgment is a legal one.” Id.(quotation omitted).
The jurisdiction and powers of magistrate judges are set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 636. A district court may instruct a magistrate judge to conduct evidentiary
hearings and submit to the district court “proposed findings of fact and
recommendations” for the disposition of certain motions and applications for
post-trial relief. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); see also Local Rules of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Magistrate Judge Rule
1(e) (permitting magistrate judges to perform all duties of a district court judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but requiring them to submit a report containing
proposed recommendations for disposition by the district court).
The statute also permits a district judge to assign to a magistrate judge, with
or without the consent of the parties, “such additional duties as are not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Id. § 636(b)(3). In Thomas
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v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 1998), we narrowly read the “additional
duties” clause to mean that “where consent is lacking, courts should be reluctant to
construe the additional duties clause to include responsibilities of far greater
importance than the specified duties assigned to magistrates.” Id. at 759 (quotation
omitted) (holding that magistrate judges may not conduct jury selection in a civil
trial without the consent of the litigants). Thus, although consent of the parties is
not an express requirement under § 636(b), when “the matter conducted solely by a
magistrate judge constitutes a critical stage of the criminal proceeding, such as
instructing the jury, the absence of express consent from all parties, particularly the
defendant, mandates reversal.” United States v. Desir, 257 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th
Cir. 2001) (holding that magistrate judge inappropriately exceeded authority at a
critical stage of the proceeding by response to jury question that went beyond
simple performance of a ministerial task).
Under § 636(c), the district court may designate a magistrate judge to
“conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter,” but only “[u]pon
the consent of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). If a magistrate judge exercises
jurisdiction pursuant to § 636(c) without the parties’ consent, the resulting
judgment is not final for purposes of § 1291. McNab v. J & J Marine, Inc., 240
F.3d 1326, 1328 (11th Cir. 2001).
Because Campbell did not consent to the referral, and a decision on the
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merits of his motion was more than a purely ministerial task, the magistrate judge
was authorized only to make a report and recommendation to the district court.
The magistrate judge exceeded her authority in issuing a final order. Although the
district court did not expressly instruct the magistrate judge to issue a final order, it
too erred in refusing to direct her to provide a report and recommendation for its
own disposition.
Nevertheless, the error is of no consequence. The district court conducted
its own review of the record when it denied Campbell’s second amended motion,
which asserted grounds for relief and made arguments essentially identical to those
considered by the magistrate judge in the earlier motion. In effect, the district
court’s decision on Campbell’s second motion ratified and rendered final the
magistrate judge’s order on the first motion. The basis for Campbell’s Rule
60(b)(4) motion was that the district court had improperly dismissed his second
habeas petition as successive because the first petition had not been resolved on the
merits. However, this Court has repeatedly rejected the same argument.2 The
district court did not err in denying Campbell’s motion.
AFFIRMED.
2
In our order of January 23, 2002 denying Campbell’s application for leave to file a
second or successive habeas petition, Case No. 02-10188, we held that because his original 1994
petition was dismissed with prejudice, any subsequent habeas petition would be treated as
successive. We reiterated that holding in our order of January 8, 2004, Case No. 03-16354.
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