Kurt Bowden v. Lincoln County Health System ( 2009 )


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  •                                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-10855                 FEBRUARY 10, 2009
    ________________________            THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 05-02503-CV-5-CLS
    KURT BOWDEN,
    father of Dianna Bowden, a minor, deceased,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    LINCOLN COUNTY HEALTH SYSTEM,
    a Corporation d.b.a. Lincoln Medical Center,
    LINCOLN MEDICAL CENTER EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES,
    CHARLES EAKES,
    an individual,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    _________________________
    (February 10, 2009)
    Before MARCUS, KRAVITCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellants Lincoln County Health System and Charles Eakes (collectively
    “Defendants”) appeal the district court’s order finding that neither the Alabama nor
    the Tennessee statutory cap on a governmental entity’s liability applied where an
    Alabama plaintiff sued a Tennessee county entity and its employee in federal
    district court in Alabama.
    This wrongful death action, based upon the substantive law of the State of
    Alabama, arose out of a collision between an automobile driven by Dianna
    Bowden, a citizen of Alabama, and an ambulance driven by Defendant Charles
    Eakes, an employee of Defendant Lincoln County Health System, a Tennessee
    county governmental entity. The collision occurred in Madison County, Alabama.
    Plaintiff Kurt Bowden — the father and personal representative of Dianna Bowden
    — brought suit against the county entity and the driver. At the conclusion of a trial
    in the district court for the Northern District of Alabama, a jury found Defendants
    liable and awarded Plaintiff $3.1 million dollars.
    Defendants filed a post-judgment motion, asking the court inter alia to
    reduce the jury award to $100,000 in accordance with the statutory damage
    limitations contained in Alabama Code § 11-93-2 or, in the alternative, to $250,000
    in accordance with Tennessee Code § 29-20-403. Both the Alabama and
    Tennessee statutes limit the damages available against a county governmental
    2
    entity. The district court found that Lincoln County Health System is a county
    governmental entity; however, it held that it was not entitled to the benefit of either
    statute because (1) the Alabama statutory cap was not intended to apply to a
    Tennessee governmental entity and (2) the principles of comity should not apply to
    give effect to a Tennessee statute that would limit the damages awarded by the jury
    in this case. Accordingly, the court denied the motion and affirmed the jury award.
    Defendants appeal.1
    We review a lower court’s legal determinations de novo, Estate of Shelfer v.
    Commissioner, 
    86 F.3d 1045
    , 1046 (11th Cir. 1996), and its decisions regarding an
    exercise of comity under an abuse of discretion standard. Belize Telecom, Ltd. v.
    Gov’t of Belize, 
    528 F.3d 1298
    , 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Daewoo Motor Am.,
    Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 
    459 F.3d 1249
    , 1256 (11th Cir. 2006)).
    After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs and having
    received the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the district court did not
    err. Accordingly we AFFIRM for the reasons stated in the district court’s thorough
    and well reasoned opinion.
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    Defendants argue for the first time on appeal that the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as
    well as the principles of comity, requires the application of the Tennessee statutory cap on
    damages. Because this argument was not raised before the district court, we do not consider it.
    Hurley v. Moore, 
    233 F.3d 1295
    , 1297 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Arguments raised for the first time on
    appeal are not properly before this Court.”).
    3
    ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring specially:
    I concur in the result reached by the opinion for our court.
    4