Xia Chen v. U.S. Attorney General , 237 F. App'x 593 ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    JUNE 27, 2007
    No. 06-15294                     THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                    CLERK
    ________________________
    BIA No. A79-400-388
    XIA CHEN,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    _________________________
    (June 27, 2007)
    Before BLACK, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Xia Chen, proceeding pro se, seeks review of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) decision, affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) order
    denying her application for asylum and withholding of removal under the
    Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and relief under the United Nations
    Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment
    or Punishment (“CAT”). We find that we lack jurisdiction to consider Chen’s
    claims of persecution on the basis of China’s family-planning policies, and that
    substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that she was not persecuted for her
    participation in Falun Gong activities. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed in
    part, and denied in part.
    Background
    Chen, a native and citizen of China, arrived in the United States on May 22,
    2001 and requested asylum at the airport. In a sworn statement submitted at the
    airport, she alleged that she had been persecuted on the basis of politics, that
    someone had tried to rape her, and that although she reported the incident, her
    assailant was not punished. Further, she alleged that she left because she was
    afraid that she would be forced to marry someone against her will. At a subsequent
    asylum interview, she explained that she was being threatened by a man named
    Jin-Xing, a powerful businessman with an uncle who worked for the Chinese
    government, because she had refused to marry him. She claimed that he had
    2
    beaten her brother and had attempted to rape her in order to force her to marry him.
    At this second interview, she stated that she had never been detained or arrested for
    any other reason.
    Before the IJ, Chen requested that she be allowed to amend her asylum
    application, in light of the fact that she had a child after filing, and would now be
    subject to China’s one-child policy. The IJ granted her request. She then testified
    that she was from a rural part of Fujian province and that she and her brother were
    practitioners of Falun Gong. She claimed that she and her brother were arrested
    while meditating with other practitioners. At the police station, the chief of police
    demanded that she marry his son, a man named Chen Jian Xing. After she refused,
    both she and her brother were beaten. Chen claimed that she was next detained in
    a small cell, until Chen Jian Xing took her to an interrogation room and attempted
    to rape her. A knock on the door stopped him, and he left, but the chief of police
    later returned and threatened to imprison her and her family if she did not agree to
    marry his son. She agreed and was released from prison. She alleged that she later
    complained to the authorities, but they declined to help her because of Chen Jian
    Xing’s family connections.
    Chen admitted that she had not testified to these facts in her prior interviews.
    However, she claimed that she had not fully understood the questions she was
    3
    asked or why she was being interviewed and had therefore refrained from saying
    too much. She also alleged that she wanted another child and that she feared that
    she would be prevented from having one if she was returned to China.
    The IJ denied Chen’s application, finding that she was not credible because
    there were several inconsistencies in the information she provided Further, the IJ
    concluded that even if she had been credible, she had not established a nexus
    between the alleged events and her Falun Gong membership, as her testimony
    established that the threatening policeman was only interested in obtaining her
    agreement to marry his son. Additionally, the IJ found that Chen was not entitled
    to relief on her family planning persecution claim, since country reports
    established that the one child policy was fairly relaxed in the rural areas in which
    Chen lived. Chen appealed this decision to the BIA, arguing that the IJ’s
    credibility findings were against the weight of the evidence. She claimed that
    discrepancies in her testimony were the result of anxiety, and that she had credibly
    testified that she would be persecuted because of her Falun Gong activties. The
    BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, including his credibility finding. Chen
    now seeks review of this decision.
    Standard of Review
    When the BIA issues a decision, we review only that decision, except to the
    4
    extent the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 
    257 F.3d 1262
    , 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). We review the IJ and the BIA’s legal determinations
    de novo. D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    388 F.3d 814
    , 817 (11th Cir. 2004). The
    IJ’s and BIA’s factual determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence
    test, and we “must affirm the BIA’s decision if it is supported by reasonable,
    substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Al
    
    Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1283-84
    (quotation marks omitted). Likewise, a credibility
    determination is reviewed under the substantial evidence test, and “[we] may not
    substitute [our] judgment for that of the BIA with respect to credibility findings.”
    
    D-Muhumed, 388 F.3d at 818
    .
    Discussion
    To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate a well-
    founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
    in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). To
    qualify for withholding of removal under the INA, an alien must show that it is
    more likely than not that, if returned to her country, her life or freedom would be
    threatened on account of one of the same protected grounds. 8 U.S.C.
    § 1231(b)(3). Thus, an applicant who is unable to meet the standard for asylum is
    also unable to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal.
    5
    Huang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    429 F.3d 1002
    , 1011 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). For
    CAT relief, an applicant must “establish that it is more likely than not that he or
    she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” Reyes-
    Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 
    369 F.3d 1239
    , 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8
    C.F.R. §208.16(c)(2)).
    Before us, Chen argues that the IJ erred in concluding that she was ineligible
    for INA or CAT relief on account of China’s family planning policies. However,
    in her appeal to the BIA, she challenged only the IJ’s credibility finding insofar as
    it related to her Falun Gong persecution claim and did not discuss her separate
    family planning claim. Since this claim was not administratively exhausted, we
    lack jurisdiction to review it and accordingly dismiss the petition on these grounds.
    8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    463 F.3d 1247
    , 1250
    (11th Cir. 2006).
    Next, Chen argues that the IJ’s ruling on her Falun Gong persecution claim
    is not supported by substantial evidence. The IJ based this decision, in part, on his
    conclusion that her testimony was not credible. “[A]n adverse credibility
    determination alone may be sufficient to support the denial of an asylum
    application” when there is no other evidence of persecution. Forgue v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    401 F.3d 1282
    , 1287 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Indications of
    6
    reliable testimony include consistency on direct examination, consistency with the
    written application, and the absence of embellishment as the applicant repeatedly
    recounts his story. Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    440 F.3d 1247
    , 1255 (11th Cir. 2006)
    (per curiam); see also Dalide v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 
    387 F.3d 1335
    , 1343 (11th Cir.
    2004) (affirming the BIA’s adverse credibility determination, which was based
    upon its finding that the applicant’s testimony conflicted with his answers to
    interrogatories, affidavit, deposition, and other documentary evidence).
    Here, there were several material inconsistencies in Chen’s testimony before
    the IJ and her earlier interviews, namely (1) her failure to mention her Falun Gong
    membership prior to the hearing before the IJ; (2) her earlier statement that she had
    never been arrested or detained, as compared to her later assertion that she was
    arrested while meditating; (3) her initial statement that only her brother was beaten,
    and her later testimony that she was beaten as well; and (4) inconsistencies in the
    name of the man who threatened her and his relationship with government
    officials. As such, there is substantial evidence supporting the IJ’s adverse
    credibility finding. Further, although Chen presented country reports documenting
    the treatment of Falun Gong members generally, she presented no evidence beyond
    her incredible testimony that she was persecuted. See 
    Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287
    (noting that an adverse credibility determination does not alleviate the IJ’s duty to
    7
    consider other evidence produced by the asylum applicant). Thus, we cannot say
    that the IJ erred in finding that Chen failed to demonstrate eligibility for INA or
    CAT relief. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition in part, and deny the petition in
    part.
    PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART
    8