United States v. Sedrick Lavon Towells ( 2012 )


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  •            Case: 11-10288   Date Filed: 07/27/2012   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 11-10288
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 4:10-cr-00140-LSC-TMP-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    SEDRICK LAVON TOWELLS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (July 27, 2012)
    Before HULL, KRAVITCH and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 11-10288     Date Filed: 07/27/2012    Page: 2 of 5
    After a guilty plea, Sedrick Lavon Towells appeals his 120-month sentence
    for possession of five grams or more of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). After review, we conclude that
    Towells’s sentence is directly impacted by Dorsey v. United States, __ U.S. __, __
    S. Ct. __, Nos. 11-5683, 11-5721 (U.S. June 21, 2012), and that Towells preserved
    the Dorsey issue in the district court and in this direct appeal. Therefore, we
    vacate Towells’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On November 1, 2009, police in Gadsden, Alabama, observed Defendant
    Towells leave his vehicle, enter another car, and exit that car to go to a nearby
    house. Police ordered Towells to stop and observed Towells throw a clear plastic
    bag over a house as he walked away. Police recovered the plastic bag, which
    appeared to contain crack cocaine, and arrested Towells.
    Forensic analysis showed that the plastic bag contained 20.36 grams of
    crack cocaine. On September 29, 2010, Towells pled guilty to one count of
    possessing five grams or more of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).
    A. Presentence Investigation Report
    Towells’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”) assigned a base offense
    2
    Case: 11-10288        Date Filed: 07/27/2012       Page: 3 of 5
    level of 22 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(9). The PSI recommended a two-
    level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a one-level reduction for
    providing complete information about his involvement in the offense or timely
    notifying authorities of his intent to plead guilty, which together resulted in a total
    adjusted offense level of 19. The PSI assigned Towells a criminal history category
    of III, which yielded an advisory guidelines range of 37 to 46 months’
    imprisonment.
    Prior to Towells’s plea, the government filed a notice claiming that Towells
    had been convicted of a felony “Violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances
    Act.”1 The government alleged that this crime was a “prior conviction for a drug
    felony offense” under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B) that triggered that statute’s 10-
    year mandatory minimum sentence for persons convicted of possessing five grams
    or more of crack cocaine.2 Accordingly, the statutory mandatory minimum
    sentence of 10 years became Towells’s guidelines sentence. See U.S.S.G.
    1
    The government’s notice did not specify which provision of the Georgia Code Towells
    violated, but documents attached to the government’s notice showed that Towells pled guilty in
    1997 to one count of violating Georgia Code § 16-13-30(a), which provides, “Except as
    authorized by this title, it is unlawful for any person to purchase, possess, or have under his
    control any controlled substance.” Under Georgia Code § 16-13-30(g), “Any person who
    violates subsection (a) of this Code section with respect to a controlled substance in Schedule III,
    IV, or V shall be guilty of a felony . . . .”
    2
    
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B) stated that “[i]f any person commits such a violation [of
    § 841(a)] after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be
    sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years . . . .”
    3
    Case: 11-10288     Date Filed: 07/27/2012   Page: 4 of 5
    § 5G1.1(b) (“Where the statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the
    maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum
    sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”).
    B. Fair Sentencing Act Objection
    Towells did not object to any of the facts alleged in the PSI, including his
    prior Georgia felony drug conviction. At his January 2011 sentencing hearing,
    Towells argued that the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) applied to his sentence.
    Towells committed this federal crime in November 2009, before the FSA was
    enacted, on August 3, 2010. Towells argued that the FSA still applied.
    The FSA raised from five to 28 grams the threshold amount of crack
    cocaine necessary to trigger the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence under
    § 841(b)(1)(B). Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220 § 2(a), 
    124 Stat. 2372
     (2010). Towells pled guilty to possessing only 20.36 grams of crack
    cocaine. Thus, if the FSA applied, Towells would not be subject to the 10-year
    mandatory minimum sentence. Rather, Towells would be subject to his advisory
    guidelines range of 27 to 46 months’ imprisonment.
    The district court declined to apply the FSA-amended penalty provisions
    and sentenced Towells to 120 months’ imprisonment. The United States Supreme
    Court recently held that the FSA’s “more lenient penalty provisions apply to
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    Case: 11-10288    Date Filed: 07/27/2012   Page: 5 of 5
    offenders who committed a crack cocaine crime before August 3, 2010, but were
    not sentenced until after August 3.” Dorsey v. United States, __ U.S. __, __ S. Ct.
    __, Nos. 11-5683, 11-5721, slip. op. at 2 (U.S. June 21, 2012). We therefore
    vacate Towells’s sentence and remand for the limited purpose of resentencing in
    light of Dorsey.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-10288

Judges: Hull, Kravitch, Edmondson

Filed Date: 7/27/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024