United States v. Libardo Estupinan-Estupinan , 244 F. App'x 308 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 27, 2007
No. 06-13839 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00035-CR-T-26-TGW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LIBARDO ESTUPINAN-ESTUPINAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(July 27, 2007)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Libardo Estupinan-Estupinan appeals his conviction for conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of The Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 App. U.S.C. § 1903(a), (g), (j), and 21 U.S.C.
§ 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). He asserts two arguments on appeal, which we address in turn.
I.
Estupinan-Estupinan first contends the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over him because neither he nor his crime had a proven connection to
the United States, and it offends “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice” to allow an exercise of jurisdiction over him under these circumstances.
“A defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional
challenges to the constitutionality of the conviction, and only an attack on the
voluntary and knowing nature of the plea can be sustained.” Wilson v. United
States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992). However, to the extent that Estupinan-
Estupinan’s challenge is to the district court’s jurisdiction over him, we review his
argument de novo. See United States v. Perez, 956 F.2d 1098, 1101 (11th Cir.
1992).
We have considered and rejected the argument that, because no “nexus” was
proven between a defendant–a Colombian national who was apprehended on a “go
fast” boat in the Pacific Ocean and indicted under the MDLEA–and the United
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States, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant. See United States
v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003). “[U]nder the protective principle
of international law, [Congress] may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over vessels
in the high seas that are engaged in conduct that has a potentially adverse effect
and is generally recognized as a crime by nations that have reasonably developed
legal systems.” Id. (quotations omitted). Furthermore, we emphasized that we,
along with other Circuits, have rejected the argument that a “nexus” to the United
States is a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction under the MDLEA. Id.Because we have rejected the argument that a district court lacks jurisdiction over a
foreign national indicted under the MDLEA for transportation of drugs in
international waters, Estupinan-Estupinan’s argument fails.
II.
Next, Estupinan-Estupinan contends the MDLEA is unconstitutional
because it is an ultra vires exercise of Congress’ power under Article I, § 8, cl. 10
of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “define and punish Piracies
and Felonies on the high seas.” We have held the MDLEA does not exceed
Congress’ law-making authority, noting that the “Piracies and Felonies” Clause of
the Constitution empowers Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies
on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations,” and the MDLEA was
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designed to “punish drug trafficking on the high seas, because drug trafficking
aboard vessels (1) is a serious international problem and is universally condemned,
and (2) presents a specific threat to the security and societal well-being of the
United States.” United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1486 (2007) (quotations omitted). Because we have
previously held the MDLEA does not exceed Congress’ law-making authority, this
argument also fails. Thus, we affirm Estipinan-Estupinan’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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