Shawanda Murry v. Attorney General USA , 233 F. App'x 911 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 14, 2007
No. 06-15764 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00498-CV-OC-10-GRJ
SHAWANDA MURRY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ATTORNEY GENERAL, USA,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(May 14, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The district court granted the Attorney General summary judgment in
Shawanda Murray’s suit for retaliation brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The
claim is that prison officials retaliated against Murray after she filed an Equal
Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint. She had previously received
“Outstanding” employee evaluations, but after she filed the EEO complaint, her
evaluations were lower. In addition, she was temporarily transferred from her
position – as cook supervisor at the low security facility of the Federal Correctional
Complex at Coleman, Florida – to the institution warehouse. She was also
required to submit to psychological and physical fitness-for-duty examinations.
Title VII prohibits discrimination with respect to an employee’s
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a). Title VII’s retaliation provisions also protect certain kinds of
activity. EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000).
Under the “opposition clause,” an employer may not retaliate against an employee
because the employee “has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Similarly, under the
“participation clause,” an employer may not retaliate against an employee because
the employee “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” Id.
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“[T]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff
must prove the following elements: (1) she participated in an activity protected by
Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal
connection between the participation in the protected activity and the adverse
employment decision.” Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th
Cir. 2000). A plaintiff can show participation in a protected activity by
demonstrating that she had a subjective, good-faith belief that her employer was
engaged in unlawful employment practices and that her belief was objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and record presented. Little v. United Techs.,
Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997).
“To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that the decision-
makers were aware of the protected conduct, and that the protected activity and the
adverse action were not wholly unrelated.” Gupta, 212 F.3d at 590 (internal
citation omitted). “Discrimination is about actual knowledge, and real intent, not
constructive knowledge and assumed intent. When evaluating a charge of
employment discrimination, then, we must focus on the actual knowledge and
actions of the decision-maker.” Walker v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286
F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to
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rebut the presumption of retaliation by producing legitimate reasons for the adverse
employment action. Sullivan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1059
(11th Cir. 1999). If the employer offers legitimate reasons, the presumption of
retaliation disappears. Id. The plaintiff must then show that the employer’s
proffered reasons for taking the adverse action were actually a pretext for
prohibited retaliatory conduct. Id.The district court committed no error in granting summary judgment
because Murry did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Only her
temporary transfer to the institutional warehouse and compulsory fitness-for-duty
examinations arguably constituted adverse employment actions. However, she did
not establish a causal connection between the filing of her initial EEO complaint
and the adverse employment actions. Moreover, the Attorney General established
legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for her transfer and fitness-for-duty
examinations. Based on Murry’s outbursts and in light of her statements regarding
her brain tumor, the warden was legitimately concerned that she could no longer
perform her job duties. Murry failed to offer any evidence to show that the
Attorney General’s stated reasons were pretextual.
AFFIRMED.
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