Billy Woods v. Central Fellowship Christian Academy ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-11642
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-03999-JEC
BILLY WOODS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CENTRAL FELLOWSHIP CHRISTIAN ACADEMY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(November 26, 2013)
Before HULL, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Plaintiff-appellant Billy Woods, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Central
Fellowship Christian Academy in his race-based employment discrimination suit
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
After review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
We begin by setting forth the relevant background facts. We base our
description of the facts on the undisputed evidence in the record when the district
court ruled.
A. Woods’s Employment with Central Fellowship Christian Academy
Defendant Central Fellowship Christian Academy (“CFCA”) is a private
Christian school located in Macon, Georgia, and is affiliated with the Central
Fellowship Baptist Church, also in Macon.
Plaintiff Woods, a black male, is a licensed educator in Georgia, holding a
Bachelor of Arts degree in Biology from Talladega College and a Master of
Divinity degree from Boston University. From 1995 until 2009, Woods worked
intermittently as a teacher in Atlanta-area public schools. On May 31, 2009,
plaintiff Woods submitted an application to CFCA for a position as a “Science
Teacher.”
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CFCA decided to hire Woods, and, a few days later, Woods and CFCA
entered into a written employment contract. The contract provided that Woods’s
employment would last one year from August 1, 2009 until July 31, 2010, during
which time, Woods would receive an annual salary of $30,921.00.
In the employment contract, CFCA agreed not to terminate Woods “without
providing reasonable and adequate grounds for dismissal . . . based on
incompetence and/or fitness to perform assigned duties and/or failure to uphold
standards, rules, and regulations.” However, there was an exception to this
provision authorizing CFCA to terminate Woods “in situations[] which [CFCA]
deems to be a financial emergency for [CFCA].”
Woods began his employment as the contract provided. During the 2009-
2010 school year, Woods taught: (1) one class of anatomy; (2) one class of
physics; (3) one class of Bible; and (4) two classes of physical science. He also
supervised a session of athletic study hall.
Woods joined a staff of 64 employees for the 2009-2010 school year.
Woods was the only black employee that year. The staff’s only other minorities
were a Hispanic high school teacher (in the foreign language department) and an
Asian high school teacher (like Woods, in the science department).
B. CFCA’s Declining Enrollment and the 2009 Layoffs
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When CFCA hired Woods, the school was losing students. During the
2005-2006 school year, CFCA’s student population was 445. By the 2008-2009
school year, that number had dropped to 380, with the figure having shrunk each
year.
As a result, CFCA encountered financial troubles. In December 2008,
CFCA’s Board of Directors (the “Board”) learned that the school faced a “[b]udget
[d]eficit” that was “getting larger due to a decrease in enrollment.” At that
meeting, the Board voted to implement “[s]taff [c]uts to achieve approximately
$10,000 monthly expenses reduction.”
Accordingly, in January 2009, CFCA laid-off ten employees because “low
enrollment made it impossible to carry [the school’s] large staff.” Of the
employees laid-off at that time, six were teachers. One of those six teachers had 39
years’ experience, one had 38 years’ experience, one had 17 years’ experience, one
had 10 years’ experience, and two had less than 3 years’ experience. In January
2009, the Board also terminated the school’s Administrator, who had 24 years’
experience and was receiving an annual salary of $73,806.00. Each of the ten
employees laid-off in January 2009 was white.
C. CFCA’s Financial Difficulties During the 2009-2010 School Year
The school’s cash flow struggles persisted into the next school year. For the
2009-2010 school year, CFCA expected to have an enrollment of 380 students, and
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it budgeted accordingly. However, only 330 students enrolled. As a result, the
school encountered a budget shortfall of $25,000 per month. During the first part
of the year, CFCA met its expenses by reducing spending on equipment, utilities,
supplies, and materials.
By December 2009, CFCA was no longer able to extract savings from its
operating budget. On December 9, 2009, the Board decided to reduce all
employees’ salaries by ten percent, hoping to achieve savings of $10,459 per
month.
D. 2010 Layoffs of Plaintiff Woods and Other CFCA Employees
This measure did not fix the budget problems. Thus, on March 31, 2010, the
Board of Directors considered additional money-saving measures, specifically,
laying-off more staff members. At that meeting, the Board learned that the
school’s former Interim Administrator and Principal had been relieved of her
duties because CFCA could “no longer support the amount of administrative
personnel that [it] began [the] school year with.”
The Board then discussed other positions that could be immediately
eliminated. The minutes noted that the Board “review[ed] . . . all administrative
positions and potential work-arounds to back fill the critical roles of each
position.” After doing so, the Board agreed to allow CFCA’s new Administrator to
“delete” six positions: (1) “Elementary School Vice Principal”; (2) “High School
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Vice Principal”; (3) “One High School Science Teacher”; (4) “Dean of Students”;
(5) “High School Secretary”; and (6) “Athletic Director.” Plaintiff Woods was the
“One High School Science Teacher” whose position was “delete[d].” The Board
voted to terminate four of the affected employees, including plaintiff Woods, the
Elementary School Vice Principal, the High School Secretary, and the Athletic
Director.
The following criteria determined which positions the Board eliminated: (1)
“the . . . impact upon the students and their education” from the loss of a position;
(2) the responsibilities applicable to each position; and (3) the abilities of other
staff members to cover a deleted position’s duties. Woods’s position met these
criteria because, by the spring semester, CFCA had removed Woods from the
anatomy class and the only science classes he taught were “2 classes of Earth
Science and 1 class of Physics.” CFCA “could cover those courses with another
teacher or [its] Dean of Students.” Thus eliminating Woods “met the criteria of
minimal impact on the students/education process.”
The next day, CFCA’s new Administrator, Jeremiah Sattazahn, gave Woods
a letter informing him of the Board’s decision. Sattazahn wrote that “[b]ecause of
the extremely tight cash flow at Central Fellowship Christian Academy, there are
many scenario’s [sic] being considered at this time. Closure is not one of those
options. Reduction of expenditures is our first alternative.” The letter then
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informed Woods that “effective immediately, on this 1st day of April 2010, you
have been relieved of your position as High School Science teacher.” Although
“[l]ay offs are never desired,” the letter stated, CFCA’s present financial position”
left the school’s Board and administrators with “no choice but to take this step with
reductions.”
E. The Other Employees Terminated in April 2010
As noted, in April 2010, the Board terminated other employees in addition to
plaintiff Woods, including: (1) the elementary school Vice Principal, a white
female who had 13 years’ experience and was receiving a salary of $28,385.00; (2)
the Athletic Director, a white male who had 10 years’ experience and was
receiving a salary of $50,957; and (3) the high school secretary, a white female
who had 3 years’ experience and was receiving a salary of $17,505.00. 1
Notably, both of CFCA’s other two minority employees returned to their
positions the following school year.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1
The Interim Administrator is also listed on a record entitled “Information concerning
Employee Lay-offs over the past 2 years.” However, in an interrogatory response, defendant
CFCA stated that it had terminated the Interim Administrator due to “[d]ifferent philosophical
beliefs.” The minutes of the March 31, 2010 Board of Directors meeting (where the Board voted
to implement the layoffs) reveal that the Interim Administrator was terminated on March 26,
2010.
Although the minutes state that the Board informed the Interim Administrator that she
was being fired due to financial reasons, the minutes do not state whether this was the actual
reason for the termination. In light of this conflicting record, we do not consider the Interim
Administrator alongside plaintiff Woods and the other three employees terminated in April 2010.
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A. Woods’s Administrative Filings
Less than two months after CFCA terminated him, Woods contacted the
Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (“EEOC”). Woods alleged that he
was “the only African-American who was laid off in the high school of the
academy” and that he was “no less qualified and [had] no less seniority than some
who were retained.” Woods pointed out that, as a result of his termination, there
were “[n]o African-Americans . . . currently on the high school faculty.”
Thereafter, Woods submitted a formal charge of discrimination. In the
charge, Woods repeated his earlier allegations and concluded that he “was
discriminated against due to [his] race (African-American), in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.” More than a year after Woods
filed his charge, on September 27, 2011, he received a right to sue letter from the
EEOC.
B. Woods’s Title VII Complaint
Thereafter, Woods filed a pro se Title VII complaint in the Northern District
of Georgia. Woods alleged that CFCA terminated him because of his race and that
“[s]imilarly-situated non-African-American employees with equal or less seniority
were not laid off.” Woods requested $51,308.00 in backpay, as well as $10,000
“for related anguish and stress” and $350 for court costs.
C. CFCA’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Woods’s Response
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Following discovery, CFCA moved for summary judgment. CFCA made
three arguments; specifically, that: (1) because Woods’s position as a high school
science teacher was a “religious position,” CFCA’s termination of Woods’s
employment fell under the the “ministerial exception” to Title VII, first recognized
by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v.
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); (2) Woods had not established a
prima facie case of racial discrimination; and (3) even if Woods had established a
prima facie case, CFCA had offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
terminating Woods, and Woods had not shown that this reason was a pretext for
unlawful discrimination.
In opposition to CFCA’s summary judgment motion, Woods responded that:
(1) the ministerial exception did not apply because he had “entered into a
legitimate contract following the approval of an application . . . with the
understanding that the school does not discriminate based on race”; and (2) he had
established a prima facie case by showing that he was “laid off when no other full-
time teachers in the school were laid off.”
D. The District Court’s Grant of CFCA’s Summary Judgment Motion
Thereafter, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
(“R&R”) recommending granting CFCA’s summary judgment motion. The
magistrate judge concluded that “Woods’[s] position [fell] under the ministerial
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exception to Title VII.” Alternatively, the magistrate judge determined that Woods
had not established a prima facie case of race-based discrimination because he had
“failed to present any evidence of similarly situated non-African American
individuals who were treated differently than him.” The magistrate judge further
advised that, even if Woods had established a prima facie case, he had not rebutted
CFCA’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating him.
Woods objected to the R&R. The district court overruled Woods’s
objections, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, and granted the
summary judgment motion.
Woods timely appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
We review the award of summary judgment in light of our Title VII
precedent about a prima facie case and pretext. Because we determine that the
district court properly granted summary judgment in light of these well-established
principles, we need not consider the district court’s ruling on Hosanna-Tabor and
the ministerial exception. 2
2
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment and draw “all
inferences and review all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”
Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). However, “liberal pleading does not
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Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
A plaintiff can establish a Title VII claim using either direct or
circumstantial evidence. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th
Cir. 2003). When a plaintiff “offers direct evidence [of discrimination] and the
trier of fact accepts the evidence, then the plaintiff has proven discrimination.” Id.Woods offered no such direct evidence here.
Instead, Woods sought to establish his discrimination claim by offering only
circumstantial evidence. Thus, we analyze Wood’s claim under the burden-
shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Under this approach, a plaintiff must first present a prima
facie case of discrimination, thereby creating a presumption of discrimination.
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1331 (11th Cir. 1998).
If the plaintiff does so, the employer must rebut this presumption by offering
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action.” Id. “If the
require that, at the summary judgment stage, defendants must infer all possible claims that could
arise out of facts set forth in the complaint.” Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d
1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004).
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employer successfully rebuts the presumption, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to discredit the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons by showing that they
are pretextual.” Id.At that point, the plaintiff’s burden of rebutting the defendant’s explanation
“merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that [he] has been the
victim of intentional discrimination.” Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co.,101 F.3d
1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In a case like this one involving “a discharge as part of a reduction in force,”
a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) “that he was a member
of a protected group and was adversely affected by an employment decision”; (2)
“that he was qualified for his own position or to assume another position at the
time of the discharge”; and (3) “that his employer intended to discriminate against
him in making the discharge decision.” Standard, 161 F.3d at 1331.
Here, Woods did not establish a prima facie case because he failed to offer
“sufficient evidence from which a rational fact finder could conclude” that CFCA
intended to discriminate against him in deciding to terminate his position without
offering him an alternative position. See id. The Board meeting minutes showed
that, when the Board decided to lay-off Woods, its members did not discuss
Woods’s race or the race of any other affected employee. Likewise, there is no
mention of race in the termination letter sent to Woods. Woods points to no other
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evidence from which a court could draw an inference that CFCA considered race
in its decisionmaking process.
Woods argued he met his initial burden by showing that similarly situated
non-minority employees were treated differently. Woods is wrong. When a Title
VII plaintiff attempts to show discriminatory intent by pointing to non-protected
class members treated differently, the proffered comparator “must be nearly
identical to the plaintiff.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091
(11th Cir. 2004). Woods argued before the district court that “none of the full-time
teachers who were hired at the same time or after the Plaintiff (similarly-situated,
non-African-American employees) were laid off at the time that the Plaintiff was
laid off.” However, this statement does not identify any specific comparator. To
the extent that Woods did refer to specific individuals—the persons who taught
Woods’s classes in his place—Woods offered nothing more than conclusory
statements that those persons were similarly situated to him.
Even if Woods had made a prima facie showing, summary judgment was
nevertheless appropriate. CFCA rebutted Woods’s prima facie case with a
legitimate, race-neutral reason for terminating Woods. Specifically, the record
established that CFCA faced a financial crisis causing it to either lay-off staff
members or close. Notably, CFCA implemented numerous cost-saving measures
before it resorted to layoffs. Once CFCA’s Board decided to lay-off staff
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members, it adopted race-neutral criteria for identifying positions to eliminate.
The record contained a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation of how the
Board concluded that Woods’s position satisfied these criteria, and thus why the
Board decided to lay off Woods specifically, along with three other staff members.
In light of the record, CFCA easily satisfied its “exceedingly light” burden of
showing a valid, non-racial reason for its action, even if Woods established a prima
facie case. See Vessels v. Atlanta Ind. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 770 (11th Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
After CFCA met its burden of production, Woods failed to show that
CFCA’s proffered explanation for its action was a pretext for race discrimination.
Instead, Woods responded to CFCA’s summary judgment motion with only
conclusory allegations of discrimination, which we have previously held are
inadequate to establish pretext, particularly in the face of a detailed record
supporting an employer’s action, like the record here. See Mayfield, 101 F.3d at1376–77 (“Conclusory allegations of discrimination, without more, are not
sufficient to raise an inference of pretext . . . where an employer has offered
extensive evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.”
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
For example, Woods conceded that, according to his termination letter,
CFCA’s financial condition was the reason for his being terminated. Nevertheless
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Woods “believe[d] that the statement [in the letter] was an attempt to cover
discrimination which was the true motive for [his] layoff.” Similarly, after CFCA
described its dwindling enrollment and the rounds of layoffs preceding Woods’s
termination, Woods stated only that these facts were “irrelevant.” Woods also
categorized CFCA’s tuition shortfalls and other financial problems as “misleading”
facts because CFCA had other sources of income. Even if Woods’s unsupported
statement was true, it did not establish that CFCA was not experiencing a financial
crisis when it terminated Woods. CFCA’s possible ability to address the budget
shortfalls differently does not lead to the conclusion that CFCA decided to lay-off
employees (pursuant to race-neutral criteria) as a pretext for discriminating against
Woods. To conclude otherwise would amount to “second-guessing a reasonable
decision by [CFCA],” which we may not do. See Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1091.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s award of summary
judgment to defendant CFCA.
AFFIRMED.
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