Shelton R. Thomas v. Neil Warner ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
------------------------------------------- ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 5, 2007
No. 06-10883
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
--------------------------------------------
D.C. Docket No. 05-02148-CV-CAP-1
SHELTON R. THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NEIL WARNER, Sheriff,
COLONEL ALDER, he/she is being
sued in his individual and official
capacity,
MAJOR PRINCE, he/she is being
sued in his/her individual and official
capacity,
LIEUTENANT RAY, he/she is being
sued in his/her individual and official
capacity,
SERGEANT BENITES, sued in his
individual and official capacity,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
----------------------------------------------------------------
(June 5, 2007)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and BARKETT, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Shelton Thomas, a state prisoner, appeals pro se the
district court’s sua sponte dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint alleging constitutional
violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
According to Plaintiff’s complaint, these are the facts. Plaintiff is an inmate
of the Cobb County Adult Detention Center. Prison officials denied Plaintiff
access to the prison’s law library between 14 June 2005 and 21 June 2005, and
Plaintiff claims this action was a denial of access to the courts because he could
not prepare his state habeas petition. When he was denied access to the law
library, Plaintiff pursued relief through the prison’s grievance procedures. But
prison officials refused to sign his grievances, ignored his grievances, and
otherwise failed to follow the prison’s grievance procedures; Plaintiff claims he
was deprived of due process.
On 19 July 2005, Plaintiff submitted a grievance to Deputy Sheriff M.
Gloyd for signing. Plaintiff asked Sheriff Gloyd if he needed to place the pink
copy under the original before signing, and Sheriff Gloyd “reacted aggressively”
2
by “swiping the original grievance and snatching the pink copy and . . . signing it
in a very hostile manner.” Plaintiff responded, “Dude, you don’t have to get piss-
off about it.” Sheriff Gloyd made a dismissive motion with his hand and said,
“Get on away from the table.” Plaintiff responded, “What you gonna do, make me
stand in a corner?” Sheriff Gloyd then walked around the table, reached for some
chemical agent, and ordered Plaintiff to “cuff up.” Plaintiff raised his hands and
said, “Cuff up for what?” Sheriff Gloyd then sprayed Plaintiff in the face with the
chemical agent, causing pain and discomfort, high blood pressure, and a pus like
excretion in both of his eyes. Plaintiff claims that this conduct was done in
retaliation for his grievances, violating his First Amendment rights.1
As a result of the 19 July 2005 incident, Sheriff Gloyd filed a disciplinary
report against Plaintiff, who was then given a disciplinary hearing. In the hearing,
Plaintiff was prevented from calling witnesses and introducing exculpatory
evidence, and Plaintiff was sentenced to 20 days in isolation. While in isolation,
Plaintiff’s meals consisted of “nutra-loaf” and water. Plaintiff argues that he was
denied due process in his disciplinary hearing and that, in the light of his dietary
1
Plaintiff asserted below that this conduct also violated his Eighth Amendment rights, and the
district court dismissed that claim. Because Plaintiff does not raise this issue on appeal, it is
abandoned. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004).
3
restrictions for high blood pressure, his meals in isolation constituted “cruel and
unusual punishment.”
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983against prison officials. The district court dismissed the suit under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A for failure to state a claim.2 We affirm.
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under §
1915A(b)(1). Leal v. Georgia Dep’t of Corrections, 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th
Cir. 2001). We will accept all allegations in the complaint as true and will
construe them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112
F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).
First, the district court correctly decided that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to
state an access-to-the-courts claim. The “constitutional right of access to the
courts requires prison authorities to provide prisoners with adequate law libraries
or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Wilson v. Blankenship,
2
Section 1915A(b) of Title 28 provides that a federal court must dismiss a complaint that “is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” A complaint is
frivolous when the factual allegations are “clearly baseless” or the legal theories are “indisputably
meritless.” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). A complaint fails to state a claim
when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief. Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004). Although
the district court ordered that the instant action be “dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A,” the district court’s analysis reveals that the dismissal was ordered because Plaintiff’s
complaint failed to state a claim.
4
163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998). But to succeed on an access to the courts
claim, a prisoner “must show actual injury as a constitutional prerequisite.” Id. A
prisoner “cannot merely allege a denial of access to a law library or adequate
attorney.” Id. at 1291. Instead, he “must demonstrate that the lack of a law library
or inadequate access to counsel hindered his efforts to proceed with a legal claim
in a criminal appeal, post-conviction matter, or civil rights action seeking to
vindicate basic constitutional rights.” Id.Here, Plaintiff has only alleged a denial of access to a law library for a short
time. He has alleged no facts showing how his efforts to pursue state habeas relief
were hindered by being denied access to the library. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to
state a claim.
Second, the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s due process claim
based on the prison’s grievance procedures. We agree with other circuits that have
decided that a prisoner does not have a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in
an inmate grievance procedure. See, e.g., Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir.
1994) (stating that Constitution creates no entitlement to voluntarily established
grievance procedure); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (same).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations that prison officials failed to comply with the
prison’s voluntary grievance procedures does not state a due process claim.
5
Third, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a First Amendment claim of
retaliation. Retaliation against an inmate for filing grievances or lawsuits can
violate the inmate’s First Amendment rights. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235,
1248 (11th Cir. 2003). But to succeed on a retaliation claim, the prisoner must
demonstrate that “the prison official's actions were the result of [the prisoner’s]
having filed a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment.” Id. In
other words, the prisoner must establish that his grievance was the cause of the
retaliatory treatment.
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges no facts showing that the grievances
caused Sheriff Gloyd to spray Plaintiff with the chemical agent and subsequently
file a disciplinary report. According to Plaintiff’s version of the facts as set out in
the complaint, Sheriff Gloyd took no disciplinary action against Plaintiff until
Plaintiff disobeyed Sheriff Gloyd’s orders to back down. Thus, based on the
complaint, Sheriff Gloyd’s acts were only done in response to Plaintiff’s
misconduct. Without facts showing that Sheriff Gloyd’s act was a result of
Plaintiff’s grievances, he fails to state a First Amendment claim of retaliation.
Fourth, Plaintiff stated no due process claim based on his inability to
introduce certain evidence in his disciplinary hearing that resulted in 20 days of
isolation. A prisoner, “who has already been deprived of liberty, can be deprived
6
further of his liberty, such that due process is required, when (1) a change in the
prisoner's conditions of confinement is so severe that it essentially exceeds the
sentence imposed by the court, or (2) when the government has consistently
bestowed a certain benefit to prisoners, usually through statute or administrative
policy, and the deprivation of that benefit imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Kirby v.
Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1290-91 (11th Cir.1999). We agree with the district
court that Plaintiff’s 20 days in isolation was not an excessive, atypical or
significant hardship that would implicate the Due Process Clause. See Sandin v.
Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995); Rodgers v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1253
(11th Cir. 1998).
Fifth, Plaintiff did not state an Eighth Amendment claim based on his
dietary restrictions for high blood pressure and being fed “nutra-loaf” during
isolation. Deliberate indifference to an prisoner’s serious medical needs violates
the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291 (1976). But the
medical treatment must be “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to
shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Harris v.
Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted).
7
Plaintiff’s allegations are merely conclusory. He fails to assert any
imminent health risks, deliberate indifference of prison officials to his serious
medical needs, or gross incompetence. Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state an
Eighth Amendment claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s dismissal is
AFFIRMED.
8