Batchelor v. South Florida Water Management District , 242 F. App'x 652 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 20, 2007
No. 06-14615 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-80044-CV-KLR
BARRY D. BATCHELOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT
DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 20, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Barry D. Batchelor appeals the summary judgment in favor of the South
Florida Water Management District and against his complaint under the self-care
provision of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The
district court held that the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We affirm.
The issue we must decide is whether, in the light of Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003), our holding in
Garrett v. University of Alabama Board of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th
Cir. 1999), reversed in part on other grounds, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), that Congress
did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity through the self-care provision
of the FMLA remains good law. Batchelor argues that the district court construed
Hibbs too narrowly by holding that the decision only applied to the family-care
provision of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). We agree with the district
court; our decision in Garrett, 193 F.3d at 1219, is controlling.
We review a summary judgment de novo. Cuvillier v. Rockdale County,
390 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment should be granted if
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Only the Supreme Court
or this Court sitting en banc can overrule the decision of a prior panel of this Court.
United States v. Marte, 356 F.3d 1336, 1344 (11th Cir. 2004).
Under the Eleventh Amendment, a State is immune from suit in federal court
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without its consent. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100,
104 S. Ct. 900, 908 (1984). “Congress may, however, abrogate such immunity in
federal court if it makes its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726, 123 S. Ct. at 1976. In
Garrett, we held that Congress was without authority to abrogate the sovereign
immunity of the states from complaints under the self-care provision of the FMLA.
193 F.3d at 1219. The Supreme Court, in Hibbs, addressed the authority of
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity for claims arising under only the
family-care provision of the FMLA. 538 U.S. at 725–740, 123 S. Ct. at1976–1984. Our holding in Garrett that Congress is without authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity for claims arising under the self-care provision of the
FMLA remains the law of this Circuit. See Marte, 356 F.3d at 1344.
The summary judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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