Josefina Olacirequi Sanchez v. United States , 247 F. App'x 194 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 7, 2007
No. 05-16191 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket Nos. 04-21128-CV-FAM & 01-00092-CR-FAM
JOSEFINA OLACIREQUI SANCHEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 7, 2007)
Before BLACK, MARCUS and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Josefina Olacirequi Sanchez appeals the district court’s denial of her 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, in which she argued that her trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for a variety of reasons and that her sentence under the
mandatory sentencing guidelines was unconstitutional. The district court found
that Sanchez’s counsel was not ineffective, but did not address Sanchez’s claim
that her sentence was unconstitutional. On appeal, Sanchez argues that the district
court did not address all of the claims in her § 2255 motion. For the reasons set
forth more fully below, we vacate and remand.
Sanchez filed a pro se § 2255 motion attacking her convictions, after jury
trial, for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)-(B), 846,
and the 235-month term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to those convictions
under the then-mandatory guidelines system. In her § 2255 motion, Sanchez
presented various arguments that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in
advising her regarding the government’s plea offer. The district court later
permitted her to file a supplemental brief raising the claim that her sentence was
unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159
L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). The district court set an evidentiary hearing before a
magistrate judge and appointed current counsel to represent Sanchez.
The magistrate’s report and recommendation addressed Sanchez’s claims of
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ineffective assistance of counsel, but did not mention her Blakely claim. Sanchez
objected that the magistrate had failed to resolve all of the claims in her motion
because he had failed to address her Blakely claim. She also objected that the
magistrate had failed to discuss one aspect of her ineffective-assistance claim, that
trial counsel had grossly underestimated her sentencing exposure. The district
court denied Sanchez’s § 2255 motion, stating that “[f]or the reasons stated in the
report of the Magistrate Judge and upon independent review of the file, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: [] This motion to vacate is denied.”
Sanchez moved for a certificate of appealability, which the district court
granted in part as to the issue of whether it had erred in adopting the magistrate’s
report without specifically addressing Sanchez’s Blakely claim. We later
expanded the certificate of appealability to include the following issue:
Whether the district court erred in denying appellant’s claim that
counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately advise her regarding
the risks and benefits of accepting the proffered plea agreement?
Sanchez argues that the district court violated our rule, as announced in
Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), that district courts
must address all claims raised in habeas cases and that, therefore, we should vacate
the district court’s judgment without prejudice to permit it to consider her Blakely
claim.
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When reviewing the district court's denial of a § 2255 motion, we review
questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Lynn v. United
States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.). The scope of review is limited to the
issues specified in the certificate of appealability. Murray v. United States, 145
F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1998).
Expressing “deep concern over the piecemeal litigation of federal habeas
petitions” in Clisby, we exercised our supervisory authority to require that district
courts resolve all claims for relief raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus
under § 2254, regardless of whether habeas relief is granted or denied. Clisby, 960
F.2d at 935-36. We explained that, when a district court does not address all
claims presented in a habeas petition, we will “vacate the district court's judgment
without prejudice and remand the case for consideration of all remaining claims.”
Id. at 938.
Although this case arises from a § 2255 motion rather than a § 2254 habeas
petition, the principles developed in § 2254 proceedings generally likewise apply
to motions under § 2255. Gay v. United States, 816 F.2d 614, 616 n.1 (11th Cir.
1987).1 We have also vacated and remanded a district court’s one-sentence denial
1
We have previously applied Clisby in § 2255 cases, although in unpublished,
non-binding opinions. See, e.g., Conaway v. United States, 184 Fed. Appx. 890, 891
(11th Cir. 2006); Jernigan v. United States, 180 Fed. Appx. 56, 57-58 (11th Cir.
2006).
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of a § 2255 motion so that the district court could “provide further explanation of
its ruling in order to provide this court with a sufficient basis for review.”
Broadwater v. United States, 292 F.3d 1302, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation
omitted).
A careful review of the record reveals that the district court did not address
Sanchez’s Blakely claim. The government does not contend that the district court
did address the claim, but instead argues that we should address the claim in the
first instance because it is “a pure question of law whose proper resolution is
beyond any doubt.” The government relies on Baumann v. Savers Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assoc., 934 F.2d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1991), but Baumann is inapposite
because it addresses exceptions to the general rule that we will not address an issue
that a party failed to raise in the district court, but wishes to raise on appeal. See
id. Clisby, on the other hand, addresses the situation where a party did raise the
issue below, but the district court failed to address it. See Clisby, 960 F.2d at 934-
36. Nothing in Clisby indicates that a forfeited-issue analysis should apply where
the district court has erred under Clisby. See id. at 935 (concluding that, even
though the respondent urged us to consider the claims not addressed by the district
court, we could “do no more than remand the case to the district court to consider
all remaining claims”). We hold that remand is required here for the district court
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to consider all of Sanchez’s claims in the first instance.
In light of the forgoing, we vacate the district court’s judgment without
prejudice and remand with instructions for the district court to consider Sanchez’s
Blakely claim.2 See Clisby, 960 F.2d at 938.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
2
We also note that a review of the record reveals that the district court did not address the
portion of Sanchez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim relating to trial counsel’s alleged
misadvice regarding the possible maximum sentence she faced if convicted after trial. The district
court should address this assertion on remand.
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