United States v. Tashimbe Wiliams , 279 F. App'x 751 ( 2008 )


Menu:
  •                                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    May 22, 2008
    No. 07-13947                 THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 04-20874-CR-WMH
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    TASHIMBE WILLIAMS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (May 22, 2008)
    Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Tashimbe Williams appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm and
    ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (g)(1) and 924
    (d)(1). On appeal, Williams argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to
    sustain the conviction, and, thus, that the district court erred when it denied his
    motion for judgment of acquittal.
    We review de novo the disposition of a defendant’s properly preserved
    motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Perez-Tosta, 
    36 F.3d 1552
    ,
    1556 (11th Cir. 1994). When the defendant fails to preserve a motion for judgment
    of acquittal, we review the sufficiency of the evidence for a manifest injustice,
    which requires a finding that “the evidence on a key element of the offense is so
    tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” United States v. Tapia, 
    761 F.2d 1488
    , 1491-92 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). We consider all of the evidence
    produced at trial against the defendant in evaluating a claim that the evidence was
    insufficient to convict. United States v. Thomas, 
    8 F.3d 1552
    , 1558 n.12 (11th Cir.
    1993).
    Here, Williams failed to renew his motion for a judgment of acquittal, so we
    will only reverse his conviction upon a finding of manifest injustice. See 
    Tapia, 761 F.2d at 1492
    . In reviewing witness testimony, “[t]he jury gets to make any
    credibility choices, and we will assume that they made them all in the way that
    supports the verdict.” United States v. Thompson, 
    473 F.3d 1137
    , 1142 (11th Cir.
    2
    2006), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 2155
    (2007).
    “To establish a violation of § 922(g)(1), the government must prove beyond
    a reasonable doubt three elements: (1) that the defendant was a convicted felon, (2)
    that the defendant was in knowing possession of a firearm, and (3) that the firearm
    was in or affecting interstate commerce.” United States v. Deleveaux, 
    205 F.3d 1292
    , 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2000). Possession can be shown by either actual or
    constructive possession, so long as there is a reasonable inference that the accused
    maintained “dominion and control” over the weapon. United States v. Sweeting,
    
    933 F.2d 962
    , 965 (11th Cir. 1991). In United States v. Scott, 
    263 F.3d 1270
    , 1274
    (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), we held that testimony that the firearm possessed by
    the defendant was manufactured in California and had moved in interstate
    commerce to Georgia, where the defendant was arrested with it, was sufficient to
    establish a nexus to interstate commerce.
    Here, the government presented three witnesses that, if the jury believed
    their testimony, established Williams’s possession of a firearm. Further, a
    government witness testified that the gun was manufactured in California, that the
    manufacturer who made the gun did not manufacture them in Florida, and that the
    only way for the gun to get from California to Florida was to travel through
    interstate commerce. Finally, the government introduced certified copies of at
    3
    least two of Williams’s prior felony convictions into evidence. Each element of
    the offense was thus established by the government. Moreover, the jury was free
    to credit the testimony of the government witnesses over that of the defense
    witnesses, which included Williams himself. Therefore, nothing in the record
    demonstrates that Williams’s conviction was a manifest miscarriage of justice.
    Upon careful review of the record on appeal and consideration of the parties’
    briefs, we discern no error. Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    4