USCA11 Case: 22-10452 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/06/2022 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10452
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
BOBBY W. BRYANT, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD,
JASON MCWILLIAMS,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cv-00225-TES
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10452
____________________
Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Bobby W. Bryant, Jr. appeals from the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Norfolk Southern Railroad (Nor-
folk), his employer, on his claims alleging a hostile work environ-
ment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 and 3, and dismissing related state-law claims
against Jason McWilliams, his former co-employee. After careful
review, we affirm.
First, Bryant challenges the district court’s denial of his mo-
tion to strike portions of an affidavit submitted by Norfolk in sup-
port of its summary judgment motion because it contained inad-
missible hearsay. Even assuming the challenged testimony was in-
admissible, it could presumably be reduced to admissible evidence
at trial by having those individuals testify to their statements. See
Jones v. UPS Ground Freight,
683 F.3d 1283, 1293–94 (11th Cir.
2012). Thus, we find that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying Bryant’s motion to strike. See Conroy v. Abraham
Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc.,
375 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting
that “we will affirm a district court’s evidentiary ruling unless the
district court has made a ‘clear error of judgment’ or has applied an
‘incorrect legal standard’”).
Next, Bryant argues that the district court erred in accepting
Norfolk’s statement of material facts as true. Following the Middle
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22-10452 Opinion of the Court 3
District of Georgia local rules, Norfolk submitted a statement of
materials facts over which it contends there is no genuine dispute.
See M.D. Ga. Local Rule 56. Bryant did not attach a separate and
concise statement of material facts or specifically respond to any of
Norfolk’s numbered material facts as required by the local rules.
See
id. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
Norfolk’s statement of material facts to be admitted. See Mann v.
Taser Int’l, Inc.,
588 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that
we “review a district court’s application of local rules for an abuse
of discretion”).
Then, Bryant argues that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment for Norfolk on his hostile work environment
and retaliation claims. After a careful review of the record, 1 we
find that summary judgment for Norfolk was appropriate for the
reasons stated in the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned
order.
Lastly, Bryant argues that the district court erred in declin-
ing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state-
law claims against McWilliams and by denying his motion to en-
force a settlement agreement. After the district court found
1 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “viewing
all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-
moving party.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys.,
408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir.
2005) (per curiam). “We will affirm the grant of summary judgment only if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Id.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10452
summary judgment appropriate for Norfolk on Bryant’s federal
law claims, the only remaining claims were his state-law claims
against McWilliams, which the district court has discretion to de-
cline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over.
28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). Thus, the district court did not abuse its considerable
discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Bryant’s state-law claims and denying his motion to enforce the set-
tlement agreement as to those claims. 2 See Romero v. Drummond
Co.,
552 F.3d 1303, 1313 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[w]e review
for abuse of discretion a decision not to exercise supplemental ju-
risdiction”).
AFFIRMED.
2 McWilliams moves this court to award him double costs and attorney’s fees,
arguing that Bryant’s appeal is frivolous because we lack appellate jurisdiction
over Bryant’s appeal of the dismissal of the claims against him. But because
the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of Bryant’s state-law claims was
a final decision that ended litigation on the merits in federal court, we have
appellate jurisdiction. Even though we find that Bryant did not show the dis-
trict court abused its discretion here, Bryant’s arguments are not “utterly de-
void of merit.” McLaurin v. Terminix Int’l Co.,
13 F.4th 1232, 1243 (11th Cir.
2021). Thus, McWilliams’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.
