United States v. Daniel Paul Weathers , 161 F. App'x 854 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
January 4, 2006
No. 05-12451 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00017-CR-CAR-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DANIEL PAUL WEATHERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(January 4, 2006)
Before ANDERSON, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Paul Weathers appeals his conviction for making a false
statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. A federal grand jury indicted Weathers for “knowingly and willfully make
a materially false statement to the [FBI] knowing the same to be false; that is, the
defendant reported to the [FBI] the location of explosive materials in Athens,
Georgia, to be used by a group of individuals to bomb the [R. G. Stephens] Federal
Building located in Athens, Georgia . . . .” The government introduced evidence,
including a letter that Weathers sent to the FBI stating that he knew of a plot to
plant explosives in three government buildings in Athens, Georgia,1 and testimony
of three law enforcement officers who were involved in the subsequent
investigation of the alleged plot.
At the conclusion of the government’s case, Weathers moved for a judgment
of acquittal, arguing that the specific charge in the indictment stated that he made a
false statement concerning the location of explosive devices in Athens, Georgia,
while the government’s evidence showed that he gave incorrect information about
the location of explosives in Jackson County, Georgia. In denying the motion, the
court reasoned that the thrust of the investigation seemed to be preventing
explosions at the buildings, and the material false statement related to Athens,
Georgia, because that was the potential site of the bombings. The jury found
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In the letter, Weathers stated that a group that he used to be involved with was going to
plant bombs that would explode in three buildings in Athens over the next three days. Weathers
also stated that he knew of a location in Jackson County, Georgia, where the group kept a large
weapons and explosives cache.
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Weathers guilty, and Weathers renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the government failed to prove, during
trial, that Weathers falsely stated that explosives were located in Athens, Georgia.
We review de novo the disposition of a defendant’s properly preserved
motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552,
1556 (11th Cir. 1994). We must determine whether “a reasonable fact-finder could
conclude that the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Pistone, 177 F.3d 957, 958 (11th Cir. 1999). In so
determining, we must “view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d
1217, 1236 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“[R]easonable inferences, and not mere speculation, must support the jury’s
verdict.” Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d at 1557.
Section 1001(a) states in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in
any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the
United States, knowingly and willfully: . . . (2) makes
any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; . . . shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1996). “Proof of five elements is essential to sustain a
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conviction under the false statement proscription of § 1001: (1) a statement, (2)
falsity, (3) materiality, (4) specific intent, and (5) agency jurisdiction.” United
States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1287 (5th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
Weathers contends that the government had not proven the second and third
elements beyond a reasonable doubt because his statements concerned only the
location of explosives in Jackson County, Georgia, not Athens, Georgia, as the
indictment charged. We disagree.
In his letter to the FBI and his statements to the FBI agents investigating his
claims, Weathers averred that explosions would take place in Athens, Georgia on
February 12, 2003, and that agents could find the explosives to be used in Jackson
County, Georgia. These statements necessarily concern the location of explosives
in Athens because otherwise no explosions could take place. Weathers fabricated
the very existence of those explosives, so he knew that his statements concerning
bombings in Athens were false. He did not know whether there were going to be
either any explosions or explosives in Athens on February 12, 2003. Thus, a
reasonable jury could have concluded that Weathers lied about the location of
explosives in Athens and that the government had met its burden with respect to all
five elements of the § 1001 charge. Weathers’s conviction is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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