Collins Ex Rel. Estate of Knowlton v. Marriott International, Inc. ( 2014 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-15739
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-22423-UU
R. TRAVIS COLLINS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of DAVID
KNOWLTON, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Maryland corporation,
Defendant,
THE RITZ-CARLTON MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, a Maryland
corporation, RC ABACO HOLDING COMPANY, LTD., a foreign corporation, et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
THE RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL COMPANY, LTD, a foreign corporation, THE
ABACO CLUB ASSOCIATION, LTD., a foreign corporation, THE ABACO
CLUB RC, LTD., et al.,
Defendants-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellees,
D.SCOTT LIBERTORE,
Defendant-Third Party Defendant.
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________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 14, 2014)
Before MARCUS, FAY, and WALKER, * Circuit Judges.
WALKER, Circuit Judge:
Although there were no witnesses, David Knowlton, a property owner at the
Abaco Club, apparently fell to his death from a rocky cliff adjacent to the
defendants’ Abaco Club property on the island of Abaco in the Bahamas. R. Travis
Collins brought this action alleging that the defendants breached their duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect the safety of Knowlton as an invitee while on
defendants’ property. Following a trial in the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, a jury found defendants one percent negligent and Knowlton
ninety-nine percent negligent, and awarded no damages. The district judge then
granted defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and denied plaintiff’s
motion for a new trial. We REVERSE and REMAND for a new trial on all issues.
BACKGROUND
The Abaco Club is a private golf club located on the island of Abaco in the
Bahamas. Knowlton was a member of the Abaco Club and owned a cottage on the
*
Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
sitting by designation.
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Club’s property. The Club is located on a peninsula ending at a rocky promontory
known as “the Point.” The Point is not owned by the Abaco Club but is only
accessible by land from Club property. Prior to the events of this case, there was no
fencing or signage demarcating the Point from the Club’s property.
The Point is comprised of uneven volcanic rock formations, cliffs that drop
into the ocean, and a blowhole that waves crash through. A golf cart path on the
Club’s property intersects with a rough path that leads from the Club property to a
crest overlooking the Point. The crest is approximately 50 feet from the golf cart
path and 200 feet from the farthest tip of the Point.
On the evening of August 19, 2007, Knowlton and three male friends who
were staying with Knowlton for a long weekend took a golf cart to the Point to take
pictures of the sunset. According to one friend, they had intended to take pictures
from the crest overlooking the Point but because the view of the sunset was good
from the golf cart path, they first stopped there. Knowlton then left the others and
walked up the path towards the crest. The other three decided to meet Knowlton on
the Point when they were finished taking pictures.
Somewhere between two and ten minutes later, Knowlton’s friends walked
up to the crest to meet Knowlton but he was nowhere to be seen. One friend
testified that there was nobody on the Point and, had there been, he would have
seen him. The friends immediately went for help from Club staff and began
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searching, unsuccessfully, for Knowlton. The following day, Knowlton’s body was
found in the water in a cove two-and-a-half miles from the Club. The death
certificate listed the cause of death as “polytrauma with intracranial hemorrhage and
fracture of ribs/injury upper and lower extremities.” Collins v. Marriott Int’l Inc.,
No. 1:09-cv-22423, slip op. at 10 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2012).
At the trial, plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in (1) failing
to maintain the property on the Point; (2) failing to provide adequate warnings
about dangerous conditions on the Point; and (3) failing to prohibit residents and
guests at the Abaco Club from accessing the Point.
Regarding damages, plaintiff submitted evidence that Knowlton, who was 53,
had two children at the time of his death: a ten-year-old daughter, Grace, and a two-
and-a-half-year-old son, Greyson. Grace lived with her mother, who had been
divorced from Knowlton since 2001, and her step-father. Greyson lived with
Knowlton and his mother, Knowlton’s wife. Knowlton saw his children regularly
and his death affected them. An expert for the plaintiff testified to $10.6 million in
economic damages: $6.2 million for Greyson’s loss of support; $59,294 for
Greyson’s loss of services; $169,171 for Grace’s loss of support; and $4.1 million
for the Estate’s net accumulations. 1 The defendants did not present any evidence on
1
Plaintiff’s expert testified that “loss of services” relates to things done around the house by
family members for the benefit of a child such as cooking, cleaning, repairs, and maintenance.
Plaintiff’s expert also testified that there is a large disparity between Greyson’s and Grace’s loss
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damages.
Three-and-a-half hours after the case was submitted to the jury, the jury sent
the following note to the judge: “We tried to settle (to agree) this case. We are
unable to come to a 100% agreement!” Exhibits & Jury Notes 3, July 25 2012,
ECF No. 415. The court responded that the jury should keep deliberating. Forty-
five minutes later, the jury asked the judge, “Can we find the defendants negligent
with an award to the plaintiff (estate) of $0?” Id. at 5. The court responded: “You
must find whatever is fair and reasonable in light of the evidence.” Id. Seventeen
minutes later, the jury returned a verdict finding defendants one percent liable and
Knowlton ninety-nine percent liable, and awarding the estate zero dollars in
damages.
Following the jury verdict, both sides moved pursuant to Rule 50(b) for
judgment as a matter of law. In addition, the plaintiff moved for a new trial on the
basis that the verdict was an impermissible compromise, that toxicology evidence
was erroneously admitted, and that the district court erred in its jury instructions on
Knowlton’s status as an invitee. The district judge granted defendants’ motion for
of support because Greyson was living with Knowlton when he died while Grace was living with
her mother and step-father. Trial Tr. 452:19–453:14, July 18, 2012, ECF No. 421. Mr. Collins,
the personal representative of Knowlton’s estate, testified that Knowlton’s 49% interest in a
company called Stratix was sold for the benefit of the estate but its value was not provided. Id. at
579:5–581:4. Such value, however, would not detract from plaintiff’s expert’s loss calculation,
which was based on lost wages earned by Knowlton had he lived and worked until the age of 65,
not assets that he already owned.
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judgment as a matter of law, denied plaintiff’s motion for the same and denied
plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. Collins, No. 1:09-cv-22423, slip op. at 30. This
appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Judgment as a Matter of Law for Defendants on Duty and Causation
“We review de novo a district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law,
applying the same standard as the district court.” Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats,
Inc., 420 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005). “A district court should grant judgment
as a matter of law when the plaintiff presents no legally sufficient evidentiary basis
for a reasonable jury to find for him on a material element of his cause of action.”
Id. “The question before the district court regarding a motion for judgment as a
matter of law remains whether the evidence is ‘legally sufficient to find for the
party on that issue.’” Chaney v. City of Orlando, 483 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir.
2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)). “[T]he court should review all of the
evidence in the record,” but in doing so, “the court must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The parties agreed at trial that Florida supplies the
substantive law in this diversity action notwithstanding that the claim arose in the
Bahamas.
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A. Defendant’s Duty and Breach
The parties also do not dispute that Knowlton was an invitee on the Club’s
property. “[A] property owner owes two duties to an invitee, [(1)] to use reasonable
care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition and [(2)] to give the
invitee warning of concealed perils which are or should be known to the property
owner, and which are unknown to the invitee and cannot be discovered by him
through the exercise of due care.” Fieldhouse v. Tam Inv. Co., 959 So. 2d 1214,
1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Fenster v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 785 So.
2d 737, 739 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)).
As part of the duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, a
property owner also has a duty to maintain the property to prevent foreseeable risks
that exist on adjacent property. This is true because the “duty element of a
negligence action focuses on whether the defendant’s conduct foreseeably created a
broader ‘zone of risk’ that poses a general threat of harm to others.” Almarante v.
Art Inst. of Fort Lauderdale, Inc., 921 So. 2d 703, 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
(quoting Goldberg v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 899 So. 2d 1105, 1110 (Fla. 2005)).
Accordingly, a “landowner’s conduct can give rise to a zone of risk extending
beyond the physical boundaries of his property when harm reaching outside those
boundaries is foreseeable.” Id.
In Almarante, the plaintiff was struck and injured by a motorcycle while
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crossing a highway that ran between two school dormitory buildings that she
frequented as a student. Id. at 704. The defendant moved to dismiss on the basis
that it had no legal duty to provide a reasonably safe passage across property that it
did not own. Id. The Almarante court held that plaintiff’s complaint stated a valid
cause of action because the school created a foreseeable zone of danger for its
students by building its dormitory on either side of a busy highway without taking
steps to ensure their safe passage. Id. at 705; see also Bailey Drainage Dist. v.
Stark, 526 So. 2d 678, 682 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam) (holding that even if overgrown
brush causing a dangerous condition for passing motorists was “located on privately
owned property so that removal is not an option, the [defendant] still has a duty to
warn of the danger”); Gunlock v. Gill Hotels Co., 622 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1993) (holding that a hotel built adjacent to a highway “owed a duty to
exercise reasonable care for the safety of its invitees in passing over the highway to
and from appellee’s hotel facilities”).
In this case, it is undisputed that the Point is only accessible from the Abaco
Club property that defendants purchased and developed for use by invitees such as
Knowlton. It is also undisputed that the Point presented foreseeable risks to those
who entered it. There was also evidence that Abaco Club employees knew that its
guests frequented the Point. Because the Point is a foreseeable danger made
accessible by defendants in developing the adjacent Abaco Club, the defendants,
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while they had no duty to maintain the Point property that they did not own, had a
duty to maintain their own Club property in a reasonably safe manner to protect its
invitees against that danger. 2
Defendants contend that they owed Knowlton no such duty because “the
risks associated with the Point are inherent in the natural landscape, open and
obvious and just as foreseeable to [Knowlton] as to Defendants.” Appellee Br. 26.
This argument, however, ignores the nature of the defendants’ duty here.
“[A]lthough the open and obvious nature of a hazard may discharge a landowner’s
duty to warn, it does not discharge the duty to maintain the property in a reasonably
safe condition. A plaintiff’s knowledge of a dangerous condition simply raises the
issue of comparative negligence and precludes summary judgment.” Fieldhouse,
959 So. 2d at 1216 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The district court, in granting defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of
law, stated that “an owner has no duty to warn where the danger is obvious and
apparent, or the invitee otherwise has knowledge of the danger which is equal to or
superior to the owner’s knowledge.” Collins, No. 1:09-cv-22423, slip op at 13.
This statement of the law, however, focuses only on the duty to warn. It fails to
2
Indeed, this was precisely plaintiff’s theory of the case at trial. Following the presentation of
evidence at trial, the court summarized the position of plaintiff’s counsel: “Mr. Parks does not
maintain that the Ritz should have done anything on the Point to fix the property. . . . Mr. Parks
contends that the Ritz should have put a fence or warning sign on the Ritz’s own property saying
[don’t] go out to the Point. Right, Mr. Parks?” Plaintiff’s counsel responded, “Correct.” Collins,
No. 1:09-cv-22423, slip op at 3 n.4 (alterations in original).
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consider the defendants’ separate duty to use ordinary care to maintain the Abaco
Club property in a reasonably safe manner to protect against foreseeable dangers on
the Point by means other than posting a warning. The district court thus erred in
granting judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on the duty owed to
Knowlton as an invitee.
The district court’s instructions to the jury were also erroneous in a similar
respect. The district court instructed that the preliminary issue for the jury is
whether David Knowlton was defendants’ invitee when on the Point, and after
explaining the duties owed to invitees and non-invitees, instructed that it was
“undisputed that the [d]efendants did not own the Point.” Jury Instructions 8-9,
July 25, 2012, ECF No. 404. These instructions pointed the jury in the wrong
direction: the question was not whether defendants owed to Knowlton a duty as an
invitee while he was on the Point—plainly they did not—but whether the
defendants owed a duty to Knowlton as an invitee on Abaco Club property. The
instructions also failed to accurately explain defendants’ duty to use ordinary care
to maintain the Abaco Club property in a reasonably safe manner to protect its
invitees against foreseeable dangers on the Point.
B. Inferring Causation
The district court also granted judgment as a matter of law to defendants
because plaintiff failed to establish that defendants’ negligence caused Knowlton’s
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death without relying on an “impermissible stacking of inferences” by the jury.
“Inferences may be pyramided only if the initial inference is established to the
exclusion of any other reasonable theory.” Hurst v. Astudillo, 631 So. 2d 380 (Fla.
3d DCA 1994). In the district court’s view, the initial inference for plaintiff’s
case—that Knowlton encountered a danger on the Point about which defendants
had superior knowledge—was not established to the exclusion of other theories.
Impermissible inferences only exist, however, when no direct evidence is
presented on negligence or causation and a jury infers causation based on an
inference of negligence. See McCormick Shipping Corp. v. Warner, 129 So. 2d
448, 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961) (finding impermissible stacking of inferences where
the “jury was required under the circumstances to infer that there was negligence on
the part of the appellant in providing a defective or inadequate ladder and upon that
inference, to infer further that such negligence was the proximate cause of the fall”).
In another ladder case, Hurst v. Astudillo, the plaintiff was injured while climbing
defendant’s ladder. 631 So. 2d at 381. Although there was no evidence that the
ladder was defective, that its placement created a dangerous condition, or why the
ladder slipped, the trial judge found negligence and proximate cause. Id. This was
an impermissible pyramid of inferences because it required the trial court to infer
negligence and that such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.
Id. (citing McCormick Shipping Corp., 129 So. 2d at 449-50). The Hurst court
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concluded: “Simply stated, [plaintiff’s] fall, standing alone, cannot support a
finding of [defendant’s] liability.” Id. at 381.
This is not the case here. As discussed in the preceding section, defendants
owed Knowlton a duty of reasonable care to protect him against the foreseeable
zone of risk that the parties do not dispute existed on the Point. Once the jury finds
a breach of that duty, i.e., negligence, there is only one inference required of the
jury: that Knowlton was killed by conditions on the Point. Plaintiff submitted
evidence that allowed the jury to find that it was more likely than not that this was
the case: that Knowlton’s friends were unable to find him minutes after he walked
onto the Point and that the following day his damaged body was found in a cove
some distance away. Based on this evidence, the jury was free to infer a causal
nexus between the negligence and the harm. Thus, the district court erred in
granting to defendants judgment as a matter of law following the trial.
II. Toxicology Evidence
Evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Haygood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 1512, 1515 (11th Cir. 1993). In order
to justify granting a new trial, an error must have affected “substantial rights”;
otherwise, the error is harmless. Id.
Dr. William Hearn of the Miami-Dade Medical Examiner’s Office testified at
trial that a sample of Knowlton’s urine received from authorities in the Bahamas
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contained 0.22% alcohol. The plaintiff contends that this evidence should have
been excluded because it was irrelevant and it incorrectly suggested that urine
alcohol levels are the same as blood alcohol levels, which would imply that
Knowlton was severely intoxicated when he died.
This evidence was properly admitted because it had probative value and was
not unduly prejudicial. Evidence of plaintiff’s intoxication is normally relevant in
tort cases, particularly when the law uses a comparative negligence standard for
apportionment of liability. See Garay v. Carnival Cruise Line, Inc., 904 F.2d 1527,
1531 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Collins, No. 1:09-cv-22423, slip op at 25 (“Plaintiff
fails to recognize that Defendants used the measurement only to corroborate their
contention that Knowlton’s own negligence contributed to his death because he had
been drinking before his fall—not to prove any particular level of intoxication
associated with a legal standard.”).
The urine alcohol level evidence was not unduly prejudicial because there
was little risk that it could be mistaken for evidence of the more familiar blood
alcohol level. The district court correctly found, and the plaintiff ignores on appeal,
that “neither Plaintiff’s expert . . . nor Dr. Hearn . . . testified that 0.22% urine
alcohol concentration rendered Knowlton intoxicated. And both of these witnesses
testified that urine alcohol content cannot be correlated to blood alcohol
concentrations.” Collins, No. 1:09-cv-22423, slip op at 25. Of course, the plaintiff
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could have requested an instruction to the jury on the difference between alcohol
levels in blood and urine, but he did not do so. Admitting the evidence was not
error.
III. Compromise Verdict
The plaintiff argues that the jury’s verdict in this case was a compromise
verdict that conflated liability and damages. We review for abuse of discretion a
district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on the verdict being an
improper compromise. Mekdeci ex rel. Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat’l Labs., 711 F.2d
1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1983). Federal law governs the decision whether or not to
grant a new trial, but an issue of the sufficiency of damages awarded for a state
claim is decided under state law. Hattaway v. McMillian, 903 F.2d 1440, 1451
(11th Cir. 1990).
A motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 must be granted “when the
issues of liability and damages were tried together and there are indications that the
jury may have rendered a compromise verdict.” Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1513
(quoting Lucas v. Am. Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1980)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A compromise verdict results when jurors resolve their
inability to make a determination with any certainty or unanimity on the issue of
liability by finding inadequate damages. However, an insufficient damages verdict,
standing alone, does not necessarily indicate a compromise. Ordinarily there must
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be other evidence demonstrating that the deficient monetary award resulted from an
impermissible compromise.” Id. at 1513-14 (internal citations omitted).
The jury found zero dollars in damages despite being instructed by the
district court to determine the total amount of loss suffered by Knowlton’s estate
without adjusting for any percentages of comparative fault it may have found. The
plaintiff’s expert estimated a total loss to Knowlton’s estate of $10.6 million.
Further, there was significant evidence of Knowlton’s close relationship with
Grace, even though she lived with her mother, in support of non-economic
damages. Defendants submitted no evidence related to damages. It was the jury’s
job to find the total damages and the percentage of defendant’s contribution to the
loss. It was for the court to then apply that percentage to the total damages.
Plainly, the jury’s finding of zero dollars in damages resulting from Knowlton’s
death is drastically deficient. See Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Merker, 907 So. 2d 1213,
1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (noting that “where the evidence is undisputed or
substantially undisputed that a plaintiff has experienced and will experience pain
and suffering as a result of an accident, a zero award for pain and suffering is
inadequate as a matter of law”); see also Westminster Cmty. Care Servs., Inc. v.
Mikesell, 12 So. 3d 838, 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (holding “the damages award of
zero dollars was clearly inadequate in light of the substantial evidence at trial of
economic and noneconomic damages” resulting from husband’s wrongful death);
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Snoozy v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 695 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding
zero-damages award inadequate because “substantial, undisputed, and unrebutted
testimony” showed that deceased father “had a close relationship with his children,
and that [the children] suffered a great loss as a result of their father’s death”).
The district court stated that the jury’s award of damages was not inadequate
as a matter of law because the parties did not stipulate to a minimum amount of
damages and the evidence at trial did not indisputably set a range of monetary
recovery. But there need not be an agreed-upon damages range for an award to be
inadequate. See Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1514 (finding that the zero dollars in
damages awarded by the jury to an injured child was inadequate because defendant
never disputed the child’s damages and the evidence was uncontroverted).
The other required indicia of a compromise verdict are also present here. See
Westminster, 12 So. 3d at 842 (holding that there was an impermissible compromise
where the damages award was inadequate, liability was “hotly contested” at trial,
the jury was deadlocked, the court charged the jury to continue deliberating to reach
a decision, and less than one hour later the jury returned a verdict); Newalk v.
Florida Supermarkets, Inc., 610 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that
there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was
inadequate and “liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the
jury”); see also Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1488 (11th Cir. 1983)
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(finding no compromise verdict because the jury consistently rejected the
defendants’ affirmative defenses, was not deadlocked, and did not attempt to
qualify its verdict or request additional instructions). Liability was hotly contested
by the parties at trial. The jury, in a note to the district judge, stated that it was
unable to come to an agreement. After being told to keep deliberating, and only
forty five minutes later, the jury asked whether it could find defendants negligent
but award zero dollars to the plaintiff. Seventeen minutes after the judge responded
by telling it to find a verdict that is “fair and reasonable,” the jury rendered its
verdict.
In Mekdeci, the Eleventh Circuit found the verdict to be an impermissible
compromise and remanded for a new trial because the jury’s award was inadequate,
liability was “strongly contested,” the jurors made clear that they could not reach
agreement on liability, and the jury attempted to qualify its verdict by asking to
explain its reasons to the parties. 711 F.2d at 1514-15. Most importantly, the jury
stated to the judge that it was “hopelessly deadlocked,” yet returned a verdict
shortly after receiving an Allen charge. Id. at 1515. As in Mekdeci, the jury here
professed to be deadlocked shortly before returning a verdict finding defendants
negligent and making a damages finding that was not supported by the evidence.
Moreover, liability was strongly contested at trial. Contrary to the district court’s
suggestion, the contest over liability need not be “exceptional” to support a finding
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that the jury reached an impermissible compromise, and the fact that the jury found
the defendants only 1% liable does not show that there was a lack of contest over
liability. Indeed, the jury’s question to the judge—asking whether it could find
liability but award zero damages—suggests that some members of the jury may
have gone along with a finding of liability only if accompanied by an award of zero
damages. The district court abused its discretion here in not finding that the verdict
was the result of an impermissible compromise.
Defendants argue that if a compromise verdict is found, any new trial should
be limited to damages only. Defendants, however, misread our case law on
compromise verdicts. “[A] jury verdict influenced by an improper compromise
cannot stand and a complete new trial is required because liability and damages are
inseparable. Hence, if there is a compromised finding on liability, a separate trial
on damages alone will not suffice—both liability and damages must be relitigated
in a new trial.” Burger King Corp., 710 F.2d at 1486 (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial on both liability and damages.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of
judgment as a matter of law for defendants and, consistent with this opinion,
REMAND for a new trial on all issues.
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