United States v. Gregory S. Jones , 256 F. App'x 251 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    OCTOBER 2, 2007
    No. 06-15654                    THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                   CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 89-00013-CR-GET-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    GREGORY S. JONES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (October 2, 2007)
    Before BIRCH, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Gregory S. Jones, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his
    motion to reduce his sentence based on a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing
    Guidelines, pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). A federal jury convicted Jones of
    two counts of bank robbery, two counts of firearm offenses under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) for each respective robbery, and one count of possession of a firearm by a
    convicted felon. On appeal, Jones argues that the district court abused its
    discretion in denying his motion to reduce his sentence because, based on the
    retroactive application of U.S.S.G. App. C, Amendment 599 (2000)
    (“Amendment 599”), it impermissibly applied weapons enhancements to determine
    the offense level of the bank robbery counts under the Sentencing Guidelines.
    Jones contends that, by applying these weapon enhancements to determine his
    offense level, the court double counted the conduct accounted for in the firearm
    charges. Jones further argues that the district court still could reduce his total
    sentence, even if he already had completed the guideline portion of his punishment
    and only continued to serve his consecutive statutory mandatory sentences under
    § 924(c). Lastly, Jones contends that the court should consider the fact that he is
    older, has published two books, has written a self-development program, maintains
    exceptional institution conduct, and is not presently a dangerous individual.
    I. BACKGROUND
    2
    We review “a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence pursuant
    to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2), based on a subsequent change in the guidelines, for
    abuse of discretion.” United States v. Brown, 
    332 F.3d 1341
    , 1343 (11th
    Cir. 2003). “A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an
    error of law.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). To the extent the district court made legal
    conclusions concerning the scope of its authority under the Sentencing Guidelines,
    in a proceeding to modify a sentence under § 3582(c)(2), review is de novo.
    United States v. White, 
    305 F.3d 1264
    , 1267 (11th Cir. 2002).
    A district court ordinarily cannot modify a term of imprisonment after it has
    been imposed. United States v. Moreno, 
    421 F.3d 1217
    , 1219 (11th Cir. 2005),
    cert. denied, 
    547 U.S. 1050
     (2006). “[H]owever, in the case of a defendant who
    has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has
    subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission, upon a defendant’s
    motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the
    factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a
    reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
    Commission.” 
    Id.
     (quotation and citation omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)
    (“[w]here a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the guideline range
    applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an
    3
    amendment to the Guidelines Manual . . . , a reduction in the defendant’s term of
    imprisonment is authorized under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).”).
    Amendment 599, “which was enacted in order to clarify under what
    circumstances a weapons enhancement properly may be applied to an underlying
    offense when the defendant has also been convicted for the use or possession of a
    firearm pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c),” is listed as an amendment covered by the
    policy statement. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c); see also United States v. Pringle, 
    350 F.3d 1172
    , 1178-81 (11th Cir. 2003).
    As amended by Amendment 599 , Application Note 4 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4
    now provides:
    If a sentence under this guideline is imposed in conjunction with a
    sentence for an underlying offense [i.e., armed robbery], do not apply
    any specific offense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or
    discharge of an explosive or firearm when determining the sentence
    for the underlying offense. . . . Do not apply any weapon enhancement
    in the guideline for the underlying offense, for example, if (A) a
    co-defendant, as part of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,
    possessed a firearm different from the one for which the defendant
    was convicted under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c); or (B) in an ongoing drug
    trafficking offense, the defendant possessed a firearm other than the
    one for which the defendant was convicted under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c).
    However, if a defendant is convicted of two armed bank robberies, but
    is convicted under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) in connection with only one of
    the robberies, a weapon enhancement would apply to the bank robbery
    which was not the basis for the 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) conviction.
    U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 599 (2000). To determine whether a reduction in
    4
    sentence is warranted the court must (1) reassessing the defendant’s sentencing
    package under the Guidelines, as amended, and (2) considering the sentencing
    factors of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). See United States v. Vautier, 
    144 F.3d 756
    , 760
    (11th Cir. 1998).
    Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’s
    § 3582(c)(2) motion. Although the court did not conduct its own analysis, it
    adopted the government’s arguments, which properly applied the two-step analysis
    to determine that a reduction was not warranted. After careful review of the record
    and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s order denying Jones’s
    § 3582(c) motion.
    III. CONCLUSION
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-15654

Citation Numbers: 256 F. App'x 251

Judges: Birch, Dubina, Carnes

Filed Date: 10/2/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024