United States v. Jose Garcia Frias , 239 F. App'x 575 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                     FILED
    ________________________          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    AUGUST 28, 2007
    No. 05-16493                  THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                 CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 05-20487-CR-PCH
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JOSE GARCIA-FRIAS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (August 28, 2007)
    Before DUBINA, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Jose Garcia-Frias appeals his conviction and sentence for 62 months of
    imprisonment for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , and attempt to possess with intent to distribute heroin, 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    .
    Garcia-Frias presents three arguments in this appeal, each for the first time. First,
    Garcia-Frias argues that he is entitled to a new trial because of statements the
    prosecutor made during closing argument. Second, he argues that the district court
    erred when it sentenced him for both conspiracy and attempt because the
    convictions arose out of a single course of conduct. Third, he argues that the jury
    instructions violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 2348
    (2000). We affirm.
    Garcia-Frias first argues that the prosecutor’s suggestion during closing
    rebuttal that the jury was being “duped” constituted a personal attack on his
    counsel and entitles him to a new trial. The government argues that the
    prosecutor’s comments were not a personal attack but a response to the repeated
    arguments of defense counsel that the government “duped” Garcia-Frias in
    executing the drug bust. Because GarciaFrias did not object to the statements of
    the prosecutor, we review for plain error. See United States v. Arias-Izquierdo,
    
    449 F.3d 1168
    , 1185 n.8 (11th Cir. 2006). We will reverse only if there is (1) error
    that is (2) plain, (3) affects substantial rights, and (4) seriously affects the fairness,
    integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Martinez,
    2
    
    407 F.3d 1170
    , 1173 (11th Cir. 2005).
    Garcia-Frias cannot establish plain error. “A reversal is warranted when
    prosecutorial misconduct was so pronounced and persistent that it permeated the
    entire atmosphere of the trial.” United States v. Mueller, 
    74 F.3d 1152
    , 1157 (11th
    Cir. 1996). It is not clear that the comments of the prosecutor were a personal
    attack on defense counsel, and the comments did not affect the substantial rights of
    Garcia-Frias. The district court twice instructed the jury that the arguments of
    counsel were not evidence and the verdict of the jury had to be based on the
    evidence. United States v. Bailey, 
    123 F.3d 1381
    , 1402 (11th Cir. 1997). We
    cannot say, however, that the comments reached the level of plain error.
    Garcia-Frias next argues that, although he can be convicted of both
    conspiracy and attempt, 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , he cannot be sentenced on both counts
    because they arose out of a single course of conduct. Garcia-Frias’s argument is
    foreclosed by our precedent in United States v. Cochran, 
    883 F.2d 1012
    , 1017–18
    (11th Cir. 1989), in which we upheld the imposition of separate sentences for
    conspiracy and attempt, even though they both arose from the same narcotics
    transaction, because each offense requires proof of different facts. Garcia-Frias’s
    argument, which we review for plain error because it was raised for the first time
    on appeal, fails.
    3
    Finally, Garcia-Frias contends that the instruction to the jury that the
    government need not prove that Garcia-Frias had knowledge of the quantity and
    type of drugs involved “as long as he knew he was dealing with a controlled
    substance,” violates the Sixth Amendment, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 2348
     (2000). This argument fails. Garcia-Frias acknowledges
    that the jury instruction was consistent with the law of this Circuit. See United
    States v. Gomez, 
    905 F.2d 1513
    , 1514–15 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mejia,
    
    97 F.3d 1391
    , 1392–93 (11th Cir. 1996). Garcia-Frias raises the issue “purely for
    purposes of preservation,” but we are bound by our precedents.
    Garcia-Frias’s conviction and sentence are
    AFFIRMED.
    4