United States v. John Louis Williams , 151 F. App'x 804 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 22, 2005
No. 05-10773 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-20506-CR-CMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOHN LOUIS WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 22, 2005)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant John Louis Williams appeals his drug and firearms convictions for
violations of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 922(g)(1). The
issue on appeal is whether Williams’s conviction for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute less than five kilograms of cocaine was supported by sufficient
evidence that was not barred by the statute of limitations.
The sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's guilty verdict is subject to
de novo review, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in favor of
the jury’s verdict. United States v. Clay, 376 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1427 (2005). We will “uphold the jury’s verdict whenever
a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We review the district court’s
interpretation and application of statute of limitations de novo.” United States v.
Hunerlach, 197 F.3d 1059, 1064 (11th Cir. 1999). An appellant preserves a statute
of limitations claim through motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial.
United States v. Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308,1310 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997).
In order to convict a defendant of “conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent
to distribute, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) an
illegal agreement existed; (2) the defendant knew of it; and (3) the defendant, with
knowledge, voluntarily joined it.” United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354,
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1365 (11th Cir. 2001). The government may establish a defendant’s knowing and
voluntary participation in the conspiracy through circumstantial evidence. United
States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423, 1426 (11th Cir. 1998). We distinguish, however,
between conspiratorial agreements and mere buyer/seller transactions. United
States v. Mercer, 165 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999). “Where the buyer’s
purpose is merely to buy and the seller’s purpose is merely to sell, and no prior or
contemporaneous understanding exists between the two beyond the sales
agreement, no conspiracy has been shown.” Id. (quotation omitted). A conspiracy
has been shown, however, where (1) the government can establish a continuing
relationship between buyer and seller or a continuing course of conduct, or (2)
there are “numerous references to other conspirators and details regarding the
conspiratorial agreement.” Id. References to having people ready to sell or details
of the drug delivery have been deemed sufficient to convict. Id. at 1336. An
inference of an intent to distribute may be drawn from a person’s possession of a
large quantity of illegal drugs. United States v. Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d 1228,
1233 (11th Cir. 2003).
The statute of limitations for a conspiracy charged pursuant to § 846 is five
years. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2003). The requirements of the statute of limitations
are satisfied if the government proves that a conspiracy continued into the
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limitations period. Arnold, 117 F.3d at 1313. Furthermore, a conspiracy is
presumed to continue so long as its objective has neither been abandoned nor
accomplished. United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120, 1124-25 (11th Cir. 1983).
Because the record demonstrates that there was testimony indicating a
continuing relationship that resulted in the repeated transfer of a large quantity of
illegal drugs, and evidence showing that Williams had people in place to sell drugs
and was preparing to re-enter the cocaine business, we conclude that the evidence
was sufficient to support Williams’s conviction for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine. Because the conspiracy continued into the limitations
period, we conclude that the evidence of the conspiracy was not time-barred by the
statute of limitations. Accordingly, for the above stated reasons, we affirm
Williams’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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