Frankie L. Dixon v. Comm'r of SS , 151 F. App'x 810 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 23, 2005
No. 05-11954 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00290-CV-WDO-5
FRANKIE L. DIXON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(September 23, 2005)
Before CARNES, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Frankie L. Dixon, pro se, appeals the district court’s order affirming the
denial of his application for benefits by the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration. We affirm.
On August 20, 1999, Frankie L. Dixon, pro se, filed an application for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3). The administrative law judge determined that
Dixon was not disabled and denied his application. Dixon sought judicial review
of the decision in the district court. The district court remanded the case under §
405(g) because the Commissioner had discovered there was evidence missing from
the transcript. Following the filing of a corrected transcript, the case was re-
opened in the district court.
Local Rule 9.2 required Dixon to file a brief supporting his complaint and
detailing errors in the Commissioner’s final decision within thirty days. Dixon did
not comply with the rule. Approximately one year after the deadline had passed,
the magistrate judge ordered Dixon to explain why he had not filed a brief. Dixon
responded that he “was dealing with the death of my mother ... as well as, the stress
and pressure of my present situation.”
The magistrate judge recommended that Dixon’s complaint be dismissed for
failure to comply with the local rule. The district court issued an order that
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appeared to accept the magistrate judge’s recommendation, but that order also
recites that the court had reviewed the record and found that the record supported
the Commissioner’s findings: “After carefully reviewing the entire record and
finding that the record supports the SSA’s findings ... .” We interpret this language
as at least an alternative holding that the denial of benefits was due to be affirmed
even if Dixon had not failed to comply with the local rule. We will proceed on that
assumption, since the denial of benefits was proper on the merits rendering it
unnecessary for us to decide whether any procedural component of the district
court’s decision is correct.
Dixon must complete a multi-step process in order to establish that he is
disabled for the purposes of the disability insurance and supplemental security
income programs. See Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997).
First, Dixon must prove that he has not engaged in substantial gainful activity. See
Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). Second, he must prove that
he has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. See id. Third, he must
show that his impairment or combination of impairments matches those contained
in a list of impairments. See id. If he cannot prevail at the third step, he must
proceed to the fourth step and show that he is unable to perform his past relevant
work. See id. If Dixon succeeds at that, at the fifth step the burden shifts to the
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Commissioner to show that there is other work Dixon can perform. See id. If the
Commissioner meets her burden at the fifth step, Dixon must prove that he is
unable to perform that work. See id.Because Dixon attempts to establish disability through his own testimony of
pain or other subjective symptoms, he must also satisfy a three-part “pain
standard.” See Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). The pain
standard requires: (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition, and either (2)
objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising
from that condition, or (3) evidence that the objectively determined medical
condition is so severe that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged
pain. See id.We must determine whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision and whether correct legal standards were applied.
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). “Substantial evidence
is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal marks omitted).
Substantial evidence does support the Commissioner’s decision. Three
physicians who examined Dixon found no objective evidence that he was
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physically limited. The record indicated that Dixon had the physical capacity to do
basic work activity with only a “minimal limitation on his ability to function
independently, appropriately, and effectively in an age-appropriate manner.” The
objective medical evidence did not reflect that Dixon’s pain was as severe as he
alleged or that he suffered from a condition so severe that it would give rise to the
pain he claimed. The record further indicated that Dixon had no significant mental
impairment. Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s
finding that Dixon did not have a severe impairment because he was not
significantly limited by a physical or mental impairment.
AFFIRMED.
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