Randal J. Chatham v. Colonel Blake Adcock , 334 F. App'x 281 ( 2009 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 24, 2009
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 07-14995 CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00127-CV-JTC-3
RANDAL J. CHATHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COLONEL BLAKE ADCOCK,
Administrator of the Coweta County
Jail, is sued in his official and
individual capacity,
SGT. ELIZABETH HOMER,
on duty officer in charge at Coweta County
Jail, is sued in her official and
individual capacity,
JENNIE ADCOCK,
head nurse at the Coweta County Jail, is
sued in her official and individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees,
SGT. JOHN LEWIS,
detective, is sued in his official
and individual capacity,
Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(June 24, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HOOD,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Randal Chatham, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint against three prison
officials of the Coweta County Jail complaining that the officials showed
deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition by denying him access to
medication and failing to protect him from prisoner violence, in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See U.S. Const. , amend. VIII, XIV. The
prison officials denied Chatham’s allegations and, as an affirmative defense,
alleged that they were immune from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Following an initial round of discovery, the officials moved the district court for
summary judgment, asserting their defense of qualified immunity. Addressing the
question of whether the evidence of record showed that the officials had infringed
*
Honorable Joseph M. Hood, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, sitting by designation.
2
Chatham’s constitutional rights as alleged, the district court held that it did not;
the evidence was insufficient to make out a case for the jury. The court therefore
granted summary judgment.
Chatham now appeals the court’s ruling.1 The thrust of his appeal is that the
district court erred in concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish
triable issues of fact on his claims that the officials were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs and in failing to protect him from inmate violence. We
agree that the evidence was insufficient to establish these claims for the reasons
stated in the portion of the district court’s order granting summary judgment
attached to this opinion as an Appendix. See Chatham v. Adcock, No. 3:05-CV-
0127, Order and Opinion (2007).
AFFIRMED.
1
In his appeal, Chatham also challenges the district court’s denial of (1) his request for
the appointment of counsel, (2) his motion for a continuance, (3) his motion to compel discovery,
(4) his motion for reconsideration of the court’s order denying his motion to amend his complaint
and to dismiss the officials’ summary judgment motion, and (5) his motion for leave to amend
his complaint. We find no merit in any of these challenges. Rulings (1), (2), (3), and (5) were
proper exercises of the district court’s sound discretion and we find no error in ruling (4).
3
APPENDIX
B. Lack of physical injury due to denial of Xanax
1. The legal framework
As discussed in greater detail in Section IV.D. 1., infra, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, including deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need amounting to the unnecessary and wanton infliction ofpain. Steele
v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that "{i]n this circuit, it is
established that psychiatric needs can constitute serious medical needs and that the
quality of psychiatric care one receives can be so substantial a deviation from
accepted standards as to evidence deliberate indifference to those serious psychiatric
needs."). Nevertheless, "[njo Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner
confined in ajail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e). "In order to avoid dismissal under § 1997e(e), a prisoner's claims for
emotional or mental injury must be accompanied by allegations of physical injuries
that are greater than de minimis." Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
294 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2002).
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The meaning of the phrase "greater than de minimis," however, is far from
clear. At least one district court in this Circuit has held that "diarrhea, vomiting,
cramps, nausea, and head aches from eating spoiled food" are de minimis injuries,
precluding the recovery of compensatory damages. Watkins v. Trinity Serv. Group
Inc., Case No. 8:05-cv-1 142, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85592, at 1 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 27, 2006). See also Daniels v. Beasley, Case No. 07-200 15, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18137, at *1*2 (5th Cir. July 30, 2007) (unpublished opinion) (concluding
that claim failed based on prisoner's receipt of "wrong medication, which resulted in
excessive sleep, a loss of appetite, and a temporary loss of vision," because, inter a/ia,
prisoner failed to show that "his injuries were more than de minimis" under
§ 1 997e(e)); Sneed v. Hunt County Med. Dep't, Case No. 3-05-CV-2032, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3479, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2006) (holding that prisoner's
allegations, "that he suffered 'discomfort to mental health, lack of sleep, [and] anxiety
attack[s]' as a result of not receiving his medication," were "insufficient to establish
'physical injury' under the PLRA"). But see, e.g., Munn v. Toney, 433 F.3d 1087,
1089 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that plaintiff's allegations of "headaches, cramps,
nosebleeds, and dizziness," as a result of being denied his prescribed blood-pressure
treatment, survived § 1 997e(e) review).
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It appears that § 1 997e(e), when applicable, bars the recovery of compensatoly
damages, but the availability of punitive and/or nominal damages in certain cases is
still an open question in this Circuit. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th
Cir. 2003) (concluding that "[n]ominal damages are appropriate if a plaintiff
establishes a violation of a fundamental constitutional right, even if he cannot prove
actual injury sufficient to entitle him to compensatory damages," but remanding to
district court to determine whether prisoner complaint "could be liberally construed
to request nominal damages"). See also Boxer X v. Donald, 169 Fed. Appx. 555,
558-59 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (noting that Eleventh Circuit
has yet to decide whether, absent a showing of physical injury as required by
§ 1997e(e), nominal or punitive damages are unavailable).
2. The parties' dispute
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claims that "he was anxious, experienced
nausea and vivid nightmares and had fluctuating blood pressure and hallucinations"
are insufficient to satisfy the § 1997e(e) physical injury requirement. [Defs.' Reply
Br. at 10. See also Defs.' Supp. Br. at 10-11.1 Plaintiff responds that "he was on a
mental 'roller coaster ride' due to Coweta County's repeatedly 'crashing him, cold
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turkey' from extended periods of heavy prescription use of Xanax,"9 which
"unnecessary mental abuse was the main contributor to his suicide attempt on or
about January 23, 2005." [Pl.'s Resp. at 16.] Plaintiff states that "this near death
experience was in fact a physical injury." After a three-day recovery period at a
hospital psychiatric unit, Plaintiff returned to the Jail, where he was once again
"crashed" off his prescribed medication, "endangering him of seizure and coma," and
causing him "mental torment." Plaintiff contends that his mental suffering was so
severe that it amounted to "serious physical harm." He also claims that, even without
physical injury, he is entitled to punitive damages for this serious harm. [ at 16-
18.]
3. Analysis
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff claims that "he suffered from illusions in
a reduced mental state" and was "near a nervous breakdown" as the result of the
denial of Xanax in January 2005. [Doe. 8, ¶ IV & Part IV attached page 1.] In his
affidavit, Plaintiff asserts that he experienced "5 days in mental agony," from January
26, 2005, until on or about January 31, 2005, consisting of "agonizing anxiety,
Once again, Plaintiff refers to his prior incarcerations at the Jail, in August
and November 2004, which are not at issue herein.
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nausea, vivid nightmares, fluctuating blood pressure, and audio and visual
hallucinations." [Pf.'s Aff. ¶ 22-24; see Pf.'s Exs. E22-E24.] However, one of
Plaintiff's own exhibits refutes his claim that his "fluctuating blood pressure"
constituted a physical injury. [ Pf.'s Ex. E22 (indicating that from January 28,
2005, through January 30, 2005, Plaintiffs six systolic blood pressure readings (two
per day) ranged from a low of 116 to a high of 130, with an average reading of 123,
and his diastolic readings ranged from a low of 80 to a high of 90, with an average
reading of 85).]
Plaintiffs remaining symptoms anxiety, nightmares, and hallucinations
- - do
not rise to the level of a physical injury that is "greater than de minimis." Moreover,
although Plaintiff did seek treatment for his "cold symptoms" during the five-day
period at issue, he apparently did not complain of nausea or any other physical
symptom as a result of Xanax withdrawal, stating only that he felt "agitated." [
Nurse Adcock Aff. ¶ 4 & Attach. A.] Accordingly, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1 997e(e),
Plaintiff may not obtain compensatory damages based on his denial-of-Xanax claim. 10
'° However, Plaintiff might have been able to obtain punitive or nominal
damages on his denial-of-Xanax claim if this claim otherwise were to survive
summary judgment review, which, as discussed in Section IV.D. 1 .b.( 1), infra, it does
not.
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C. Cot. Blake's supervisory liability
1. The legal framework
Noting the well-established rule "that supervisory officials are not liable under
§ 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability," the Eleventh Circuit has stated that, instead, a
supervisor is individually liable only when he "personally participates in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between [his] actions
and the alleged constitutional deprivation." Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,
1360(11th Cir. 2003). This causal connection can be established by showing that the
supervisor knew about and failed to correct a widespread history of abuse or had a
custom or policy that resulted in a constitutional violation, or that the "facts support
an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew
that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so."
icL (Internal quotations omitted). "The standard by which a supervisor is held liable
in [his] individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous."
Id.
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2. The parties' dispute
Col. Adcock asserts that he carmot be held liable for the violations alleged by
Plaintiff because he played no role in setting the Jail's policy regarding medications,
and he did not deny Plaintiff medications or a transfer out of maximum security
detention. {Defs.' Supp. Br. at 11-12.]
Plaintiff responds that Col. Adcock, the administrator of a small jail, who,
according to Sheriff Yeager, "does indeed run the jail," cannot deny all responsibility
for Plaintiff's mis-classification as a maximum security prisoner and for the
enforcement of the Jail's "no controlled substances" policy. [Pf.'s Resp. at 18.]
Plaintiff asserts that Col. Adcock refused Cpl. Morgan's and Sgt. Homer's separate
inquiries as to whether Plaintiff might be removed from dormitory A-6; ignored the
three letters Plaintiff sent to him regarding Plaintiff's treatment at the Jail; and acted
as the final decisionmaker with respect to Plaintiff's housing, as evidenced by
Sgt. Homer's comments that "she was not moving anybody" and that "she wasn't
calling Col. Adcock at home on a weekend." [jj at 19-20.]
3. Analysis
Although Col. Adcock may not be held liable in his individual capacity simply
because he "runs the jail," as Plaintiff suggests, he may be held liable if he knew
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about or was personally involved in any decision that violated Plaintiffs
constitutional rights, or if he enforced a custom or policy that resulted in a violation.
Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360. Based on these standards, Plaintiff has presented
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Col.
Adcock may be held liable in his individual capacity. [See. e.g., Pl.'s Ex. E25 at 1
(Plaintiffs February 7, 2005, letter to CoT. Adcock, wherein Plaintiff states he "was
told by all [medical personnel at the Jail] that Zanex [sic] is not allowed in this jail by
orders of Nurse Jennie Adcock and yourself").]11 At a minimum, there is a genuine
issue as to whether CoT. Adcock enforced a "controlled substances" policy that, by
longstanding practice, resulted in deliberate indifference to one or more of Plaintiff's
serious medical needs.
Moreover, a county official may be held liable in his official capacity if a
constitutional violation resulted from (1) "an action taken or policy made" by a final
policymaker for the county in the "area of [its] business" at issue, or (2) "a practice
or custom that is so pervasive, as to be the functional equivalent of a policy adopted
by the final policymaker." Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir.
Although Defendants characterize such statements as hearsay [ç Defs.'
Reply at 4], these statements, and others like them, may be admissible under Fed. R.
Evid. 801 (d)(2)(D) as admissions of a party-opponent. $. Sect. II, supra.
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1995). Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55, 694 (1978)
(noting that "official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading
an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent," and stating that a local
government may be held liable under § 1983 "when execution of [its] policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly
be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury"); Grech v. Clayton County, 335
F.3d 1326, 1329-30 & nn.5-6 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing official-capacity
liability of county officials). See also Purcell v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313,
1325 & n.27 (11th 2005) (concluding that "Georgia.. . sheriff's authority and duty
to administer [his] jail. . . flows from the State, not [the] County" - entitling him to
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for damages in his official capacity, but
failing to reach same issue with respect tojail administrator because district court did
not address it and appellant did not raise it); Sanders v. Langley, Case No.
1:03-cv-1631-WSD, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21180, at *29*32 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 29,
2006) (Duffey, J.) (denying Eleventh Amendment immunity to Georgia sheriff on
prisoner's claims of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs).
Accordingly, Col. Adcock is not insulated from liability herein, either in his
individual or official capacity, based on his position as a supervisor at the Jail.
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However, punitive damages are unavailable in a suit against a county and, hence, in
a suit against a county employee in his or her official capacity. See, e.g., Alexander
v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1322 n.14 (11th Cir. 2000), overruled on other
grounds, Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). See also
Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (stating that "a municipality is
immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983")
D. The elements of a constitutional violation
To prevail on a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
establish that an act or omission committed by a person acting under color of state
law deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States. Hale, 50 F.3d at 1582.
1. Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
a. The legal framework
The Eighth Amendment prohibits indifference to a serious medical need so
deliberate that it "constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). To demonstrate
deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show both "an objectively serious medical
need" and the defendant's subjective knowledge of, and more than negligent
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disregard of, that need. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003).
also Hill v. Dekaib Re'1 Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994)
(noting that "a 'serious' medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician
as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention"). "A core principle of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence in the area of medical care is that prison officials with
knowledge of the need for care may not, by failing to provide care, delaying care, or
providing grossly inadequate care, cause a prisoner to needlessly suffer the pain
resulting from his or her illness." McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th
Cir. 1999) (noting that "prison officials may violate the Eighth Amendment's
commands by failing to treat an inmate's pain")
Negligence, however, even rising to the level of medical malpractice, does not
constitute deliberate indifference. McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1254. See also Hinson v.
Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that it is well-settled that
"medical malpractice-negligence by a physician-is insufficient to form the basis of
a claim for deliberate indifference"), amended by 205 F.3d 1264 (2000); Adams v.
Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that "[m}ere negligence in
diagnosing or treating a medical condition is an insufficient basis" for a deliberate
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indifference claim). Nor does a simple disagreement over a diagnosis or course of
treatment constitute deliberate indifference. As long as the medical treatment
provided is "minimally adequate," a prisoner's preference for a different treatment
does not give rise to a constitutional claim. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,
1504-05 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Adams, 61 F.3d at 1547 (concluding that the
medical provider's "failure to administer stronger medication" to a prisoner who
subsequently died was "a medical judgment and, therefore, an inappropriate basis for
imposing liability under section 1983").
b. The parties' dispute
Defendants argue that there is no causal connection between their actions and
Plaintiff's alleged injuries because staff doctors, not Col. Adcock or Nurse Adcock,
made the decisions regarding Plaintiff's medications. [Defs.' Supp. Br. at 13-14.]
They also argue that Plaintiff's claims amount to no more than a disagreement over
the course of treatment he received, and that "Plaintiff's need for Xanax for anxiety
and more attention to his cyst were not sufficiently serious medical needs to make the
refusal a constitutional violation." [ at 14-15.] Defendants argue further that their
actions did not constitute deliberate indifference because, on each occasion when
Plaintiff did not receive his prescribed medications, "he was given other
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medications." Finally, they contend that substituting Motrin for Vicodin does not
give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. [ at 17.]
Noting that no staff doctor has submitted an affidavit in support of Defendants'
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that Nurse Adcock's "very cursory
substitution" of Motrin for Vicodin - without having Plaintiff examined by a doctor
- is constitutionally infirm, as demonstrated by the prescription of stronger pain
medication by GDOC doctors just two weeks later. [Pl.'s Resp. at 21-22.] Plaintiff
also claims that the emotional distress he suffered as a result of repeated denials of
Xanax and the injuries he suffered in inmate Hardy's assault are sufficient to show
a causal connection between his injuries and Defendants' actions and omissions. [i
at 22-23.] Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the "twice denial of [his] Xanax and the
resulting mental 'roller coaster ride' that subsequently resulted in a suicide attempt
and unnecessary mental torture"; the substitution of the ineffective Motrin for the
prescribed Vicodin when he was in severe pain after Hardy's assault; and the total
lack of treatment for his cysts before July 12, 2005, demonstrate deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. [Id. at 23-27.]
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c. Analysis
(1) Denial of Xanax
When Plaintiff arrived at the Jail on or about January 26, 2005, he had a
prescription for three medications to address his mental condition - Lexapro (10 mg
daily), Trazodone (50 mg daily), and Xanax (1.5 mg daily). [Pf.'s Ex. E18.] Jail
officials discontinued the Xanax, without substituting "other medications," as they
claim, and without attempting to wean Plaintiff from the Xanax by gradually reducing
his dosage. Burdette v. Butte County, 121 Fed. Appx. 701, 702 (9th Cir. 2005)
(unpublished opinion) (concluding that prisoner, who had suffered seizure and fall
while awaiting pill call, had failed to show that decision "to taper him off of Xanax
and prescribe Imipramine" constituted deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need because "[i]t is undisputed that the risk of serious side effects from tapering a
patient off of Xanax is statistically slight").
Even so, the gravamen of Plaintiff's claim that he had a serious medical need
for Xanax is based on his alleged suffering during the approximately five days when
he was on suicide watch at the Jail, from January 26 until January 31, 2005. [S.
Pf. 's Aff. ¶J 22-24.] However, Plaintiff does not assert that he informed Defendants
of the alleged seriousness of his mental condition during that critical five-day period,
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and the medical records reflect that he did not, instead complaining only of "cold
symptoms." [ Nurse Adcock Aff. ¶ 4 & Attach. A.]
Given that Plaintiff was receiving other "psychotropic medication" during that
time period, this Court cannot conclude that the record before it sets forth a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Defendants were deliberate/v indifferent to a
serious medical need resulting from the denial of Xanax to Plaintiff. It appears to the
Court that, at most, Plaintiff's denial-of-Xanax claim amounts to a claim of medical
negligence, which cannot form the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and
unusual punishment. Although, in Steele, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment to a doctor who had denied a patient his
prescribed psychotropic medication, it did so in light of evidence that the prescribing
medical team had informed the defendant-doctor that his patient was a "potential
suicide risk" without the medication. Steele, 87 F.3d at 1268-7 1.
Here, by contrast, there is no indication in the record that any outside
physician, or that Plaintiff himself, for that matter, informed the Jail medical staff that
Plaintiff was a potential suicide risk or otherwise had a serious medical need for
Xanax during the time period at issue. In fact, Plaintiff states that the physician at the
psychiatric unit who treated him prior to his transfer to the Jail determined that he
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was "non-suicidal" upon his release from the unit on January 26, 2005. [Pf.'s Aff.
¶ 23.] Moreover, the Jail's Medical Notes for the weeks following Plaintiff's release
from suicide watch - made by, among others, Dr. Scott, apparently the staff
psychiatrist - indicate that, on February 1, 2005, Plaintiff was "no longer suicidal";
on February 2 and February 16, 2005, he was "not depressed"; and on February 14,
2005, although he claimed that he was "hearing voices" and "not sleeping," he slept
"during the day" and did not appear "psychotic." [P11's Exs. E20, E23, E24.]
Nowhere in the above Medical Notes, or in any other record evidence, does it appear
that Plaintiff complained of "extreme" or "agonizing" anxiety, "horribly torturous
nightmares," or any other profound mental disturbance as a result of being denied
Xanax, as he has asserted in various pleadings herein. [ Doc. 8; Pf.'s Aff. ¶ 23.]
Accordingly, without record evidence that Defendants were aware that Plaintiff had
a serious medical need for Xanax, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Defendants' denial of Xanax constituted deliberate indifference. Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's denial-of-Xanax claim.
(2) Treatment of Plaintiff's cysts
It is unclear from the record when, if ever, Plaintiff's cysts became a serious
medical need to which Defendants might have been deliberately indifferent.
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Clark v. Argutto, 221 Fed. Appx. 819, 823, 824 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished
opinion) ("assuming arguendo that the cyst [on prisoner's wrist] was an objectively
serious medical need," but affirming summary judgment to defendants because
prisoner "received an MRI and has not shown deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need"). However, this Court need not address the merits of Plaintiffs claim
in this regard because there is not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Plaintiff attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to this claim.
Section IV.A.3., supra. Accordingly, the instant claim will be denied without
prejudice.
(3) Denial of Vicodin
It is undisputed that Plaintiff returned from the hospital in July 2005 with a
prescription for Vicodin, for which Nurse Adcock substituted Motrin. Although
Nurse Adcock states that Dr. Burnett approved the substitution, her notes of July 13,
2005, do not make this clear. [See Nurse Adcock Aff. ¶ 8 & Attach. H.] Moreover,
Defendants do not attempt to show that Motrin provides pain relief equivalent to that
provided by Vicodin. In that regard, their citation of a Tenth Circuit case - holding
that the substitution of Tylenol for dentist-prescribed Motrin passed constitutional
muster - is unpersuasive. [$. Defs.' Supp. Br. at 17.] Furthermore, in reversing a
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district court's grant of summary judgment to a doctor and nurse who had prescribed
ineffective medications for a prisoner's severe pain (who "basically did nothing to
alleviate that pain"), the Eleventh Circuit held that it was a jury question whether the
defendants had been deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs.
McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1257-58 (citing with approval Third Circuit opinion "finding
that inmate stated a claim for deliberate indifference based on denial of post-operative
pain medication," and noting that, "although plaintiff was provided with aspirin, this
may not constitute adequate medical care") (internal quotations omitted). As noted
supra, "deliberate indifference may be established by a showing of grossly inadequate
care as well as by a decision to take an easier but less efficacious course of
treatment." Seals v. Shah, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1384 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (Thrash, J.).
Nevertheless, it is undisputed that neither of the two community physicians
who examined Plaintiff in July 2005, shortly after his return to the Jail from the
hospital emergency room, prescribed anything stronger than Motrin. [Nurse Adcock
Aff. ¶ 9 & Attachs. I, J.] Plaintiff's assertion that these doctors adapted their medical
recommendations to the Jail's policy on controlled substances is entirely speculative
and unsupported by actual evidence. Moreover, the Emergency Room Note for
Plaintiff's July 12, 2005, hospital visit immediately after his altercation with Hardy
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indicates that Plaintiff was "in mild distress" and only "complain[ed] of some pain
to the left wrist and back of the hand where he was struck with a broom handle."
[Pf.'s Ex. E38 at 1 (emphasis added).] Accordingly, the Court finds that, at most,
Plaintiff's denial-of-Vicodin claim amounts to a disagreement over a course of
treatment recommended by different medical doctors, none of whom is a defendant
herein. The Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether this claim sets forth an Eighth Amendment violation, which it does not.
Harris, 941 F.2d at 1504-05. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summaly
judgment on Plaintiff's denial-of-Vicodin claim.
2. Failure to protect Plaintiff from assault by inmate Hardy
a. The legal framework
"[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the
hands of other prisoners." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). However,
not every instance of inmate on inmate violence "translates into a constitutional
liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety." Ici at 834. A
violation occurs "when a substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is
subjectively aware, exists and the official does not respond reasonably to the risk."
Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001) (en bane) (internal
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quotations omitted). To survive summary judgment, a Plaintiff must "produce
sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants'
deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation." Hale, 50 F.3d at 1582.
"Merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify liability
under section 1983 . . . . The known risk of injury must be a strong likelihood, rather
than a mere possibility before a guard's failure to act can constitute deliberate
indifference." Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations and
internal quotations omitted). Moreover, to be deliberately indifferent, a prison
official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference."
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (emphasis added).
b. The parties' dispute
Defendants argue that Sgt. Homer was unaware of a substantial risk to Plaintiff
from inmate Hardy prior to their fight, and she was not on duty at the time of the
fight, so that she cannot be held liable for the injuries that Hardy inflicted upon
Plaintiff. [Defs.' Supp. Br. at 13.] Defendants contend that "general hostilities" in
a prison dormitory do not constitute a substantial risk of harm. {Defs.' Reply at 14.]
They assert that by removing inmate Roberts from dormitory A-6, Sgt. Homer took
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the action she felt necessary to prevent violence between Roberts and Plaintiff,
without realizing that Hardy's friendship with Roberts gave cause to be concerned
about Plaintiff's welfare. Defendants argue that although, in hindsight, Sgt. Homer
"could have taken a different course of action, the Constitution does not provide a
forum for second-guessing." [Defs.' Supp. Br. at 18-20.]
Plaintiff responds by asserting that he suffered escalating abuse from Roberts
and Hardy from the time Roberts was assigned to dormitory A-6; that Sgt. Homer was
aware of the "strong connection" between these two "gangstas"; and that, given the
repeated warnings from Plaintiff and others, neither Sgt. Homer nor Col. Adcock
could have been unaware of the danger that Hardy posed to Plaintiff. [Pf. 's Resp. at
28-30; see Pf.'s Ex. E31 (Sgt. Homer's 7-2-05 incident report, noting, "Problems w/
inmates 'dividing up.' Black vs. White."); Pf.'s Ex. E33 (Sgt. Homer's 7/03/05
incident report, referring to Roberts and Hardy as "close," and noting that "these two
have the potential to cause more problems").]
Plaintiff states that a Jail officer informed him that Hardy had been transferred
into dormitory A-6 after being involved in a fight with two other inmates, who "were
able to get the best of him (Hardy) with a broom handle." {Pf.'s Aff. ¶ 33.] Shortly
thereafter, Hardy assaulted two Mexicans inmates in A-6, slamming a cell door on the
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hand of one of them and severing the last joint on one of his fingers, which Plaintiff
knew because he and two other inmates had helped clean up the blood and had found
the severed joint. [J ¶ 37.]
According to Plaintiff, the Jail officers knew about Hardy's propensity to
verbal abuse, which Hardy displayed on a regular basis, and advised Plaintiff to "steer
clear" of Hardy because "he is a bad one." [j ¶ 34-35, 38.] Plaintiff states that
Hardy's co-defendants on aggravated assault and battery charges were removed from
A-6 prior to Hardy's arrival there "to protect them from Hardy." [Jh ¶ 32.] When
Roberts was placed in A-6 in May 2005, he and Hardy "became abusive toward
[Plaintiff], threatening violence and calling [him] 'cracker." [j ¶ 36.] By July 2,
2005, there were "near riot conditions" in A-6, with "nearly all blacks . . . now
abusive" to him, and continuing threats of violence. [Ith ¶ 40, 42-43.]
c. Analysis
Hardy's allegedly belligerent attitude towards whites and, in particular,
Plaintiff, and his allegedly repeated acts of violence at the Jail; his friendship with
Roberts, who apparently shared Hardy's feelings and who nearly came to blows with
Plaintiff; Nurse Webb's alleged, though disputed, statement that guards at the Jail
anticipated a fight between Hardy and Plaintiff at some time not long before the
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assault; the allegedly repeated warnings to Jail officials, from Plaintiff and others, that
Hardy posed a danger to Plaintiff- all these facts, alleged by Plaintiff or admitted by
Defendants, suggest that Hardy's close proximity to Plaintiff constituted a risk of
harm to Plaintiff. Moreover, a reasonable response to this risk would have been to
separate Plaintiff from Hardy. Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583-85 (reversing grant of
summary judgment to County Sheriff because, inter a/ia, there was evidence "of
several reasonable measures to reduce the risk of violence"). Nevertheless, as
discussed infra, Plaintiff's allegations, serious though they may be, do not establish
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sgt. Homer and/or Col. Adcock not
only knew of facts suggesting that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm
from Hardy, but also subjectively drew the inference that he did. Farmer, 5 11
U.S. at 837.
Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003), is instructive in this
regard. In Carter, the plaintiff, who had suffered a knife attack at the hands of his
ceilmate, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment, in favor of two
prison officials, on the plaintiff's claim that the officials had been deliberately
indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm posed by his ceilmate. at 1347.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment because there was
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insufficient record evidence of the defendants' "subjective awareness" of such a risk.
Id. at 1349.
During Plaintiff's time [with his] celimate. . ., Defendants clearly knew
that [the celimate] was a "problem inmate" with a well-documented
history of prison disobedience and had been prone to violence.
Defendants also had specific notice from Plaintiff that [the ceilmate]
acted crazy, roaming his cell like a "caged animal." But before
Defendants' awareness arises to a sufficient level of culpability, there
must be much more than mere awareness of [the celirnate's] generally
problematic nature.
. Despite the plaintiff's many complaints to the defendants, he never directly told
them that his cellmate had threatened him, although he did inform them of his
cellmate's remark that the plaintiff would help with the celimate's plan to fake his
own hanging "one way or another," which, apparently, the plaintiff took as a threat.
Id. at 1349-50.
To assume that Defendants actually made the inference that [the
cellmate's] statement constituted a serious threat would assume too
much. Defendants would have had to read imaginatively all derogatory
and argumentative statements made between prisoners to determine
whether substantial risks of serious harm exist. We do not view the
summary judgment record as supporting a contention that Defendants
drew the inference or should have drawn the inference from [the
cellmate's] "one way or another" comment as a serious threat, leaving
Plaintiff exposed to any substantial risk of serious harm.
Defendants arguably should have placed Plaintiff elsewhere but
merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify
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liability under section 1983. Defendants only possessed an awareness of
[the celimate's] propensity for being a problematic inmate; to find
Defendants sufficiently culpable would unduly reduce awareness to a
more objective standard, rather than the required subjective standard set
by the Supreme Court. Such a generalized awareness of risk in these
circumstances does not satisfy the subjective awareness requirement.
Ih at 1350 (footnote, citation, and internal quotations omitted). See also Lavender
v. Kearney, 206 Fed. Appx. 860, 863-64 (11th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant because, although he knew of assailant's
"violent nature and knew of his racial animus against white residents," "there was no
evidence he was aware that [assailant] posed a specific risk" to plaintiff; and noting
that "[g]eneral knowledge about an inmate's violent tendencies, without more specific
information about the risk, does not constitute deliberate indifference"). McBride v.
Rivers, 170 Fed. Appx. 648, 655 (11th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (affirming
grant of summary judgment to defendants because, although plaintiff, a victim of
inmate violence, had informed defendants "that he feared for his life" if placed in
same cell with his eventual assailant, plaintiff "did not identify a specific prior
incident, from which the defendant could infer that a substantial risk existed").
Likewise here, although Plaintiff asserts that Hardy threatened him repeatedly
in the days before the assault, Plaintiff has not identified any specific "serious threat"
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from Hardy, which he then reported to Sgt. Homer, Col. Adcock, or any other Jail
officer prior to July 12, 2005. S.. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350 (discussing "serious
threat" requirement and noting that "derogatory and argumentative statements" are
not equivalent to threats). The only specific threat that Plaintiff sets forth in the
record is Hardy's alleged threat on the morning of July 12, 2005, shortly before the
assault occurred, that he would "swing on" Plaintiff, by which time it was too late for
Sgt. Homer, who was not on duty at the time, or Col. Adcock, who did not personally
witness the threat, to do anything to help Plaintiff. [ Pf.'s Aff. ¶ 50; see also Doc.
8-2, Part IV attach. ¶J 19-20 (alleging that on or about July 5, 2005, after Roberts had
been transferred, Plaintiff "began receiving renewed threats" from Hardy, and that on
July 12, 2005, approximately thirty minutes before the assault, Hardy threatened
Plaintiff in the breakfast line, "attempted a sneak attack from behind on Plaintiff,"
and spit on Plaintiff "in plain view" of three officers).]
The fact that Hardy was a "problem inmate" with "violent tendencies" simply
"does not satisfy the subjective awareness requirement." Carter, 352 F.3d at
1350; Lavender, 206 Fed. Appx. at 863. At most, Plaintiff has demonstrated that
Defendants were negligent in not separating him from Hardy, but negligence is not
the constitutional standard by which Defendants' actions or omissions are to be
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judged. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350. Sgt. Homer asserts that she felt that the
transfer of Roberts away from A-6 dormitory on July 3, 2005, "alleviated the[]
problems" there. [Homer Aff. ¶ 5.] There simply is insufficient evidence in the
record to allow the Court, or a jury, to second guess Sgt. Homer's assertion that she
was not aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff during the nine days
that intervened between the transfer of Roberts and the assault by Hardy.
Accordingly, although the Court is sympathetic with the misfortune that befell
Plaintiff as a result of that assault, Sgt. Homer and Col. Adcock are entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that they were deliberately indifferent to the
risk of harm posed by Hardy.
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