Karen Michelle Eckman v. Rose Williams , 151 F. App'x 746 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-12445 SEPTEMBER 13, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 02-00085-CV-WLS-1
KAREN MICHELLE ECKMAN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
ROSE WILLIAMS, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(September 13, 2005)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant, Karen Michelle Eckman (“Eckman”), appeals from the district
court’s denial of her federal habeas corpus petition brought under 28 U.S.C. §
2254. The district court granted Eckman a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on
the following issues: (1) whether the district court erred in applying the deference
standard set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); and (2) whether sufficient evidence was
presented to support Eckman’s convictions.
The record demonstrates that Eckman was convicted in the Superior Court
of Lee County, Georgia, of two counts of malice murder, four counts of felony
murder, two counts of aggravated assault, hijacking a motor vehicle, and armed
robbery. On direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed Eckman’s two
aggravated assault convictions, concluding that these convictions should have
been merged with the malice murder convictions, but it affirmed the remaining
convictions and sentences. Eckman v. State, 548 S.E.2d 310, 274 Ga. 63(2001).
Eckman subsequently filed her federal petition presenting a single issue:
that her convictions are not supported by constitutionally sufficient evidence, in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1997). The district court referred the
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matter to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation.1 The magistrate
judge recommended that the district court deny Eckman habeas relief. The district
court, after some modification, adopted the report and recommendation and
entered judgment in favor of the respondent.
We review the district court’s denial of habeas relief de novo, while fact
findings made by the district court are reviewed for clear error. Sims v. Singletary,
155 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 1998).
After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we first conclude
that the district court correctly applied the deference standard as set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) to Eckman’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. In essence, what
Eckman argues here is that the deference standard as stated in § 2254(d) is not
appropriate in sufficiency of evidence claims. If we were to accept that argument,
we would be ignoring the directives of § 2254(d), and we would be requiring the
reviewing court to assess the sufficiency of evidence claims in each case on a de
novo basis. This we cannot do. Only Congress is vested with the power to
regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts in habeas corpus matters. Ex parte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 249, 6 S. Ct. 734, 739 (1886).
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See 28 U.S.C. § 636 et seq.
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It is clear that Congress specifically passed the AEDPA in response to the
federal court’s failure to limit its review of state court proceedings to a deferential
standard. See Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192, 198-99 (7th Cir. 1997). We
conclude that it is Congress’s plain intent that federal courts sitting under their
authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, et seq. must apply the deference standard
as articulated in § 2254. There has been no exception from this standard carved
out for Jackson v. Virginia claims. If we were to apply a different standard to
these claims, we would be engaging in judicial legislation of the AEDPA, which is
not permitted. Accordingly, we hold that the district court acted properly when it
applied the deference standard of § 2254(d) to Eckman’s sufficiency of the
evidence claim.
We agree with the State that the district court incorrectly framed the second
issue. The sufficiency of the evidence issue had already been raised by Eckman
on direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court and decided adversely to her.
Thus, the district court granted Eckman a “second bite at the apple” by reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence claim on the merits. Instead, the district court
should have framed the issue as whether it erred by holding that the Georgia
Supreme Court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of, or contrary to,
established federal law. No matter how the issue is framed, however, we conclude
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from the record that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient as clearly set forth
in the Georgia Supreme Court’s findings. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
we affirm the judgment of the district court denying habeas relief.
AFFIRMED.
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