Ackerman v. Deaf & Hearing Connection of Tampa Bay, Inc. , 197 F. App'x 879 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 26, 2006
No. 06-13250 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00843-CV-T-27-TGW
PATRICK ACKERMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DEAF AND HEARING CONNECTION OF TAMPA BAY, INC.,
d.b.a. Bayou Courtyard,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(September 26, 2006)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Patrick Ackerman appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a
preliminary injunction against Deaf and Hearing Connection of Tampa Bay
(“DHC”). In his complaint, Ackerman, who is deaf and blind, alleged that DHC
violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and the Rehabilitation Act when it denied
his request for a roommate and declined to renew his lease. After review, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
DHC is a non-profit company that provides case management services for
deaf and hard-of-hearing adults. DHC owns and operates the Bayou Courtyard
Apartments, an independent living complex with predominately disabled residents.
Ackerman has been a client of DHC’s case management program since 1998, and
has lived in the Bayou Courtyard Apartments since 2002. In the summer of 2004,
Ackerman, who was deaf, went blind.
In October 2005, Ackerman’s roommate moved to a different apartment to
live alone. For the next two months, Ackerman failed to pay the full rent that was
due for his apartment. In December 2005, Ackerman and DHC reached an
agreement which resolved Ackerman’s past-due rent, allowed him to remain in
tenancy for the remainder of his existing lease (due to expire in May 2006), and
enrolled him in a low-income rent program. In February or March 2006, Jocelyn
Epple, another tenant at the Bayou Courtyard Apartments, moved out of her own
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apartment and into Ackerman’s. Ackerman tried to give DHC additional rent for
Epple, but DHC refused it. DHC informed Ackerman that, because he was
participating in the low-income rent program, he could not have a roommate. In
March 2006, DHC advised Ackerman that it would not be renewing his lease.
On May 3, 2006, Ackerman filed a complaint against DHC alleging, inter
alia, violations of the FHA and the Rehabilitation Act. Ackerman claimed that
DHC did not reasonably accommodate his request for a roommate, whom he
needed to assist him with daily living tasks and as a companion to help his
depression. He also claimed that DHC discriminated against him by not renewing
his lease.
Ackerman also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against DHC
requesting, inter alia, that DHC maintain renewal of his lease and allow him the
roommate of his choice. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied
Ackerman’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Ackerman now appeals that
decision.1
II. DISCUSSION
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We review a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.
See Int’l Cosmetics Exch., Inc. v. Gapardis Health & Beauty, Inc., 303 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th
Cir. 2002). The district court has a range of choice in reaching its decision, and we will not
reverse unless the district court applies incorrect legal standards or procedures, relies on clearly
erroneous factfinding, or reaches a clearly unreasonable or incorrect conclusion. See Schiavo ex
rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005).
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A district court may issue a preliminary injunction when the moving party
shows: 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; 2) a substantial threat
that irreparable injury will occur; 3) that the injury will outweigh any damage the
proposed injunction may cause the nonmovant; and 4) that an injunction would not
be adverse to the public interest. See Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424
F.3d 1117, 1128 (11th Cir. 2005).
Ackerman claims that DHC violated the FHA and the Rehabilitation Act by
refusing to allow Epple to be his roommate and by declining to renew his lease.
The FHA makes it unlawful to “discriminate in the sale or rental . . . [of a
dwelling] to any buyer or renter because of a handicap” and to “discriminate
against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such
dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2). The FHA further
defines discrimination to include “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations
. . . when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
The Rehabilitation Act prevents discrimination in federal grants and
programs as follows:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by
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reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a).
In this case, the district court determined that Ackerman could not show a
substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his underlying claims and
denied his motion for a preliminary injunction. Ackerman has not shown that the
district court abused its discretion in its determination. First, most of the residents
at the Bayou Courtyard Apartments have one or more disabilities. Indeed,
Ackerman’s Director of Housing and his former case manager are both deaf.
Instead, the decision not to renew Ackerman’s lease was because of his violations
of various rules. For example, evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing
supported the district court’s conclusion that Ackerman had previously agreed to
forgo a roommate in order to take advantage of the low-income program, and that
Ackerman violated the terms of their agreement by finding a roommate. In short,
the evidence supported the district court’s conclusion that DHC did not
discriminate against Ackerman because he is deaf and blind, but that the denial of
his desired roommate and the nonrenewal of his lease were based on his continuing
violations of his agreement.
Finally, Ackerman himself acknowledges that the district court noted this
case was a “close call.” Where a question is sufficiently close that the district court
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could have gone either way in issuing a preliminary injunction, “there can be no
abuse of discretion.” Revette v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Iron Workers, 740 F.2d 892, 893 (11th Cir. 1984).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Ackerman’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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