United States v. Donnie Atkins , 346 F. App'x 479 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    SEPTEMBER 25, 2009
    No. 08-16741                 THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 08-00010-CR-01-MHS-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DONNIE ATKINS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (September 25, 2009)
    Before CARNES, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Donnie Atkins appeals his 308-month sentence for armed bank robbery, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2113
    (a) and (d) and 2, and discharge of a firearm during
    a crime of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(iii). On appeal, he
    argues that the district court erred by increasing his offense level pursuant to
    U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(C) based on the sum of money stored inside the bank vault
    because there was no evidence that he could have accessed the vault before fleeing
    the bank. In applying § 2B3.1(b)(7), the district court included the money stored
    inside the vault, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, because it found that Atkins
    intended to steal the money stored inside the vault. The government responds that
    the district court correctly applied § 2B3.1(b)(7)(C). In the alternative, it argues
    that any error was harmless because (1) the court stated that it would have imposed
    the same sentence despite the guideline calculation, and (2) the sentence was
    reasonable.
    As a preliminary matter, we need not determine whether the district court
    erred in its assessment of the loss amount under § 2B3.1(b)(7)(C) because, as the
    government argues, the district court stated that it would have imposed the same
    sentence regardless of the guideline calculation, and the sentence was reasonable.
    In United States v. Tampas, we held that any error in the district court’s loss
    calculation was harmless error because the loss amount enhancement did not affect
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    the defendant’s sentence. 
    493 F.3d 1291
    , 1305 (11th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that the
    district court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence (regardless of the
    loss calculation recommended by the Guidelines), recognized the advisory nature
    of the Guidelines, stated that the sentence complied with the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)
    factors, and imposed a sentence within the statutory maximum). However, we
    have also instructed that a district court’s statement that a disputed guidelines issue
    was irrelevant because the sentence was imposed in consideration of the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors did not render appellate review moot. United States v. Keene,
    
    470 F.3d 1347
    , 1349 (11th Cir. 2006). This is so because the sentence imposed,
    assuming error in the guideline calculation, still must be substantively reasonable.
    
    Id.
    Reasonableness review requires the application of an abuse-of-discretion
    standard. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 
    128 S.Ct. 586
    , 594, 
    169 L.Ed.2d 445
    (2007). “In reviewing the ultimate sentence imposed by the district court for
    reasonableness, we consider the final sentence, in its entirety, in light of the
    § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Thomas, 
    446 F.3d 1348
    , 1351 (11th Cir.
    2006). “We may find that a district court has abused its considerable discretion if
    it has weighed the factors in a manner that demonstrably yields an unreasonable
    sentence.” United States v. Pugh, 
    515 F.3d 1179
    , 1191 (11th Cir. 2008). We have
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    held that comparing the sentence imposed against the statutory maximum sentence
    is one indication of reasonableness. United States v. Valnor, 
    451 F.3d 744
    , 751-52
    (11th Cir. 2006).
    “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing
    that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and the factors in
    section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 
    431 F.3d 784
    , 788 (11th Cir. 2005). The
    § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
    history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
    of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
    the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the
    need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or
    medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines
    range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need
    to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution
    to victims. Id. at 786 (summarizing 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)).
    Atkins’s sentence, even assuming error, was substantively reasonable. The
    sentence was well-within the statutory maximum sentence and imposed in
    consideration of Atkins’s extensive criminal record, the violent nature of his
    offense, and the need to promote deterrence. Thus, any error in the district court’s
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    valuation of the loss amount was harmless error.
    Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
    affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
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