Gwendolyn Troup v. Fulton County, GA , 297 F. App'x 934 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-11573 October 29, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-02357-CV-TCB-1
GWENDOLYN TROUP,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
(October 29, 2008)
Before DUBINA, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Gwendolyn Troup (“Troup”), brought an action in the United
States Court for the Northern District of Georgia, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that Fulton County, Georgia, violated her procedural due process rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by denying
her application for disability retirement benefits. Troup subsequently withdrew
her Fifth Amendment claims, and the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the county on the remaining Fourteenth Amendment claims. We affirm.
The issue presented on appeal is whether the district court properly granted
the county’s motion for summary judgment where Troup failed to demonstrate a
constitutionally protected interest in the disability retirement benefits offered by
Fulton County, Georgia’s defined contribution plan.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion for summary
judgment. Begner v. United States, 428 F.3d 998, 1001 (11th Cir. 2005).
“Summary judgment is proper if, when viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sierra Club, Inc. v.
Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904, 911 (11th Cir. 2007).
After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we conclude that
the district court properly granted the county’s motion for summary judgment
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because applicants for benefits do not have a legitimate entitlement to those
benefits that triggers due process protection. Troup contends that the district court
erred in finding that she had no constitutionally protected property interest in
potential disability retirement benefits. The United States Supreme Court has
“never held that applicants for benefits, as distinct from those already receiving
them, have a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the due process clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942, 106 S.
Ct. 2333, 2343 (1986) (citing Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305, 320, n.8, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3189, n.8 (1985)). In her brief, Troup
also recognizes that the Eleventh Circuit has never ruled that applicants for
benefits have constitutionally protected interests. Troup does rely on the Fourth
Circuit case of Mallette v. Arlington County Employees’ Supplemental Retirement
System II, 91 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 1996), in which the Fourth Circuit found that, as
“a member of the class of persons the Retirement System was intended to protect
and benefit, Mallette has more than an abstract desire for the benefits.” Id. at 636.
It is important to note, however, that the Fourth Circuit further found that Mallette
would have a property interest in those benefits and the attendant right to be heard
only if she could “make a prima facie case of eligibility. . . .” pursuant to “the
Arlington Code [that] vests county employees who meet its eligibility
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requirements with a right to receive disability retirement benefits when they suffer
work-related disabilities.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
In the present case, however, it is undisputed that after receiving additional
information from hand specialist Dr. Jim Roderique, Dr. Eric A. Benning of the
Fulton County Health Department advised the Administrative Committee of the
plan that Troup did not meet the criteria for total disability under the plan. As
such, Troup did not meet the plan’s disability retirement criteria, and could not
establish a prima facie case of eligibility even if the Fourth’s Circuit’s decision in
Mallette were binding on us.
Because we conclude that there is no merit to any of the arguments Troup
makes in this appeal, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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