Elmore Nichols, Jr. v. Bob Riley , 141 F. App'x 868 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 25, 2005
No. 04-16149
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 03-00685-CV-N
ELMORE NICHOLS, JR., individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BOB RILEY, Governor of the State of Alabama, in
his individual and official capacity,
DONAL CAMPBELL, Commissioner of the Alabama
Prison System, in his individual and official capacity, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(July 25, 2005)
Before CARNES, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Elmore Nichols, Jr., an Alabama state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants in his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action. Nichols challenges the district court’s findings with respect to his
claims that: (1) the conditions of confinement at the Draper Correctional Center
(“DCC”) violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment; and (2) defendant
James DeLoach, warden of DCC, transferred him to G.K. Fountain Correctional
Center (“FCC”) in retaliation for filing his § 1983 complaint. We review a district
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and apply the same legal standards as
the district court. Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 892 (11th Cir. 2000).
A. Eighth Amendment Claim
The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, forbids cruel and unusual punishments. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
This protection extends to the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, which must
conform to contemporary standards of decency. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2399 (1981). The Eighth Amendment also protects
against future harm to prison inmates. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34,
113 S. Ct. 2475, 2480-81 (1993). An inmate may be granted injunctive or
declaratory relief even in the absence of proof that he actually has been injured by
the dangerous condition. See id.
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The district court erred by finding that Nichols lacked standing because he
failed to demonstrate that he had suffered an actual, physical injury. The
conditions of confinement, if found to be inhumane, constituted a deprivation of
Nichols’s rights under the Eighth Amendment, and, assuming that the other two
requirements of standing were met, entitled him to seek injunctive relief. See id.
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment through “the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836, 114 S. Ct.
1970, 1978 (1974). Wantonness has been defined as “deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner.” Id. To establish an Eighth
Amendment violation, a prisoner must prove both an objective and a subjective
component. Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004). “Under the
objective component, a prisoner must prove the condition he complains of is
sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id. Under the subjective
component, the prisoner must prove that the prison official acted with ‘deliberate
indifference.’” Id.
Assuming, without deciding, that Nichols offered sufficient evidence to
allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the conditions of confinement at
DCC were inhumane, we nonetheless conclude that summary judgment in favor of
DeLoach was proper. Because the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the
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ADC was making a reasonable effort to correct the alleged inhumane conditions of
confinement at DCC, a reasonable factfinder could not have concluded that
DeLoach acted with deliberate indifference. See Hale v. Tallapoosa, 50 F.3d
1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on Nichols’s Eighth Amendment claim.
B. Retaliatory-Transfer Claim
While an inmate does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
against being transferred to a less agreeable prison, Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S.
78, 88 n.9, 97 S. Ct. 274, 279 n.9 (1976), prison officials may not transfer, or
otherwise punish, an inmate in retaliation for exercising his right to file grievances
against prison officials, see Bridges v. Russell, 757 F.2d 1155, 1157 (11th Cir.
1985). Such retaliatory transfers violate an inmate’s First Amendment rights and
his right of access to the courts. See Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467,
1468 (11th Cir. 1989).
We find that the district court erred by concluding that DeLoach had not
violated Nichols’s rights by transferring him to FCC, without specifically
addressing the actual reasons for the transfer. If Nichols was transferred solely for
filing his § 1983 complaint against prison officials, then his constitutional rights
were violated and he was entitled to relief. See id.
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In an affidavit, DeLoach stated that Nichols was transferred because he was
found to be in possession of a copy of the ADC’s Administrative Regulations and
Institutional Standard Operating Procedures – a violation of prison regulations.
That may be true, but Nichols states in his own affidavit that he was not
transferred for disciplinary reasons, but rather, solely because he had filed his
§ 1983 complaint. Without more to evaluate, Nichols’s affidavit suffices to create
a genuine factual dispute as to the actual reason for his transfer. Therefore,
summary judgment was improper. Accordingly, we vacate the grant of summary
judgment in favor of DeLoach on Nichols’s retaliatory-transfer claim, and remand
to the district court for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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