Pablo Cruz v. Manuel Aladro , 129 F. App'x 549 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 22, 2005
No. 04-14671 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-20626-CV-ASG
PABLO CRUZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MANUEL ALADRO, Captain,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 22, 2005)
Before BARKETT, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:
Pablo Cruz, a pro se prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals the
district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to state a
claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and the court’s order denying his
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order.
Cruz filed a § 1983 action alleging that Miami-Dade County’s deduction of
a $2 subsistence fee from his prison account, while he was in the county jail,
violated his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The magistrate judge
recommended that the case be dismissed for failure to state a claim, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), essentially because Cruz could not use § 1983 to
challenge state law violations and Cruz was not alleging that the state law itself
was unconstitutional.
In Cruz’s objections to the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendations,
he argued that the magistrate judge erred because: (1) he alleged a constitutional
violation as his complaint alleged violations of his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights; (2) state officials violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by
not following state laws and regulations; (3) the state law required that anyone with
a U.S. Marshal hold be exempt from the $2 fee; and (4) he tried to use the
grievance procedure, but prison officials did not respond to his grievances, which
violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. In a motion to amend the
memorandum of law in support of the § 1983 complaint, Cruz also argued that the
magistrate judge erred by determining that the district court did not have
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jurisdiction over the plaintiff. In adopting the magistrate’s recommendation, the
district court agreed with the magistrate judge that Cruz was not challenging the
constitutionality of the state regulation but merely challenging the application of
the state law to him, which was not a cognizable claim under § 1983.
Having reviewed the record, we find no error in any of the district court’s
rulings resulting in the dismissal of the complaint in this case. We also conclude
that the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint without granting leave
to amend because Cruz never filed a motion to amend his complaint. Wagner v.
Daewoo Heavy Industries America Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en
banc). Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of
Cruz’s Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration. “Motions for
reconsideration should not be used to raise legal arguments which could and
should have been made before the judgement was issued. Denial of a motion for
reconsideration is especially sound[] when the party has failed to articulate any
reason for the failure to raise the issue at an earlier stage in the litigation.” See
Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 243 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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