Lindley v. Cisneros , 74 F.3d 1076 ( 1996 )


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  •                    United States Court of Appeals,
    Eleventh Circuit.
    No. 94-2257.
    Gertrude LINDLEY, Julia Dolce, F.J. Burr, Bernadeen L. Burr, Eve
    Montaldo, Mary Riedel, Paul Riedel, Lorence Tierney, William
    Tierney, Eva Harm, Margueritte Mitchell Mann, Lassie Mayhue Meyer,
    Ralph Meyer, Eubert F. Taffert, Irene Elbert, Gerald Purdy, Doris
    Purdy, June Knistoft, Edward Knistoft, Msgr. Robichaud, Personal
    Representative of the Estate of Dora Wade; Janice Oleson, Personal
    Representative of the estate of Edna Bromhed;     George Olmsted,
    Personal Representative of the estate of Thelma Olmsted,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    Henry CISNEROS and United States of America Department of Housing
    and Urban Development, Defendants-Appellees.
    Jan. 25, 1996.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of Florida. (No. 89-195-CIV-T-15B), Henry Lee Adams, Jr.,
    Judge.
    Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and DYER and GARTH *, Senior Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellants are former tenants in a multi-story apartment
    building   known   as   the   Mandalay    Shores   Apartments   located   in
    Clearwater, Florida.      At the time appellants were tenants, the
    apartment building was owned by the United States Department of
    Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"); each appellant occupied his
    or her apartment under a lease with HUD.        In this action appellants
    seek to recover money damages under both Florida landlord-tenant
    law and their leases for HUD's failure, despite their pleas,
    properly to maintain the apartment building and their respective
    *
    Honorable Leonard I. Garth, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
    the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
    units.
    Tenants of the same apartment complex similarly brought suit
    in Mann v. Pierce, 
    803 F.2d 1552
     (11th Cir.1986), also seeking to
    recover damages under Florida landlord-tenant law and their leases.
    They claimed that, while HUD was their landlord, the apartment
    building was "infested with a wide array of vermin and that the
    ceiling tiles were crumbling and spewing asbestos whenever the roof
    leaked or the air conditioning was operated.        [In addition, they
    claimed that] HUD failed to make reasonable provisions for running
    water and failed to maintain the project's elevators, plumbing,
    roof and common areas.      [They sought] redress, including equitable
    restitution of rent paid while HUD ... maintained the project in
    substandard conditions."      
    Id. at 1554
    .
    While Mann was pending in the district court, the Mandalay
    Shores Cooperative Housing Association (the "Association"), which
    had been a tenant in the building, brought suit to obtain the same
    relief   as   the    Mann   plaintiffs.   Its case and      Mann   were
    consolidated.       Thereafter, in an effort to obtain in a single
    adjudication relief for all of the building's former tenants, the
    plaintiffs in the consolidated cases sought class certification
    under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.          The district judge
    presiding over the cases refused to certify a class, however,
    because the causes of action of the individual plaintiffs were not
    identical;      the plaintiffs had separate leases and the facts
    underpinning their claims were not likely to be common.      Moreover,
    HUD and the Secretary opposed the idea of a mass adjudication of
    the tenants' claims.
    In an effort to have the claims of all of the former tenants
    resolved   in        the    consolidated   cases,    the    Association    obtained
    assignments from the tenants, the appellants here, and then moved
    the court for leave to amend its complaint to bring the assigned
    claims.    HUD and the Secretary opposed the motion, claiming that
    the assignments were invalid, and that consequently the Association
    could    not    represent        the   assignors.      The     court    denied    the
    Association's motion, concluding that allowing the Association to
    proceed as the tenants' representative would not promote the
    economic       and    speedy     disposition    of    the    controversy.         The
    adjudication of appellants' claims would be left to another day.
    While the consolidated suit (of the Association and the                          Mann
    plaintiffs) was pending, appellants brought the instant suit.
    HUD and the Secretary prevailed in the consolidated case and
    then moved for summary judgment in the instant case, contending
    that the doctrine of res judicata foreclosed appellants' causes of
    action.    Appellants opposed the motion.                   They argued that the
    defendants, having urged the court to reject the Association's
    effort to litigate appellants' claims in the consolidated cases and
    to defer consideration of these claims to another day, should stand
    by their word.             Common decency, if not fundamental due process,
    they claimed, required that they be given their day in court.
    The    district          court,   while   acknowledging      the    merits    of
    appellants' fairness argument, rejected their plea and granted the
    defendants summary judgment.            We reverse, and direct the court to
    reinstate appellants' claims.
    Res judicata does not bar a claim unless the parties to both
    actions—here, appellants and either the Mann plaintiffs or the
    Association (or both)—are identical or are in privity with one
    another.    See Richardson v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 
    935 F.2d 1240
    , 1244 (11th Cir.1991).      The parties are not identical;      nor
    are they in privity with one another.     HUD and the Secretary argue
    that appellants were virtually represented in the prior litigation
    by the Association.     For a number of years, they point out, the
    tenants, including appellants, had voluntarily aligned themselves
    with and supported the goals of the Association.      That may well be
    so, but such an alignment does not alter the fact that appellants'
    claims are based on their individual leases, that they assert
    discrete breaches on HUD's part, and that they assert separate
    injuries.    After all, this is why HUD and the Secretary opposed
    class certification in Mann, and this is why the district court
    denied class certification.
    As     the   district   court   stated   when   it   rejected    the
    Association's attempt to litigate appellants' claims as appellants'
    assignee:     appellants will have their day in court—later.         That
    time is now.      The judgment of the district court is accordingly
    VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.
    SO ORDERED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 94-2257

Citation Numbers: 74 F.3d 1076, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 960, 1996 WL 27670

Judges: Tjoflat, Dyer, Garth

Filed Date: 1/25/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024