Davis v. Monroe Cty. Board of Ed. ( 1996 )

PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
____________________________
No. 94-9121
____________________________
D.C. Docket No. 94-CV-140-4MAC(WDO)
AURELIA DAVIS, as Next Friend of
LaShonda D.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia
____________________________
(August 21, 1997)
Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, COX, BIRCH,
DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges,* and
KRAVITCH** and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judges.
_________________________
*Judge R. Lanier Anderson recused himself and did not participate
in this decision.
**Senior Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch, who was a member of the en
banc court which heard oral argument in this case, took senior
status on January 1, 1997, and has elected to participate in this
decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
Appellant, Aurelia Davis, brought this suit against the
Board of Education of Monroe County, Georgia, (the "Board") and
two school officials, Charles Dumas and Bill Querry, on behalf of
her daughter, LaShonda Davis. The complaint alleged that the
defendants violated Section 901 of the Education Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (1972) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)) ("Title IX"), and 42 U.S.C.
§ 19831 by failing to prevent a student at Hubbard Elementary
School ("Hubbard") from sexually harassing LaShonda while she was
a student there. Appellant separately alleged that the
defendants discriminated against LaShonda on the basis of race in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.2 Appellant sought injunctive
1
This section provides, "Every person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person
. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
2
Davis actually alleged that the named defendants
discriminated on the basis of race in violation of "the Education
Act of 1972 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991." Davis was
apparently referring to the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972), and the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The former
act, however, does not address racial discrimination in
education, and the latter act does not provide a cause of action
for racial discrimination in education. The district court
construed this portion of the complaint to allege a violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1981, which does provide a cause of action against
certain types of racial discrimination.
2
relief and $500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.
The district court dismissed appellant's complaint in its
entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. See Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F.
Supp. 363, 368 (M.D. Ga. 1994); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Appellant appealed the district court's dismissal of
her Title IX claim against the Board,3 arguing that a school
board can be held liable under Title IX for its failure to
3
Davis did not appeal the district court's dismissal of
her Title IX claim with regard to individual defendants Dumas and
Querry. Davis similarly did not appeal the district court's
dismissal of her § 1981 claim. Therefore, we do not consider
these claims.
With regard to Davis' § 1983 claim, the complaint seemed to
allege that the defendants were liable under this provision
solely because they violated Title IX. Davis, however,
apparently argued before the district court that the defendants
were liable under § 1983 for infringing LaShonda's rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The district court dismissed this implied
claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Aurelia D., 862 F. Supp. at 366.
Davis did not appeal the dismissal of her § 1983 claim to
the extent it was based on the defendants' alleged violation of
Title IX. Accordingly, that claim is not before us. She did,
however, appeal the dismissal of her § 1983 claim to the extent
it was based on the defendants' alleged violation of the Due
Process Clause. In addition, Davis argued for the first time
before the three-judge panel that the same § 1983 claim
encompassed a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The panel rejected Davis' due-process and equal-protection
arguments and affirmed the dismissal of her steadily expanding §
1983 claim under 11th Cir. R. 36-1. See Davis v. Monroe County
Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1188 (1996). Davis did not petition
the court to rehear this ruling en banc, and we see no reason to
disturb the panel's decision sua sponte. We therefore do not
consider Davis' various § 1983 claims. In sum, we address only
Davis' Title IX claim against the Board.
3
prevent sexual harassment among students. On appeal, a divided
three-judge panel reinstated her Title IX claim against the
Board. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186,
1195 (11th Cir. 1996). At the Board's request, we granted
rehearing en banc to consider appellant's Title IX claim,4 and we
now affirm the district court's dismissal of this claim.
I.
A.
We review de novo the district court's dismissal of
appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See McKusick v. City of Melbourne, 96
F.3d 478, 482 (11th Cir. 1996). To this end, we take as true the
allegations appellant has set forth in her complaint and examine
whether those allegations describe an injury for which the law
provides relief. See Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1008 (11th
Cir. 1995). We construe appellant's allegations liberally
because the issue is not whether appellant will ultimately
prevail but whether she is entitled to offer evidence to support
her claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct.
1683, 1686, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974). We begin by describing the
4
See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1418(11th Cir. 1996). Granting rehearing en banc vacated the panel
opinion by operation of law. 11th Cir. R. 35-11.
4
allegations contained in appellant's complaint.
B.
LaShonda Davis was enrolled as a fifth-grade student at
Hubbard during the 1992-1993 school year. During that school
year, Bill Querry was the principal of Hubbard, and Diane Fort,
Joyce Pippin, and Whit Maples were teachers at the school. The
complaint alleges that the Board administered federally funded
educational programs at Hubbard and supervised the school's
employees, including Principal Querry and Teachers Fort, Pippin,
and Maples.
According to the complaint, a fifth-grade student named
"G.F." was in several of LaShonda's classes and initially was
assigned to the seat next to LaShonda in Fort's classroom. On
December 17, 1992, while in Fort's classroom, G.F. allegedly
tried to touch LaShonda's breasts and vaginal area. G.F. also
allegedly directed vulgarities at LaShonda, such as "I want to
get in bed with you" and "I want to feel your boobs." LaShonda
complained to Fort. After school that day, LaShonda also told
her mother, the appellant, about G.F.'s behavior. The complaint
states that G.F. engaged in similar (although unspecified)
5
conduct on or about January 4, 1993,5 and again on January 20,
1993. LaShonda allegedly reported both incidents to Fort and to
appellant. After one of these first three incidents, appellant
called Fort, who told appellant in the course of their
conversation that Principal Querry knew about one of the
incidents.
G.F.'s misconduct continued. On February 3, 1993, G.F.
allegedly placed a door-stop in his pants and behaved in a
sexually suggestive manner toward LaShonda during their physical
education class. LaShonda reported this incident to Maples, who
was the physical education teacher. On February 10, 1993, G.F.
engaged in unspecified conduct similar to that of the December 17
incident in the classroom of Pippin, another of LaShonda's
teachers. LaShonda notified Pippin of G.F.'s behavior and later
told appellant, who then called Pippin to discuss the incident.
On March 1, 1993, G.F. directed more unspecified, offensive
conduct toward LaShonda during physical education class.
LaShonda reported G.F. to Maples and Pippin. An unidentified
teacher allegedly told LaShonda that Principal Querry was not
ready to listen to her complaint about G.F.
At some point around March 17, 1993, Fort allowed LaShonda
5
The complaint actually alleges that this second
instance of harassment occurred "on or about January 2, 1993."
We note that January 2, 1993 was a Saturday. Presumably, there
was no school on Saturday, so G.F. could not have sexually
harassed LaShonda at Hubbard on that day. Friday, January 1,
1993, was a holiday. Accordingly, we assume for appellant's
benefit that the alleged harassment occurred on or about January
4, 1993.
6
to change assigned seats away from G.F. G.F., however, persisted
in his unwelcome attentions. On April 12, 1993, he rubbed his
body against LaShonda in a manner she considered sexually
suggestive; this incident occurred in the hallway on the way to
lunch. LaShonda again complained to Fort.
Lastly, on May 19, 1993, LaShonda complained to appellant
after school about more unspecified behavior by G.F. Appellant
and LaShonda then paid a visit to Principal Querry to discuss
G.F.'s conduct. At this meeting, Querry asked LaShonda why no
other students had complained about G.F. During this meeting,
Querry also told appellant, "I guess I'll have to threaten [G.F.]
a little bit harder." On the same day, May 19, G.F. was charged
with sexual battery, a charge which he apparently did not deny.
The complaint does not tell us who summoned the police.
In all, the complaint describes eight separate instances of
sexual harassment by G.F. These eight instances of alleged
harassment occurred, on average, once every twenty-two days over
a six-month period. Three instances occurred in Fort's
classroom; two occurred in Maples' physical education class; one
occurred in Pippin's classroom; one occurred in a school hallway;
and one occurred in an unspecified location. LaShonda reported
four instances of alleged harassment to Fort, two to Maples, and
two to Pippin. LaShonda reported the final instance of
harassment, the May 19 incident, to appellant and Querry. The
complaint does not allege that any faculty member knew of more
than four instances of harassment, and the complaint indicates
7
that Principal Querry learned of only one instance of harassment
before his meeting with appellant and LaShonda on May 19.
The complaint does not state what action each of the
teachers took upon being informed by LaShonda of G.F.'s demeaning
conduct. We assume for appellant's benefit that the teachers
took no action other than Fort's apparent notification of
Principal Querry after one of the first three instances of
alleged harassment and Fort's decision around March 17, 1993, to
move LaShonda's assigned seat away from that of G.F. We will
also accept as true that Principal Querry took no measures
against G.F. other than threatening him with disciplinary action
at some point before his May 19 meeting with appellant and her
daughter. For example, we assume for appellant's benefit that
someone other than the school staff instigated the prosecution of
G.F.
Appellant claims that LaShonda suffered mental anguish
because of G.F.'s behavior. As indicia of this emotional trauma,
the complaint states that LaShonda's grades dropped during the
1992-1993 school year and that LaShonda wrote a suicide note in
April 1993. Based on the above allegations, appellant contends
that "[t]he deliberate indifference by Defendants to the
unwelcomed [sic] sexual advances of a student upon LaShonda
created an intimidating, hostile, offensive and abuse [sic]
school environment in violation of Title IX." We therefore
consider whether Title IX allows a claim against a school board
based on a school official's failure to remedy a known hostile
8
environment6 caused by the sexual harassment of one student by
another ("student-student sexual harassment").
II.
Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). Although nothing in the
plain language of Title IX speaks to the issue of student-student
sexual harassment, several district courts have held that Title
IX allows a student to sue a school board for failing to prevent
hostile-environment sexual harassment by another student. See
Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., No. 95-469-JD, http://lw.bna.com/
#0708 (D. N.H. June 13, 1997); Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch.
Dist., No. C-93-4531 MHP, 1997 WL 193919, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
6
The term "hostile environment" sexual harassment
originated in employment litigation under § 703 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)) ("Title VII"). Hostile-
environment sexual harassment occurs whenever an employee's
speech or conduct creates an atmosphere that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter another employee's working
conditions. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
21 - 22, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 - 71, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993). As
discussed infra, n.13, we conclude that Title VII standards of
liability, borrowed from the employment context, do not control
our resolution of this case. Nevertheless, for purposes of our
discussion of appellant's claim, we construe the complaint to
allege that G.F.'s speech or conduct created an atmosphere that
was sufficiently hostile or abusive to alter the conditions of
LaShonda's learning environment.
9
15, 1997); Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209,
1213 - 14 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Bruneau By and Through Schofield v.
South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 172 (N.D.
N.Y. 1996); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560,
1576 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th
Cir. 1995); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F.
Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Wright v. Mason City Community
Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419 - 20 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Bosley
v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1023 (W.D. Mo.
1995); Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp. 1452,
1469 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch.
Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal. 1993). But see Garza
v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (S.D.
Tex. 1994) ("[A] student cannot bring a hostile environment claim
under Title IX.").
The courts of appeals, however, have been less enthusiastic.
The Fifth Circuit has held that no cause of action exists where a
school board merely knew or should have known of peer sexual
harassment and failed to act. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch.
Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---,
117 S. Ct. 165, 136 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1996). Other circuits have
resolved complaints of student-student sexual harassment without
deciding whether a cause of action exists under Title IX for this
alleged harm. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 -
33 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff failed to state a
valid claim for student-student sexual harassment because he
10
failed to allege that the harassment in question was on account
of his sex); Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57
F.3d 243, 250 (2nd Cir. 1995) (holding that, even if Title IX
created a private cause of action for sexual harassment by a non-
employee of the school, plaintiff failed to allege that school
officials knew or should have known of the harassment); Doe v.
Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a defendant school counselor was entitled to
qualified immunity against a claim that he failed to respond to
known sexual harassment of the plaintiff by other students).
The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue of
student-student sexual harassment. In general, the Court has
allowed private plaintiffs to proceed under Title IX only in
cases that allege intentional gender discrimination by the
administrators of educational institutions. According to the
Court, plaintiffs can state a claim under Title IX by alleging
that a federally funded educational institution, acting through
its employees, intentionally subjected them to discrimination in
its educational programs or activities. See Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1964, 60 L. Ed. 2d
560 (1979). For example, where a teacher engaged a student in
sexually oriented conversations, solicited dates from her,
forcibly kissed her on the mouth, and thrice removed her from
another class in order to engage in coercive sexual intercourse
with her in a private office at the school, the Court found that
the school board could be held liable for his actions. See
11
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 63 - 64, 76,
112 S. Ct. 1028, 1031, 1038, 117 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1992).
Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever found,
however, that a school board can be held liable for failing to
prevent non-employees from discriminating against students on the
basis of sex. Appellant does not allege that any employee of the
Board intentionally discriminated against LaShonda by personally
participating in G.F.'s offensive conduct toward her. Rather,
appellant alleges that the Board violated Title IX by failing
adequately to respond to LaShonda's complaints. Neither the
Supreme Court nor this court has considered whether a Title IX
plaintiff can proceed under this theory. In short, by seeking
direct liability of the Board for the wrongdoing of a student,
appellant argues for an extension of liability under Title IX.
We examine the legislative history of Title IX to determine
whether Congress intended this provision to reach appellant's
allegations.
A.
The provision now known as Title IX emerged from a flurry of
bills regarding public education. In June and July 1970, the
House Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, under the leadership of Representative Edith
Green, held hearings on gender discrimination in federally funded
educational programs. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings
12
on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special Subcomm. on
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter House Hearings]. None of the
testimony before Representative Green's subcommittee concerned
student-student sexual harassment or related issues, such as
school discipline. Instead, the subcommittee's work focused on
eliminating gender discrimination in school admissions and in the
employment decisions of school administrators.
By 1970, section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 already
prohibited gender discrimination in employment. See Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)) ("Title VII").7 Title
VII, however, did not apply to educational institutions. See §
702, 78 Stat. at 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1
(1994)). Similarly, section 601 of the Civil Rights Act
prohibited racial discrimination by all recipients of federal
funding. See § 601, 78 Stat. at 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000d (1994)) ("Title VI").8 Title VI did not ban gender
discrimination by recipients of federal funding.
7
Title VII states, "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . .
sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
8
Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1994).
13
To fill this gap in antidiscrimination legislation, the
subcommittee drafted a proposed amendment to H.R. 16098, 91st
Cong. (1970). This amendment would have applied to schools the
non-discrimination requirements of Title VII and added "sex" to
the types of discrimination banned by Title VI. See House
Hearings, supra, at 1. In other words, the subcommittee's
amendment was designed to bridge the gap between Title VII and
Title VI. The amendment, however, never reached the House floor.
See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 523 n.13, 102
S. Ct. 1912, 1919, n.13, 72 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1982).
On April 6, 1971, a new education bill was introduced in the
House. See H.R. 7248, 92nd Cong. (1971). This bill contained a
provision similar to the amendment proposed by Representative
Green's subcommittee nearly one year earlier. Title X of H.R.
7248 prohibited gender discrimination in any education program or
activity receiving federal financial support. H.R. Rep. No. 92-
554, at 108 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2511 -
12. The House report on H.R. 7248 described this provision as a
response to discriminatory admissions policies and employment
practices at federally funded schools. See id. Once again,
neither the House report nor the underlying testimony discussed
student-student sexual harassment.
While the House bill remained in committee, the Senate was
considering a similar education bill. See S. 659, 92nd Cong.
(1971). The Senate bill emerged from the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare on August 3, 1971, without any
14
antidiscrimination provision at all. Consequently, on August 5,
1971, Senator Birch Bayh introduced on the Senate floor an
amendment to the committee's version of S. 659. See 117 Cong.
Rec. 30,156. (1971). His amendment, like the House provision
drafted by Representative Green's subcommittee, extended the
antidiscrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
gender discrimination by federally funded "institutions of higher
learning."9 See id. at 30,155. In defending his amendment,
Senator Bayh did not discuss student-student sexual harassment,
nor did he discuss school discipline. He focused on gender
discrimination in school admissions and employment opportunities
for female teachers. See id. at 30,155 - 56. In any event, the
Senate rejected Bayh's amendment as non-germane, id. at 30,415,
and the Senate passed S. 659 on August 6, 1971, without an
antidiscrimination provision.
On November 3, 1971, the House began consideration of S.
659, as passed by the Senate. The House "amended" the Senate
bill by striking virtually the entire contents of S. 659 and
replacing it with the contents of H.R. 7248, including the
antidiscrimination provision. See S. Rep. No. 92-604, at 1
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2595, 2595. The House
9
Senator Bayh's first amendment provided, "No person . .
. shall, on the ground of sex, . . . be subject to discrimination
under any program or activity conducted by a public institution
of higher education, or any school or department of graduate
education, which is a recipient of Federal financial assistance
for any education program or activity." 117 Cong. Rec. at
30,156.
15
made this change without official comment and passed its version
of S. 659 on November 4, 1971. See 117 Cong. Rec. at 30,882.
On November 24, 1971, the Senate, by unanimous consent,
referred the House version of S. 659 back to the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, which proceeded to amend the House
version to conform to the original Senate version. See S. Rep.
No. 92-604, at 1 - 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2595,
2595 - 96. Once again, the committee did not discuss gender
discrimination at all, much less sexual harassment among
students. On February 7, 1972, the Senate committee sent its own
version of S. 659 back to the floor of the Senate. See 118 Cong.
Rec. 2806 (1972).
Once the bill returned to the Senate floor, Senator Bayh
again introduced an amendment to add an antidiscrimination
provision.10 See id. at 5802 - 03. Bayh's proposal was intended
to "close[] loopholes in existing legislation relating to general
education programs and employment resulting from those programs."
Id. at 5803. In support of his amendment, Senator Bayh stated,
we are dealing with three basically different types of
discrimination here[:] . . . discrimination in
admission to an institution, discrimination of [sic]
available services or studies within an institution
once students are admitted, and discrimination in
10
Senator Bayh's second amendment stated, "No person . .
. shall, on the basis of sex, . . . be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance . . . ." 118 Cong. Rec. at 5803.
16
employment within an institution, as a member of the
faculty or whatever.
Id. at 5812. To counter these problems, Senator Bayh proposed a
provision he thought would "cover such crucial aspects as
admissions procedures, scholarships, and faculty employment, with
limited exceptions." Id. at 5803. Yet again, no senator
mentioned student-student sexual harassment or school discipline.
The Senate adopted Bayh's second amendment on February 28,
1972. See 118 Cong. Rec. at 5815 (1972). Because of
irreconcilable differences between the House and Senate versions
of S. 659, both Houses referred the bill to a conference
committee. See S. Conf. Rept. No. 92-798, at 1 (1972). The
conference committee reported out a joint bill containing the
antidiscrimination measure now known as Title IX. The committee,
however, did not explain its reasons for including Title IX. The
conference bill passed both Houses and was signed into law on
June 23, 1972. See 118 Cong. Rec. at 22,702. Throughout this
long legislative history, the drafters of Title IX never
discussed student-student sexual harassment or the related issue
of school discipline.
B.
While the legislative history of Title IX does not indicate
that Congress authorized a private cause of action for student-
student sexual harassment, the legislative history does show that
17
Title IX was enacted under the Spending Clause of Article I. See
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.11 When Congress conditions the
receipt of federal funding upon a recipient's compliance with
federal statutory directives, Congress is acting pursuant to its
spending power. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463
U.S. 582, 598 - 99, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3230 - 31, 77 L. Ed. 2d 866(1983) (opinion of White, J.). The legislative history of Title
IX indicates that Congress intended to impose upon recipients of
federal educational assistance a requirement of non-
discrimination on the basis of sex. The Spending Clause
authorized Congress to impose this condition.
Representative Green put it succinctly: "If we are writing
the law, I would say that any institution could be all men or all
women, but my own feeling is that they do it with their own funds
and not taxpayers' funds." Higher Education Amendments of 1971:
Hearings on H.R. 32, H.R. 5191, H.R. 5192, H.R. 5193, and H.R.
7248 Before the Special Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm.
on Education and Labor, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 581 (1971).
Representative Green also quoted with approval President Nixon,
who had stated, "Neither the President nor the Congress nor the
conscience of the Nation can permit money which comes from all
the people to be used in a way which discriminates against some
of the people." 117 Cong. Rec. at 39,257 (1971) (statement of
11
Section 8 of Article I provides, in part, that "[t]he
Congress shall have [the] Power To . . . provide for the . . .
general Welfare of the United States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
cl. 1.
18
Rep. Green). To Senator Bayh, the reach of Title IX was clearly
restricted to federally funded institutions. See 118 Cong. Rec.
at 5812. In support of Title IX, Senator McGovern stated, "I
urge my colleagues to take every opportunity to prohibit Federal
funding of sex discrimination." 117 Cong. Rec. at 30,158. This
legislative history clearly shows that Congress intended Title IX
to be a "typical 'contractual' spending-power provision."12
Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 599, 103 S. Ct. at 3231.
In addition to these indications of congressional intent,
similarities between Title IX and Title VI indicate that Title IX
was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause. As noted above,
Title VI prohibits recipients of federal funding from engaging in
race discrimination. In Guardians Association v. Civil Service
12
The Supreme Court has left open the question of whether
Title IX was enacted under the Spending Clause. See Franklin,
503 U.S. at 75 n.8, 112 S. Ct. at 1038 n.8. One could argue, as
did the petitioner in Franklin, that Title IX was enacted under §
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides Congress with the
authority to enact legislation preventing states from "deny[ing]
to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
The Equal Protection Clause, however, only protects against
action by state-sponsored entities. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 13, 68 S. Ct. 836, 842, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948). Federal
funding does not make a public school a state actor. See
Blackburn v. Fisk University, 443 F.2d 121, 123 (6th Cir. 1971).
Thus, if Title IX had been enacted under the Fourteenth
Amendment, then the antidiscrimination provision of Title IX
would not reach federally funded schools that were not state
actors. We think that the plain language of Title IX commands a
different result: no school that receives federal funding may
discriminate on the basis of gender. Therefore, we conclude that
Title IX was enacted pursuant to a power that can reach non-state
actors as well as state actors -- the spending power. See
Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1013 n.14.
19
Commission, at least six members of the Supreme Court agreed that
Title VI was enacted under the Spending Clause. See 463 U.S. at598 - 99, 629, 638, 103 S. Ct. at 3230 - 31, 3247, 3251; see also
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 - 69, 94 S. Ct. 786, 789, 39 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (1974) (describing how a school district "contractually
agreed to comply with title VI" when it accepted federal
funding).
As Justice White quoted from the legislative history of
Title VI, "It is not a regulatory measure, but an exercise of the
unquestioned power of the Federal Government to fix the terms on
which Federal funds shall be disbursed." Guardians Ass'n, 463
U.S. at 599, 103 S. Ct. at 3231 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6546
(1964) (quoting Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127,
143, 67 S. Ct. 544, 553, 91 L. Ed. 794 (1947))) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Justice White summed up the
legislative philosophy behind Title VI: "Stop the
discrimination, get the money; continue the discrimination, do
not get the money." Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 599, 103 S. Ct.
at 3231 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. at 1542) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This interpretation matches the plain language
of Title VI, which conditions the disbursement of federal funds
on the recipient's agreement not to discriminate on the basis of
race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
The language of Title IX is virtually identical to the
language of Title VI. See 117 Cong. Rec. at 30,156 (statement of
Sen. Bayh). The only differences are the substitution of the
20
words "on the basis of sex" for the words "on the ground of race,
color, or national origin" and the insertion of the word
"educational" in front of the words "program or activity." See
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 586, 104 S. Ct. 1211,
1228, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d with 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a). Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has found that
"Title IX was patterned after Title VI." Cannon, 441 U.S. at
694, 99 S. Ct. at 1956.
The Supreme Court's study of the legislative history of
Title IX has led it to conclude that the drafters of Title IX
intended that courts interpret it in the same way they have
interpreted Title VI. Id. at 696, 99 S. Ct. at 1957. Therefore,
we find that Title IX, like Title VI, was enacted under Congress'
power to spend for the general welfare of the United States. See
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th
Cir. 1997); Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185,
1187 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937, 102 S. Ct.
1993, 72 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1982). We now consider the implications
of this finding.
III.
A.
When Congress enacts legislation pursuant to the Spending
21
Clause, it in effect offers to form a contract with potential
recipients of federal funding. See Pennhurst v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 17, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1540, 67 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1981).
Recipients who accept federal monies also accept the conditions
Congress has attached to its offer. See South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 206, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2795 - 96, 97 L. Ed. 2d 171(1987). A prospective recipient is free to decline a grant of
federal funding. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
168, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2424, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1992). Similarly,
a current recipient may withdraw from a federal program and
decline further funding if it so chooses. See Guardians Ass'n,
463 U.S. at 596, 103 S. Ct. at 3229. The freedom of recipients
to decline prospectively or to terminate retrospectively a grant
of federal funding ensures that they will remain responsive to
the preferences of their local constituents. See New York, 505
U.S. at 168, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
To ensure the voluntariness of participation in federal
programs, the Supreme Court has required Congress to give
potential recipients unambiguous notice of the conditions they
are assuming when they accept federal funding. Pennhurst, 451
U.S. at 17, 101 S. Ct. at 1540. A spending power provision must
read like a prospectus and give funding recipients a clear signal
of what they are buying. The Court has explained, "By insisting
that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation." Id. With regard to the case at hand,
22
"Congress must be unambiguous in expressing to school districts
the conditions it has attached to the receipt of federal funds."
Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 398 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, --- S. Ct. ---, --- L. Ed. 2d
--- (1997). We therefore consider whether Congress gave the
Board unambiguous notice that it could be held liable for failing
to stop G.F.'s harassment of LaShonda.
Appellant and the United States Department of Justice, as
amicus curiae, argue that Title IX gave the Board clear notice of
this form of liability. Appellant points to the Supreme Court's
decision in Franklin. In Franklin, the Court suggested that
"th[e] notice problem does not arise in a case . . . in which
intentional discrimination is alleged." 503 U.S. at 74 - 75, 112
S. Ct. at 1037. The Court stated that the plain language of
Title IX imposes on schools a duty not to discriminate on the
basis of sex, and when a school teacher sexually harasses a
student, that teacher is discriminating on the basis of sex. Id.
at 75, 112 S. Ct. at 1037. Appellant argues that a school
employee is intentionally discriminating on the basis of sex when
he or she fails to prevent one student from sexually harassing
another.13 Hence, appellant asserts that the school board here
13
Appellant and the Department of Justice argue that we
should use Title VII standards of liability to interpret Title
IX. An employer is directly liable under Title VII if it is
deliberately indifferent to peer sexual harassment in the
workplace. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530,
1538 - 39 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Appellant argues that a
school should also be liable if it is deliberately indifferent to
peer sexual harassment at school.
23
The superficial appeal of this argument has attracted the
adherence of a few courts. See, e.g., Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at170 - 71. These courts have applied Title VII standards of
liability to Title IX cases simply because (1) Title VII and
Title IX both deal with sexual harassment and (2) the Supreme
Court once cited a Title VII case in discussing liability under
Title IX, see generally Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75, 112 S. Ct. at
1037 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64,
106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986)). See Bruneau, 935
F. Supp. at 170 - 71.
However, the Supreme Court has never discussed student-
student sexual harassment or generally applied Title VII
jurisprudence to Title IX cases. Perhaps for this reason, some
courts that have imposed Title VII-type liability under Title IX
have refused -- without much explanation -- to apply all of Title
VII jurisprudence to Title IX. See, e.g., Bruneau, 935 F. Supp.
at 169 - 70 ("[T]he Court cautions that by holding that Title VII
legal standards apply to an analysis of Title IX claims, the
Court is not holding that the entirety of Title VII jurisprudence
must be applied to Title IX."). Other courts have altogether
refused to apply Title VII jurisprudence to Title IX. See, e.g.,
Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 656 ("Franklin's single citation to Meritor
Savings to support the Court's conclusion that sexual harassment
is sex discrimination does not by itself justify the importation
of other aspects of Title VII law into the Title IX context.").
We decline appellant's invitation to use Title VII standards
of liability to resolve this Title IX case. See Doe v. Petaluma
City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1450 - 51 (9th Cir. 1994). First,
Title VII and Title IX are worded differently. If Congress
wished Title IX to be interpreted like the earlier-enacted Title
VII, Congress would have written Title IX to read like Title VII.
Congress did not. Interpreting the plain language of different
statutes does not automatically produce the same result simply
because both statutes proscribe similar behavior.
Second, Title VII was enacted under the far-reaching
Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 n.10
(9th Cir. 1982). Title IX was not, and consequently its reach is
narrower.
Third, the exposition of liability under Title VII depends
upon agency principles. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72, 106 S. Ct.
at 2408; Faragher, 111 F.3d at 1534 - 36. Agency principles are
useless in discussing liability for student-student harassment
under Title IX, because students are not agents of the school
board. See generally Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)
24
had sufficient notice, for purposes of the Spending Clause, that
it could be held liable. We disagree.14
(defining an agency relationship as one in which the principal
consents to representation by the agent and the agent consents to
control by the principal). Therefore, even if employers owe to
employees some sort of nondelegable duty to eliminate peer
harassment in the workplace, see generally id. § 492 (discussing
employers' duty to provide reasonably safe working conditions for
their employees), schools owe to students no comparable duty. In
short, Title VII jurisprudence does not control the outcome of
this case.
14
We note that neither this court nor the Supreme Court
in Franklin fully addressed the question of whether a student can
state a claim under Title IX for sexual harassment by a teacher -
- much less whether a student can state a claim under Title IX
for sexual harassment by another student.
The defendant school board in Franklin successfully moved
the district court to dismiss Franklin's Title IX suit on the
ground that "compensatory relief is unavailable for violations of
Title IX," a holding which this court affirmed. Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 911 F.2d 617, 618 (11th Cir. 1990).
The school board apparently conceded on appeal that the
plaintiff's allegations stated a claim under Title IX. See id.
at 619.
Similarly, the school board conceded before the Supreme
Court that teacher-student sexual harassment violated Title IX.
See Brief for Respondents at 2, 7, Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Sch. Dist., 503 U.S. 60, 112 S. Ct. 1028, 117 L. Ed. 2d 208(1992) (No. 90-918). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider "whether the implied right of action under Title IX . .
. supports a claim for monetary damages." Franklin, 503 U.S. at62 - 63, 112 S. Ct. at 1031. The Court emphasized that "the
question of what remedies are available under a statute that
provides a private right of action is 'analytically distinct'
from the issue of whether such a right exists in the first
place." Id. at 65 - 66, 112 S. Ct. at 1032. In fact, the
Franklin Court rejected the arguments of the United States as
amicus curiae precisely because those arguments concerned the
existence vel non of a cause of action for teacher-student sexual
harassment, a question which the Court considered "irrelevant."
Id. at 69, 112 S. Ct. at 1034.
The Franklin Court discussed the notice element of the
Spending Clause solely to counter the school board's argument
that "the normal presumption in favor of all appropriate remedies
should not apply because Title IX was enacted pursuant to
25
The terms of Title IX gave educational institutions notice
that they must prevent their employees from themselves engaging
in intentional gender discrimination. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at
75, 112 S. Ct. at 1037. Thus, school administrators cannot deny
admission to female applicants because of their gender. See
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709, 99 S. Ct. at 1964. School
administrators cannot discriminate against teachers on account of
sex. See North Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 530, 102 S. Ct.
at 1922 - 23. Teachers cannot sexually harass their students.
See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74 - 75, 112 S. Ct. at 1037.
The present complaint, however, does not allege that a
school employee discriminated against LaShonda in any of the
foregoing ways. The complaint does not allege, for example, that
Fort, Maples, Pippin, or Querry sexually harassed LaShonda.
Rather, the complaint alleges that these individuals failed to
take measures sufficient to prevent a non-employee from
discriminating against LaShonda. We do not think that the Board
was on notice when it accepted federal funding that it could be
held liable in this situation.
B.
Congress' Spending Clause power." Id. at 74, 112 S. Ct. at 1037.
Viewed in this light, the Supreme Court's suggestion that
teacher-student sexual harassment gives rise to a cause of action
under Title IX was arguably dicta. We assume that Franklin
created a cause of action for teacher-student sexual harassment
under Title IX, but we are wary of extending this assumed holding
to student-student sexual harassment. In any event, the Court's
discussion of this issue does not foreclose our own consideration
of whether appellant has stated a claim under Title IX.
26
First, as we have noted, nothing in the language or history
of Title IX suggests that Title IX imposes liability for student-
student sexual harassment.15 Second, the imposition of this form
of liability would so materially affect schools' decisions
whether to accept Title IX funding that it would require an
express, unequivocal disclosure by Congress. Adopting
appellant's theory of liability, however, could give rise to a
form of “whipsaw” liability, under which public schools would
face lawsuits from both the alleged harasser and the alleged
victim of the harassment. Moreover, reasonable public school
officials could perceive the likely number of such suits to be
large. Because our endorsement of appellant's theory of
liability would alter materially the terms of the contract
between Congress and recipients of federal funding, appellant
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The essence of appellant's complaint is this: once a public
school student complains to her teacher that a classmate has
sexually harassed her, the teacher and the school board become
15
The dissent devotes a great deal of attention to
whether Congress intended that Title IX create a cause of action
for student-student sexual harassment. See Post, at *1 - *7. We
seriously doubt whether Congress considered this problem at all
when it enacted Title IX, but, in any case, the dissent's heavy
reliance on its conclusory analysis of the language and history
of Title IX is largely irrelevant. The question is not whether
Congress intended to create a cause of action under Title IX for
student-student sexual harassment but, rather, whether Congress
gave school boards notice of this form of liability. In the
absence of any supporting legislative history, statutory
construction of ambiguous language cannot support a finding of
notice as required by the Spending Clause.
27
subject to the threat of liability in money damages under federal
law if they can prevent the classmate from harassing again and
fail to do so.16 See, e.g., Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023 ("Once
a school district becomes aware of sexual harassment, it must
promptly take remedial action which is reasonably calculated to
end the harassment.") (emphasis added). In practical terms, this
means that school officials would have to isolate an alleged
harasser from other students through suspension or expulsion.
The complaint devotes little attention to what measures the
Board could have taken to avoid liability. The complaint admits
that Querry and Fort tried to stop G.F.'s harassment by
threatening him and by separating him from LaShonda within Fort's
classroom. Appellant clearly does not believe that these
measures sufficed. As evidence of "deliberate indifference," the
complaint also alleges that the Board failed to create a school
sexual harassment policy. It seems unlikely, however, that the
mere existence of such a policy would foreclose liability under
appellant's theory of the case.
Apparently, the appropriateness of the Board's remedial
measures depends on whether the harassment actually ends. The
complaint suggests that G.F. should have been "suspended, kept
16
Private schools that receive federal funding would also
be subject to suit under appellant’s theory of Title IX
liability. Private school teachers and administrators, however,
would not ordinarily be subject to suit under § 1983, as would
their public school counterparts, because they would not
ordinarily be acting under color of state law. See § 1983; see
generally supra, n.2. Accordingly, we discuss individual
liability only with respect to public school employees.
28
away from LaShonda, or disciplined in [some] way" after LaShonda
complained. The Department of Justice argues broadly that a
school board must take "effective action" in response to an
allegation of harassment. We take these arguments to mean the
same thing: a school board must immediately isolate an alleged
harasser from other students to avoid the threat of a lawsuit
under Title IX.
Physical separation of the alleged harasser from other
students is the only way school boards can ensure that they
cannot be held liable for future acts of harassment. If a school
official simply tells the alleged harasser, "Don't do it again,"
and the harasser does it again, then the board becomes
susceptible to the argument that it had the power to end the
harassment, but failed to do so out of "deliberate indifference."
If the official merely transfers the alleged harasser to another
classroom, the board faces the threat of suit for any acts of
harassment committed by him in the new classroom -- after all,
the school had notice of his dangerous propensities and did not
do all it could to prevent him from harassing his new classmates.
Segregating the sexes into two separate programs within the same
school would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Title IX.
Therefore, in practical terms, to avoid the threat of Title IX
liability under appellant's theory of the case, a school must
immediately suspend or expel a student accused of sexual
29
harassment.17
Appellant's standard of liability therefore creates for
school boards and school officials a Hobson's choice: On the one
hand, if a student complains to a school official about sexual
harassment, the official must suspend or expel the alleged
harasser or the board will face potential liability to the
victim. Moreover, if a public school official with control over
the harasser finds out about his misconduct and fails to isolate
him, that official runs the risk of personal liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving the victim of her Title IX rights if
the harasser engages in further abuse.18 See Nicole M., 1997 WL
193919, at *13; Oona R.-S., 890 F. Supp. at 1462; see also
Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 723 - 24 (6th
Cir. 1996) (holding that the remedial scheme of Title IX does not
preclude a section 1983 claim based on the same conduct).
On the other hand, if the public school official, presiding
17
This is the approach, incidentally, that some school
boards have already adopted. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Kissing
Cases Highlight Schools' Fears of Liability for Sexual
Harassment, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1996, at A22, A22 ("While the
recent suspensions of two little boys for kissing girls were
widely seen as excessive, they highlight the confusion that is
sweeping schools as educators grapple with a growing fear that
they may be sued for failing to intervene when one student
sexually harasses another.").
18
If we were to rule in favor of appellant, Fort, Maples,
Pippin, Querry, and Dumas would arguably be entitled to qualified
immunity against § 1983 liability for their actions in this case.
See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir.
1995). Ruling in favor of appellant, however, would deprive
future, similarly situated defendants of qualified immunity,
because it would clearly establish a statutory right of which a
reasonable school employee would know.
30
over a disciplinary hearing, suspends or expels the alleged
harasser, the school board may face a lawsuit alleging that the
official acted out of bias -- out of fear of suit. The right to
a public education under state law is a property interest
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736, 42 L.
Ed. 2d 725 (1975). Accordingly, students facing a deprivation of
this right must be afforded due process.19 Id. at 579, 95 S. Ct.
at 738. A fair hearing in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement
of due process. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct.
623, 625, 99 L. Ed. 942 (1955). The decisionmaker who presides
over the hearing must be impartial.20 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421
19
If Georgia provided a procedure for challenging the
impartiality of the school's decisionmaker, the alleged harasser
would have received all the process to which he was entitled, and
he would have no claim under the Due Process Clause. See
McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Absent such a procedure, he could bring suit in federal court
under § 1983, alleging that the state failed to accord him the
process he was due. Whether the alleged harasser repairs to
state court or to federal court, however, the disruptive effect
on school officials, teachers, and students would be the same.
20
In his separate opinion, JUDGE CARNES insists that the
requirements of the procedural component of the Due Process
Clause are met when a school disciplinarian affords a student
faced with suspension an "informal" opportunity to explain his
side of the story. See Post, at *1 - *2. JUDGE CARNES'
reasoning is correct, as far as it goes, but he focuses on one
narrow subset of cases -- "any suspension of up to ten days."
Post at *1.
In Goss, the Supreme Court held that, "[a]t the very
minimum, . . . students facing suspension and the consequent
interference with a protected property interest must be given
some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." Id. at
579, 95 S. Ct. at 738. The kind of notice and the formality of
the hearing will depend, of course, on the nature and severity of
the deprivation the student faces: for example, "due process
31
U.S. 35, 46, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975);
McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1561 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
As we explain above, appellant's theory of the case could
impose personal liability on any public school official who
learns of an allegation of harassment and fails to exercise his
authority to prevent a recurrence of the harassment. Were we to
adopt appellant’s theory of the case, therefore, public school
requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less,
that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges
against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his
side of the story." Id. at 581, 95 S. Ct. at 740 (emphasis
added); see also, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S.
78, 86, 98 S. Ct. 948, 953, 55 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1978) (noting that
a college student's dismissal for academic reasons necessitates
fewer procedural protections than a dismissal for disciplinary
reasons).
At the end of its opinion in Goss, however, the Supreme
Court stated, "Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder
of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal
procedures. Nor do we put aside the possibility that in unusual
situations, although involving only a short suspension, something
more than rudimentary procedures will be required." Id. at 584,
95 S. Ct. at 741. The Supreme Court left open the possibility
that a more formal notice and hearing would be required for
disciplinary actions more serious than ten-day suspensions, and
so shall we.
Furthermore, regardless of the nature of the notice and the
quality of the hearing, an individual faced with the deprivation
of a property interest is entitled to an impartial decisionmaker
-- a requirement JUDGE CARNES seems to discount. See, e.g., Nash
v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 665 (11th Cir. 1987) ("An
impartial decision-maker is an essential guarantee of due
process."). JUDGE CARNES admits, for example, that a public
school principal would be impermissibly biased, for purposes of
the Due Process Clause, if the principal "took a bribe from [a]
complaining student's parents in return for suspending or
expelling [an] alleged wrongdoer." Post, at *2. JUDGE CARNES,
however, refuses to accept that a principal would be just as
impermissibly biased if the principal were forced to pay money to
a complaining student for not suspending or expelling an alleged
wrongdoer. We fail to grasp the distinction.
32
officials would have a financial incentive to punish alleged
student harassers. A financial incentive may render a
decisionmaker impermissibly biased.21 See Gibson v. Berryhill,
21
On page *4 of his separate opinion, JUDGE CARNES leads
us through a parade of horribles which, he imagines, we have
created by suggesting that appellant's theory of the case would
potentially give public school officials an impermissible
financial incentive to punish alleged student harassers. The
dire consequences he conjures, however, will never come to pass
precisely because we are not adopting appellant's theory of Title
IX liability. Only if we were to adopt her theory might public
school officials face potential liability under both Title IX and
the procedural component of the Due Process Clause. But we do
not adopt appellant's theory of liability.
With regard to non-school settings, JUDGE CARNES overstates
our opinion and then criticizes us for the breadth of our
holding. He chides us for suggesting that "[a]ll federal, state,
or local officials called upon to decide what to do in response
to one person's complaint about another would have a financial
incentive to avoid a lawsuit, which would disqualify them from
making a decision." Post, at *4. We suggest nothing of the
kind.
Nevertheless, on the merits of his critique, we suppose that
all officials in such situations could face lawsuits alleging
impermissible bias -- if none of those officials had any form of
immunity from suit, which, of course, they do have. Stated
differently, public decisionmakers have immunity from suit to
protect them from the sort of bias which might otherwise give
rise to violations of the Due Process Clause. Judges, for
example, have absolute immunity from suit because "the
independent and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the
judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages
liability." Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429,
435, 113 S. Ct. 2167, 2171, 124 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1993). Similar
concerns motivate qualified immunity. See generally Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736, 73 L. Ed.
2d 396 (1982) (reasoning that, without qualified immunity, "there
is the danger that fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of
all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public
officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties'"
(quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S. Ct. 803, 94 L. Ed. 1363 (1950))
(alterations in original)). In fact, as we discuss supra, note
18, the individual defendants in this case would likely be
entitled to qualified immunity.
33
411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S. Ct. 1689, 1698, 36 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1973).
Therefore, the disciplinary measures required to avoid liability
under Title IX could subject the school board to the threat of
suit by the disciplined harasser.22
In addition to the threat of this whipsaw liability, schools
would face the virtual certainty of extensive litigation costs.
These costs would include not only lawyers fees, but also the
burdens associated with the disruption of the educational
process. The litigation we describe would inevitably involve
In sum, we create no new procedural due process rights, as
JUDGE CARNES asserts. Our opinion does not even suggest that we
would have to create such rights if we were to uphold appellant's
theory of Title IX liability. Rather, our opinion states that
this form of liability is a logical extension of appellant's
theory of the case, and Congress gave no notice to public school
boards that they would be potentially undertaking this form of
liability when they accepted federal funding under Title IX.
22
All of the foregoing assumes, of course, that the
allegations of harassment are true. While we hesitate to assume
that any allegations of student-student sexual harassment are
false, we do not doubt that school students will be tempted into
mischief by the prospect of swift punishment against any
classmate whom they accuse of sexual harassment.
Moreover, public school officials would find such false
accusations difficult to combat. Under Title VII standards of
liability, which the appellant, the United States, and the
dissent seem anxious to adopt, an employer may be sued for
retaliating against an employee who complains about sexual
harassment. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) ("It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual . . . because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.").
Thus, under the logical implications of appellants theory of
Title IX liability, a school board could face a lawsuit from the
complaining student if it disciplines her for bringing a
vexatious complaint against a classmate. As discussed in the
text, the threat of lawsuits under § 1983 against the public
school officials themselves would soon follow.
34
teachers, students, and administrators in time-consuming
discovery and trial preparation. Schools could reasonably expect
to receive from Congress explicit notice of these consequences.
They did not.23
23
Appellant and the Department of Justice draw our
attention to the regulatory activities of the Office of Civil
Rights of the United States Department of Justice ("OCR"). The
OCR issued interim guidelines concerning schoolhouse sexual
harassment on August 16, 1996. See Sexual Harassment Guidance:
Peer Sexual Harassment, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,728 (1996). These
guidelines issued after the alleged harassment of LaShonda.
Moreover, at the time of the alleged harassment, the code of
federal regulations did not discuss student-student sexual
harassment. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.31 (1992). Therefore, OCR's
regulations did not put the Board on official notice of its
potential liability for G.F.'s harassment of LaShonda.
Nevertheless, appellant and the Department of Justice urge
that we defer to the OCR's current interpretation of Title IX for
purposes of this case. The OCR issued final policy guidance on
student sexual harassment on March 13, 1997. See Sexual
Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,
Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997). In
this publication, the OCR constructs a labyrinth of factors and
caveats which simply reinforces our conclusion that the Board was
not on notice that it could be held liable in the present
situation.
According to the March 13 guidance, schools are liable for
failing to eliminate
sexually harassing conduct (which can include unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual
nature) . . . by another student . . . that is
sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit
a student's ability to participate in or benefit from
an education program or activity, or to create a
hostile or abusive educational environment.
Id. at 12,038.
Because the meaning of this language may not be obvious to
school officials, the March 13 guidance lists several factors
which should be taken into account when a student is sent to the
office for sexually harassing another student. Among other
factors and subfactors, the school official should consider the
35
C.
School boards could reasonably believe that this form of
whipsaw liability would arise in a substantial number of cases.
According to a 1993 survey of American public school students,
65% of students in grades eight to eleven were victims of
"welcomeness" of the conduct, the age of the harasser, the age of
the victim, the relationship between the parties, the degree to
which the conduct was sexual in nature, the duration of the
conduct, the frequency of the conduct involved, the degree to
which the conduct affected the victim's education, the
pervasiveness of the conduct at the school, the location of the
incident, the occurrence of any similar incidents at the school,
the occurrence of any incidents of gender-based but non-sexual
harassment, the size of the school, and the number of individuals
involved in the incident.
The school official should keep in mind that "in some
circumstances, nonsexual conduct may take on sexual connotations
and may rise to the level of sexual harassment." Id. at 12,039.
He should also remember that "a hostile environment may exist
even if there is no tangible injury to the student," and even if
the complaining student was not the target of the harassment.
Id. at 12,041. In addition, the official must recall that a
single act of student-student harassment can create a hostile
environment. See id. Finally, the school official must keep in
mind that, if he does not kick the alleged harasser out of
school, and the harasser misbehaves again, the official could be
personally liable if a jury concludes, after the fact, that he
could have done more to prevent the harasser from harming his
classmates.
The foregoing analysis assumes, of course, that the school
official actually knew of the complaint against the harasser and
summoned him to the front office. According to the OCR, however,
the official may be liable even if he did not know about the
harassment: the official may cause the school to violate Title
IX if he failed to exercise "due care" in discovering the
misconduct. See id. at 12,042. The foregoing does not address
the lawsuit that the harasser's parents will file when the school
official summarily suspends him. According to appellant and the
Department of Justice, the Board received clear notice of this
form of liability when it accepted federal funding under Title
IX. We think not.
36
student-student sexual harassment. See American Ass'n of Univ.
Women Educ. Found., Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual
Harassment in American Schools 11 (1993) [hereinafter AAUW
Survey]. Extrapolating from Department of Education statistics,
roughly 7,784,000 public school students in grades eight through
eleven would consider themselves to be victims of student-student
sexual harassment.24 Furthermore, 59% of students (including 52%
of female students) in grades eight to eleven responded that they
had sexually harassed other students. See AAUW Survey, supra, at
11 - 12. Thus, if this survey is accurate, around 7,177,000
public school students in grades eight to eleven, male and
female, would admit to sexually harassing other students.
We do not adopt these statistics as our own definitive guide
to the extent of sexual harassment in America’s public schools.
We draw attention to these figures only to illustrate what school
boards would have to consider in deciding whether to accept
federal funding under Title IX. The AAUW Survey could suggest to
reasonable public school officials that a substantial number of
lawsuits will be brought under appellant’s theory of Title IX
24
To calculate the number of purported student victims of
harassment in the nation, we multiplied the percentage of victims
provided by the AAUW Survey by the total number of students
enrolled in public schools in grades eight to eleven during the
1992-1993 school year. We obtained the enrollment statistics
from the world-wide-web home page of the Department of Education.
See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Educ., Enrollment in Public Elementary
and Secondary Schools, by Grade: Fall 1980 to Fall 1994 (last
modified Mar. 1996) [hereinafter U.S. Education]. We used the same
process to calculate the total number of professed student
harassers in the nation.
37
liability. Therefore, imposition of this form of liability would
materially affect their decision whether to accept federal
educational funding.25
An enactment under the Spending Clause must read like a
prospectus. Just as a prospectus must unambiguously disclose all
material facts to a would-be purchaser, an enactment under the
Spending Clause must unambiguously disclose to would-be
recipients all facts material to their decision to accept Title
IX funding. The threat of whipsaw liability in a substantial
number of cases would materially affect a Title IX recipient's
decision to accept federal funding, yet Congress did not provide
unambiguous notice of this type of liability in the language or
history of that statute. We will not alter retrospectively the
25
In JUDGE CARNES' separate opinion, he characterizes our
use of statistics as an attempt "to establish that student-
student sexual harassment is such a widespread and extensive
problem that a different holding of this case would impose
massive liability upon school officials and boards." Post, at
*8. As we indicate in the text, this is not our objective at
all. We cite these statistics because school boards may consider
them to be a valid indicator of the amount of litigation that
they will face. If a lawyer for the Monroe County School Board
were trying to advise the Board about the potential costs and
benefits of accepting federal funding, would it not matter to
that lawyer whether accepting federal funds would give rise to a
few lawsuits or thousands of lawsuits?
JUDGE CARNES suggests that the AAUW Survey overstates the
actual number of lawsuits that could be brought under appellant's
theory of Title IX liability. We agree that the survey did not
use the same definition of student-student sexual harassment as
our case law dictates, but statistical purity would arguably
require a jury verdict agreeing with the allegations of each
student who claimed to have been harassed. In any event, there
are plenty of reasons for public school officials to overlook the
statistical flaws in the AAUW Survey when it is their own
pocketbooks -- not those of federal judges -- that are at stake.
38
terms of the agreement between Congress and recipients of Title
IX funding.26
IV.
We condemn the harm that has befallen LaShonda, a harm for
26
As noted above, the purpose of enactments under the
Spending Clause is "to further [Congress's] broad policy
objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and
administrative directives." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 474, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2772, 65 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1980) (opinion
of Burger, C.J.). Congress uses the spending power "to induce
governments and private parties to cooperate voluntarily with
federal policy." Id. If no one chooses to receive federal funds
under a proposed legislative program, Congress's intent would be
frustrated and its policy objectives would remain unfulfilled.
See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1013.
Prospective recipients will decline federal funding and
current recipients will withdraw from federal programs if the
cost of legislative conditions exceeds the amount of the
disbursement. Federal funding represents only 7% of all revenues
for public elementary and secondary schools in the United States.
During the 1992-1993 school year, for example, American schools
received $17,261,252,000 from the federal government out of a
total budget of $247,626,168,000. See U.S. Education, supra, at
.
School authorities must weigh the benefit of this relatively
small amount of funding against not only the threat of
substantial institutional and individual liability -- as
suggested by the AAUW Survey -- but also the opportunity costs of
devoting to litigation hours that might otherwise be spent
running their schools. Because harassment of the sort
experienced by LaShonda is rarely observed directly by school
officials, Title IX claims of the sort envisioned by appellant
would require the time-consuming testimony of numerous student
witnesses. Imposing the liability of the sort envisioned by
appellant could induce school boards to simply reject federal
funding -- in contravention of the will of Congress. See
Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1013.
39
which Georgia tort law may indeed provide redress. Appellant's
present complaint, however, fails to state a claim under Title IX
because Congress gave no clear notice to schools and teachers
that they, rather than society as a whole, would accept
responsibility for remedying student-student sexual harassment
when they chose to accept federal financial assistance under
Title IX. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Circuit Judges EDMONDSON, COX, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK and CARNES
concur in the court’s opinion with the exception of Parts III.B
and III.C.
40