United States v. Mejia ( 1996 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-2485.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Rodrigo MEJIA, Romero Eduardo Grau, Defendants-Appellants.
July 9, 1996.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. (No. 93-43-CR-FTM-17), Lee P. Gagliardi,
Judge.
Before HATCHETT and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and OAKES*, Senior
Circuit Judge.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Rodrigo Mejia appeals his convictions for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess cocaine
with intent to distribute. Romero Eduardo Grau appeals his
convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute,
conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute,
importation of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.
Grau argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion for mistrial in which he argued that the government provided
incorrect information regarding the prior criminal activity of its
key witness against him. We find Grau's argument to be without
merit and affirm his convictions without further discussion. See
11th Cir. Rule 36-1. Mejia argues on appeal that the evidence
presented was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed cocaine with the
*
Honorable James L. Oakes, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the
Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
intent to distribute it or that he knowingly and voluntarily
participated in a cocaine conspiracy. We agree and reverse Mejia's
convictions.
Upon review of the record, we find that, although the evidence
presented to the jury showed that Mejia drove a car containing
cocaine hidden under the back seat, it failed to show that he knew
the cocaine was there or otherwise knowingly possessed the cocaine.
In addition, although the evidence showed that Mejia associated
with another individual, Victor Yepes, who was involved in a
conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, it failed
to show that Mejia knew the goal of the conspiracy or that he
voluntarily joined it.
The evidence presented to the jury indicated that Yepes
intended to purchase fifty kilograms of cocaine from undercover DEA
agents posing as drug smugglers in Fort Myers, Florida. When Yepes
drove from Miami to Fort Myers, Mejia was a passenger in the car.
Upon arrival, Yepes drove to a Wendy's restaurant, got out of the
car, went inside and met with the undercover agents. Mejia, who
remained in the car, was not present for these discussions. Some
time later, Yepes returned to the car and Mejia and Yepes followed
the agents to a warehouse. Mejia remained in the car while Yepes
went into the warehouse and gave the undercover agents $47,000.
The agents had concealed about 20 kilograms of cocaine under
the back seat of a car that was located in the warehouse. The
agents drove the car containing the cocaine back to Miami, and
Yepes and Mejia followed. At an Amoco station near Miami, the
agents got out of their car. Mejia asked the agents for the keys
to their car, but did not suggest he had any knowledge that the car
contained cocaine. After an agent gave Mejia the keys, Mejia drove
to an apartment where he parked the car, got out, and went inside.
After Mejia returned to the car and started to drive away, DEA
agents arrested him. Mejia told the agents that he was to receive
$5,000 to "unload the car," but did not refer in any way to cocaine
or other narcotics.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, we review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo to
determine whether, based on the evidence presented, a reasonable
jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mejia was
guilty of the crimes charged. United States v. Lopez-Ramirez, 68
F.3d 438, 440 (11th Cir.1995). To sustain a conviction for
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly
possessed the cocaine and that he intended to distribute it. Id.To prove conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute,
the government must establish three elements: (1) that a
conspiracy to possess cocaine existed; (2) that the defendant knew
of the goal of the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant, with
knowledge, voluntarily joined it. Id.; United States v. Guerrero,
935 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir.1991). Where the government's case is
circumstantial, "reasonable inferences, and not mere speculation,
must support the jury's verdict." Id.In light of these standards, we find the evidence
insufficient to prove that Mejia knowingly possessed cocaine. The
government presented no evidence that Mejia saw or touched the
cocaine. Though there was evidence that Mejia asked for the keys
to the agents' car containing the hidden cocaine and drove it to an
apartment, "all of the circuits, including this one, require
something more than mere presence in [a car in which drugs are
hidden] to sustain a [drug possession] conviction." United States
v. Stanley, 24 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir.1994). The only other
evidence from which the jury arguably could have inferred that
Mejia possessed cocaine was his post-arrest statement that he was
to be paid $5,000 to "unload the car." But Mejia did not mention
cocaine. Though a jury could infer from Mejia's statement that he
knew he carried an illicit cargo, the government offered no
reliable evidence 1 from which a jury could infer that the illicit
cargo was cocaine or any other illegal narcotic. Because there was
no reliable evidence that Mejia knew the car contained cocaine,
evidence showing that he took the keys and drove the car is
insufficient to prove that he knowingly possessed cocaine.
Accordingly, Mejia's cocaine possession conviction was not proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
We likewise find the evidence insufficient to prove that
Mejia knew of the goal of the conspiracy and, with such knowledge,
voluntarily joined it. The goal of this conspiracy was to possess
1
Agent Gonzalez did testify at trial that Mejia had said in
his post-arrest statement that he was to be paid to "unload the
cocaine". However, Agent Gonzalez earlier had testified that
Mejia had not mentioned drugs. Agent Gonzalez also admitted that
his trial testimony was based solely on Agent Isom's report, yet
Agent Isom himself directly testified that Mejia had not said
anything about drugs, but had said only that he was to be paid to
"unload the car" without mentioning that the car contained
cocaine or any other narcotic. Thus, Agent Gonzalez's statement
under the circumstances is not sufficient evidence to be the sole
support of the charges against Mejia in this case.
cocaine with intent to distribute. Yet the government offered no
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mejia knew of this goal. As with the
possession count, evidence that Mejia asked for the keys to the car
containing the hidden cocaine, drove the car, and, after arrest,
said that he was to be paid to "unload the car," failed to prove
that Mejia knew the conspiracy's goal was the possession of
cocaine. There also was evidence that Mejia rode with Yepes from
Miami to Fort Myers and back. But the government presented no
evidence that Mejia was involved in or present for any negotiations
for the purchase of cocaine, all of which were conducted solely by
Yepes. Mejia's association with Yepes is not sufficient to
establish participation in a conspiracy to possess cocaine with
intent to distribute. See Lopez-Ramirez, 68 F.3d at 441. Thus,
although the evidence places Mejia "in a climate of activity" that
suggests something illegal, it is insufficient to show that Mejia
knew that the goal of this conspiracy was possession of cocaine and
that, with such knowledge, he voluntarily joined that conspiracy.
See U.S. v. Rosas-Fuentes, 970 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir.1992).
Accordingly, Mejia's cocaine conspiracy conviction also is
unsupported by the evidence.
For the foregoing reason, we reverse and vacate the
convictions of Rodrigo Mejia. We affirm the convictions of Romero
Eduardo Grau.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and VACATED in part.