United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-8519.
Victoria DOYLE, Duffey Doyle, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGEL- ELLSCHAFT, Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
Defendants-Appellees.
April 24, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. (No. 1:91-CV-1926-JEC), Julie E. Carnes,
Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, BARKETT, Circuit Judge, and CLARK,
Senior Circuit Judge.
CLARK, Senior Circuit Judge:
CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA PURSUANT TO
O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9.
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA AND ITS HONORABLE JUSTICES:
It appears to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit that this case involves an unanswered question of
Georgia law that is determinative of this appeal. Therefore, we
certify the following question of law, based on the facts recited
below, to the Supreme Court of Georgia for instructions.
THE FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
This is a defective products case brought by
plaintiffs-appellants Victoria and Duffey Doyle in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Victoria Doyle alleged that she purchased a new 1989 Volkswagen
Jetta, which was manufactured by defendant-appellee Volkswagen
Aktiengelellschaft and imported into the United States by
defendant-appellee Volkswagen of America, Inc. The Jetta was
equipped with an automatic shoulder belt that required no action by
the vehicle occupants. By design, the Jetta did not have a lap
belt at the driver's or front seat passenger's position; instead,
it used knee bolsters to prevent a person from sliding under the
belt during a collision.
On August 18, 1989, while driving her new Jetta, Victoria
Doyle was struck in the rear by another vehicle. As a result of
the collision, Ms. Doyle sustained severe injuries to her right
breast. Ms. Doyle's experts are prepared to testify that these
injuries were caused by the shoulder belt and were exacerbated by
the absence of a lap belt: without a lap belt to absorb a portion
of the force of the impact, a majority of the force of the impact
was focused on Ms. Doyle's right breast.
Plaintiffs' complaint set out three theories of liability:
negligence, strict liability, and breach of the implied warranty of
fitness. Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment
with the district court and provided the court with various
literature outlining the alleged known dangers of the shoulder belt
only system. Defendants also filed a motion for partial summary
judgment. They alleged that the Jetta seat belt system complied
with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards promulgated under
the authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act;1 defendants argued that they were entitled to judgment as a
1
Pub.L. No. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified at
15
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431).
matter of law because either (1) they had no duty under Georgia law
to exceed these federal standards, or (2) plaintiffs' common law
claims were preempted by the federal standards.
The district court granted defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' motion. The court
concluded that the Jetta seat belt system complied with the
applicable federal standards, notwithstanding the absence of a lap
belt. We concur in that conclusion. The district court further
concluded that Georgia law as delineated in Honda Motor Co. v.
Kimbrel2 does not hold automobile manufacturers to a higher
standard than federal requirements; thus, a plaintiff cannot
recover under Georgia law for negligently creating a defective
condition when the manufacturer is in compliance with federal
standards. Because the Jetta seat belt system at issue was in
compliance with federal standards, the court concluded that
defendants could not be liable to plaintiffs as a result of the
absence of a lap belt. Finding plaintiffs' claims precluded under
Georgia law, the district court found it unnecessary to reach the
preemption issue.
At the end of its decision, the district court noted that
defendants had not delineated on which counts they sought partial
summary judgment. Thus, the court directed the parties "to file a
joint statement within twenty days outlining the issues remaining
to be determined." The parties filed a joint statement agreeing
that the district court's ruling effectively precluded all of
2
189 Ga.App. 414,
376 S.E.2d 379 (1988), cert. denied (Feb.
15, 1989).
plaintiffs' claims. The district court then entered judgment for
defendants, and plaintiffs appealed.
Since the district court's decision, this circuit has
expressly held that standards promulgated under the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act do not preempt common law
claims. Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp.,
13 F.3d 1516 (11th Cir.), cert.
granted, --- U.S. ----,
115 S.Ct. 306,
130 L.Ed.2d 218 (1994). The
Supreme Court recently affirmed this circuit's decision.
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, --- U.S. ----,
115 S.Ct. 1483,
131
L.Ed.2d 385 (1995).
DISCUSSION
Although we agree defendants are correct that the Jetta seat
belt system complies with applicable federal standards, we must
determine whether the district court correctly interpreted Georgia
law. In concluding that Georgia law precludes automobile product
liability claims when the manufacturer has complied with applicable
federal standards, the district court relied on Honda Motor Co. v.
Kimbrel. In Kimbrel, the plaintiff was injured in a collision that
occurred while she was driving a Honda Accord. The plaintiff
alleged that Honda Motor Company had created a defective condition
by failing to equip the car with airbags, which were not required
under the applicable federal regulations. The court began by
saying:
The parties have argued exhaustively regarding preemption by
federal law, but we must first determine if there is any right
to recover under Georgia law, because preemption results where
state law conflicts with or is more stringent than federal law
and regulations.3
3
376 S.E.2d at 382 (footnote omitted).
The court then went on to conclude that the plaintiff was without
any right to recover under Georgia law because Honda Motor Company
had complied with applicable federal standards:
Because the Georgia standard of duty does not exceed the
federal, Georgia would mandate only that federal standards be
met. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208,
49 C.F.R.
§ 571.208 (1981). When the case law and statutory pattern are
combined the result is that recovery for negligent product
design could not be had against the manufacturer of a vehicle
in compliance with federal regulations as to safety
restraints. In these circumstances there would be no basis
for requiring a manufacturer to furnish passive restraints or
airbags in lieu of safety belts and a jury would not be
authorized to find any breach of duty in the failure to supply
them to a consumer.4
Thus, on the facts before it, the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that Georgia law precludes automobile product liability claims when
the manufacturer has complied with applicable federal standards.
We agree that the Georgia Court of Appeals correctly decided
Kimbrel. In that case it was shown the manufacturer had complied
with the National Safety Standards Act by installing the required
seat belts. Plaintiff's only complaint was that the manufacturer
should have installed air bags. Our court in Taylor v. General
Motors Corp.5 had the identical factual setting in a diversity case
arising in Florida. In Taylor we first discussed two key
provisions in the Safety Act:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard
established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or
political subdivision of a State shall have any authority
either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to
any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any
safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance
of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to
4
Id. at 383.
5
875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.1989).
the Federal standard.6
* * * * * *
Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard
issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from
any liability under common law.7
Our court made reference to the fact that the Safety Act "grants
automobile manufacturers the option of complying with federal
standards for occupant crash protection by installing manual seat
belts instead of airbags." After discussing the cases governing
express and implied preemption, the panel in Taylor concluded:
de la Cuesta [
458 U.S. 141,
102 S.Ct. 3014,
73 L.Ed.2d 664
(1982) ] governs this case. It holds that a state common law
rule cannot take away the flexibility provided by a federal
regulation, and cannot prohibit the exercise of a federally
granted option. See
id. In accordance with de la Cuesta, we
conclude that a state common law rule that would, in effect,
remove the element of choice authorized in Safety Standard 208
would frustrate the federal regulatory scheme. We therefore
hold that appellants' theory of recovery is impliedly
preempted by Safety Standard 208 and the Safety Act.8
While Taylor endorses the Georgia Court's ruling in Kimbrel,
it makes clear that preemption exists only when there is a conflict
between federal and state law, as there would have been had Kimbrel
been decided otherwise. In the present case, plaintiff alleged two
common law actions: Count Two in negligence and Count Three in
breach of implied warranty of fitness. We view the district court
as not allowing plaintiff to seek relief in her common law actions.
That court did rely upon this statement in Kimbrel: "Because the
Georgia standard of duty does not exceed the federal, Georgia would
6
15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1982).
7
Id. § 1397(c).
8
875 F.2d at 827 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
mandate only the federal standards be met."9
The purpose of this certification to the Georgia Supreme
Court is to determine whether the quoted statement is correct. The
United States Supreme Court has said: "Where an intermediate
appellate state court rests its considered judgment upon the rule
of law which it announces, that is a datum for ascertaining state
law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is
convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the
state would decide otherwise."10 Thus, this court must follow
Kimbrel unless there is "persuasive data" that the Supreme Court of
Georgia might render a decision contrary to Kimbrel.
We find in Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., "persuasive data" that
the Supreme Court of Georgia might render a decision contrary to
Kimbrel.11 In Banks, the parents of a child who died after
ingesting a pesticide brought suit alleging that the pesticide was
defectively designed. The Supreme Court of Georgia used the Banks
opinion to articulate a new "risk-utility analysis" to be applied
in design defect cases: "[W]e conclude that the better approach is
to evaluate design defectiveness under a test balancing the risks
inherent in a product design against the utility of the product so
designed."12 The court then set out in a footnote a "non-exhaustive
list of general factors" to be considered in applying this new
9
376 S.E.2d at 383.
10
West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
311 U.S. 223,
237,
61 S.Ct. 179, 183,
85 L.E. 139 (1940).
11
264 Ga. 732,
450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).
12
Id. at 674.
analysis; at the end of the list is this statement:
We note that a manufacturer's proof of compliance with
industry-wide practices, state of the art, or federal
regulations does not eliminate conclusively its liability for
its design of allegedly defective products.13
We find in this language "persuasive data" that the Supreme Court
of Georgia may not conclude that Georgia law precludes product
liability claims when the manufacturer has complied with federal
standards.
Accordingly, we certify the following question to the Supreme
Court of Georgia:
WHEN AN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURER SELLS AN AUTOMOBILE TO A
GEORGIA CITIZEN AND THE AUTOMOBILE IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE SAFETY ACT, DOES GEORGIA LAW PRECLUDE A
PERSONAL INJURY PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIM?
The entire record in this case and the briefs of the parties shall
be transmitted to the Supreme Court of Georgia for assistance in
answering this question.
QUESTION CERTIFIED.
13
Id. at 675 n. 6.
