United States v. Jamie Renardo Glover , 220 F. App'x 934 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 20, 2007
No. 06-11307 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00199-CR-T-17-TGW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMIE RENARDO GLOVER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 20, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jamie Renardo Glover appeals his sentence of 72 months imposed on
remand for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Glover argues that the district court erroneously calculated the
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range and his sentence is both procedurally and
substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
Glover first contends that the district court miscalculated the advisory
Guidelines range by erroneously determining his criminal history score. In
substance, Glover contends that the district court “double counted.” Glover argues
that his previous felony conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer, which
served as the qualifying element for his present crime and was used to determine
his base level offense under section 2K2.1(a) of the Guidelines, should not have
been used in determining his criminal history points under section 4A1.1. We
disagree.
Because Glover did not raise this objection before the district court, we
review his argument for plain error and conclude that no error occurred. United
States v. Raad, 406 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct.
196 (2005). Plain error occurs where “(1) there is an error; (2) that is plain or
obvious; (3) affecting the defendant’s substantial rights in that it was prejudicial
and not harmless; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The district court did not err because the “double counting” was permissible. See
United States v. Wimbush, 103 F.3d 968, 970 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] defendant’s
prior felony conviction can be considered to determine both his base level offense
under § 2K2.1(a) and his criminal history category under § 4A1.1.”).
Glover next contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable, because
the district court did not follow the requirements of Booker. See United States v.
Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180, 1182 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006) (“After Booker, a sentence may be
reviewed for procedural or substantive unreasonableness.”). Glover asserts that the
district court considered his criminal history, and he argues that criminal history is
not a factor that may be considered in sentencing. We disagree.
We again review for plain error, because Glover did not raise his objection
before the district court, and we conclude that the district court committed no error.
A district court may consider the criminal history of a defendant in sentencing,
because the district court must consider factors such as the history of the defendant,
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); the need to promote respect for the law, id.§ 3553(a)(2)(A); and the need to protect the public from future crimes of the
defendant, id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
Lastly, Glover contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in
the light of his criminal history. Glover refers to his “numerous automotive
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infractions and misdemeanor encounters” and argues that his sentence of 72
months is “greater than necessary.” This argument also fails.
Because Glover raised an objection before the district court that arguably
encompasses this argument, we review the sentence for reasonableness, see United
States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 785 (11th Cir. 2005), rather than plain error. The
district court considered the section 3553(a) factors, and “[t]he weight to be
accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion
of the district court.” United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir.
2006), petition for cert. filed, No. 06-7352 (Oct. 19, 2006). Glover’s sentence of
72 months falls at the low end of the advisory Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months
of imprisonment, and we “ordinarily . . . expect a sentence within the Guidelines
range to be reasonable.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788. Glover’s sentence is reasonable.
Glover’s sentence is
AFFIRMED.
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