Crystal Hyde v. K. B. Home, Inc. , 355 F. App'x 266 ( 2009 )


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    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-11755               ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    DECEMBER 1, 2009
    Non-Argument Calendar
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 07-01456-CV-TWT-1
    CRYSTAL HYDE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    K. B. HOME, INC.,
    Defendant,
    DANIEL J. WAIBEL,
    KB HOME,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (December 1, 2009)
    Before CARNES, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Crystal Hyde appeals the grant of summary judgment on her claims of
    gender and pregnancy discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under Title VII,
    42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) and 2000e-3(a) (“Title VII”), and the Pregnancy
    Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (“PDA”); for retaliation under the
    Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (“FMLA”); for commission of the
    tort of negligent retention under state law; and for punitive damages and attorneys’
    fees, brought against her former employer, KB Home, and her former supervisor,
    Daniel Waibel. First, she argues that the district court erred in granting summary
    judgment on her Title VII sex discrimination disparate treatment claim because she
    presented direct evidence of discrimination and established a prima facie case with
    circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Second, she argues that the district
    court erred in granting summary judgment on her Title VII sexual harassment
    claim because she suffered a tangible employment action—withdrawal of work
    assignments—and the hostile work environment interfered with her job
    performance. Third, she contends that the district court erred in finding that she
    did not present direct evidence of retaliation for taking protected FMLA leave or
    that she did not establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Fourth, she
    2
    argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her state law
    claim of negligent retention of Waibel. Finally, she argues that the district court
    erred in granting summary judgment on her claims for punitive damages and
    attorney’s fees.
    Upon review of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment for KB Home for all claims on appeal.
    I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and view the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brooks v. County Comm'n of
    Jefferson County, Ala., 
    446 F.3d 1160
    , 1161–62 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Patrick v.
    Floyd Med. Ctr., 
    201 F.3d 1313
    , 1315 (11th Cir. 2000)). Summary judgment
    should be granted if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file,
    and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
    that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Title VII Sex Discrimination Disparate Treatment
    An employer may not “discharge any individual, or otherwise to
    discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms,
    conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex,”
    3
    and, following enactment of the PDA, this includes discrimination on the basis of
    “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
    2(a)(1), 2000e(k); Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc., 
    209 F.3d 1319
    , 1320 (11th
    Cir. 2000) (per curiam). In other words, an employer is not permitted to take an
    “adverse employment action” against an employee on the basis of his or her sex or
    pregnancy, as to do so would constitute illegal discrimination. See Davis v. Town
    of Lake Park, Fla., 
    245 F.3d 1232
    , 1235 (11th Cir. 2001) (adverse employment
    action is required to obtain relief under Title VII’s anti-discrimination clause).
    Thus, an “adverse employment action” is a crucial component in any
    discrimination claim under Title VII because without it, Title VII offers no remedy.
    See 
    id. Whether an
    employment action is adverse is a matter of federal law, not
    state law. Hinson v. Clinch County, Ga. Bd. Of Educ., 
    231 F.3d 821
    , 828–29 (11th
    Cir. 2000). It is also a question of fact, although one still subject to the traditional
    rules governing summary judgment. See 
    id. at 830
    (noting that a reasonable
    factfinder could have concluded that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment
    action, thus indicating that whether an employment action is adverse is a question
    of fact); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    A plaintiff “must show a serious and material change in the terms,
    conditions, or privileges of employment” to establish an adverse employment
    4
    action. 
    Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239
    (emphasis in original). The actions must also be
    viewed under the totality of circumstances. See Akins v. Fulton County, Ga., 
    420 F.3d 1293
    , 1301 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc.,
    
    292 F.3d 712
    , 716 (11th Cir. 2002)) (“In deciding whether employment actions are
    adverse, we consider the employer’s acts both individually and collectively.”);
    Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Orange County, Fla., 
    256 F.3d 1095
    , 1118 (11th
    Cir. 2001) (“While the other actions might not have individually risen to the level
    of adverse employment action under Title VII, when those actions are considered
    collectively, the total weight of them does constitute an adverse employment
    action.”). It is important to note, however, that not all conduct by an employer that
    negatively affects an employee constitutes adverse employment action in a
    discrimination context. 
    Davis, 245 F.3d at 1238
    . Additionally, “the employee’s
    subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s action is not
    controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a
    reasonable person in the circumstances.” 
    Id. at 1239.
    Under the Supreme Court’s
    precedent in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. White, a
    plaintiff must show that the employer’s challenged action “would have been
    materially adverse to a reasonable employee,” that it would have “likely . . .
    dissuad[ed] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
    5
    discrimination,” and that the plaintiff was harmed by this. 
    548 U.S. 53
    , 57, 126 S.
    Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006).
    Under FMLA regulations, temporary reassignment to accommodate leave is
    permissible. 29 C.F.R. § 825.204(a). A reduction in hours may be accompanied
    by a reduction in overall pay, however, so long as the hourly rate remains constant.
    29 C.F.R. § 825.204(c). An employer may also alter duties or responsibilities in
    connection with an employee’s needs under the FMLA. 29 C.F.R. § 825.204.
    With respect to Title VII, in Davis, we noted that temporary changes in work
    assignments that were essentially demotions but did not change the employee’s pay
    status did not meet the definition of adverse employment 
    action. 245 F.3d at 1240
    .
    While we declined to hold that a change in work assignments can never by itself
    give rise to a Title VII claim, we observed that in the majority of instances, “a
    change in work assignments, without any tangible harm” is outside the protection
    of Title VII's anti-discrimination clause, “especially where . . . the work assignment
    at issue is only by definition temporary and does not affect the employee’s
    permanent job title or classification.” 
    Id. at 1245.
    A transfer to a different position
    can also be “adverse” if it involves a reduction in “pay, prestige, or responsibility.”
    
    Hinson, 231 F.3d at 829
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Hyde argues that the reduction of her pay rate, disallowance of vacation time
    6
    during leave, and withdrawal of substantially all of her work assignments
    constituted a serious and material change in employment involving a loss of
    prestige and responsibility. KB Home responds that it provided Hyde with every
    benefit to which she was entitled under the FMLA and that Hyde’s unsubstantiated
    claim that her pay was reduced at some point is specious. Additionally, KB Home
    argues that there is no record evidence showing that Hyde was denied vacation
    time, and Hyde admits that she was given as much time off as needed under the
    FMLA. KB Home also responds that temporary reduction and reassignment of job
    duties in preparation for an employee’s maternity leave does not rise to the level of
    a serious and material change of the terms of employment, and therefore, cannot
    constitute adverse employment action.
    Hyde additionally argues that the withdrawal of substantially all of her job
    responsibilities a month and a half before she took any intermittent leave were not
    actions taken by her employer to accommodate her FMLA leave requests. KB
    Home argues that it had to have a plan in place to continue its operations and
    ensure that work was getting done in a timely fashion when Hyde was out of the
    office taking intermittent and continuous FMLA leave. Thus, KB Home responds
    that it simply took reasonable steps to ensure that this would occur. It additionally
    argues that a temporary reassignment of job duties is proper under the FMLA, and
    7
    such temporary reassignment cannot, at the same time, somehow be deemed to
    constitute an adverse employment action for Title VII purposes.
    Hyde failed to present evidence of an adverse employment action, and
    therefore, she has not presented a cognizable claim for Title VII sex discrimination
    disparate treatment. First, Hyde relies on Hinson for the proposition that an action
    may be considered an adverse employment action under Title VII “if it involves a
    reduction in pay, prestige, or 
    responsibility.” 231 F.3d at 829
    (emphasis added).
    In Hinson, a female plaintiff’s transfer from high school principal to an
    administrative position, and eventually a full-time teacher constituted adverse
    employment action because the administrative position entailed a significant loss
    of pay, and there was an issue of fact that the new position was less prestigious. 
    Id. Hyde’s case
    is distinguishable because Hyde’s job title did not change, she did not
    receive a reduction in pay for taking FMLA leave, and although her responsibilities
    were reduced and reassigned, it was the result of KB Home preparing for Hyde’s
    intermittent and continuous medical leave. Additionally, “[a]ny adversity must be
    material; it is not enough that a transfer imposes some de minimis inconvenience or
    alteration of responsibilities.” Doe v. Dekalb County Sch. Bd., 
    145 F.3d 1441
    ,
    1453 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). Here, Hyde was not transferred or
    demoted, but her job title and salary remained the same, and her reduction in
    8
    responsibilities alone, therefore, did not amount to an adverse employment action.
    KB Home’s reassignment of Hyde’s job responsibilities to Tammy Catchings and
    Cheryl Nelson were also proper in order to prepare for Hyde’s intermittent and
    continuous FMLA leave. There is evidence that some of Hyde’s duties were daily
    ones, and some days were more intensive than others. This support’s KB Home’s
    reasoning that it withdrew Hyde’s duties because it needed to adequately prepare
    those who would be replacing Hyde while she was out on leave.
    Therefore, we affirm the decision of the district court granting summary
    judgment in favor of KB Home on Hyde’s Title VII sex discrimination disparate
    treatment claim because Hyde did not suffer an adverse employment action.
    B. Title VII Sexual Harassment
    Under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), sex-based harassment of an
    employee is forbidden. See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 
    195 F.3d 1238
    , 1244–45
    (11th Cir.1999) (en banc) (stating that although Title VII does not mention
    harassment, the Supreme Court includes harassment as actionable under Title VII).
    To prove sexual harassment, a plaintiff may rely on either a “tangible employment
    action” theory or a “hostile work environment” theory.1 Hulsey v. Pride
    1
    Hyde appears to have raised both “tangible employment action” and “hostile work
    environment” theories of sexual harassment in Count I of her complaint. Doc. 1 at 19–21 (“Count
    I: Violation of Title VII Gender-Based Discrimination with Tangible Employment Action” and
    alleging that the “gender-based discrimination by Defendant Waibel and the failure of KB Home
    to take adequate remedial measures to remedy discrimination . . . unreasonably interfered with
    9
    Restaurants, LLC, 
    367 F.3d 1238
    , 1245 (11th Cir. 2004). “[A] tangible
    employment action is a significant hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
    with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
    change in benefits.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted) (quoting Burlington
    Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
    524 U.S. 742
    , 761, 
    118 S. Ct. 2257
    , 2268 (1998)). The test
    for an adverse employment action in a disparate treatment context is similar to the
    one for a “tangible employment action” in a harassment analysis. Webb-Edwards
    v. Orange County Sheriff's Office, 
    525 F.3d 1013
    , 1031 (11th Cir. 2008) (equating
    “tangible employment action” with “adverse employment action”). Additionally,
    in order to establish employer liability, a plaintiff must also establish a “causal link
    between the tangible employment action and the sexual harassment.” Cotton v.
    Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 
    434 F.3d 1227
    , 1231 (11th Cir. 2006).
    Because Hyde failed to establish an “adverse employment action” under her Title
    VII disparate treatment discrimination claim, she likewise has not established a
    Plaintiff’s work performance and created and intimidating, hostile and offensive working
    environment”). The Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, however, only addressed
    Hyde’s harassment claim under the tangible employment action theory and denied summary
    judgment on Hyde’s harassment claim because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
    whether a reduction in responsibilities constituted a “tangible employment action.” Doc. 99 at
    43–46. Although the district court granted summary judgment on the harassment claim without
    explanation, it appears that when the district court found that Hyde’s Title VII disparate treatment
    discrimination claim could not survive, it concurrently found that Hyde’s Title VII harassment claim
    also could not survive. Doc. 110 at 4. Because it is unclear which theory of harassment Hyde
    makes her claim under, we address both theories upon review of the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment for KB Home.
    10
    “tangible employment action” for her Title VII harassment claim. Therefore,
    Hyde’s harassment claim under the “tangible employment action” theory cannot
    survive KB Home’s motion for summary judgment.
    A Title VII harassment claim under the “hostile work environment” theory is
    established upon proof that “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory
    intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
    conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
    environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
    510 U.S. 17
    , 21, 
    114 S. Ct. 367
    , 370
    (1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (holding that Title VII is not
    implicated in the case where there is a mere utterance of an epithet); Miller v.
    Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 
    277 F.3d 1269
    , 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). To prove sexual
    harassment under a hostile work environment theory, a plaintiff must show that:
    (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome
    sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her sex; (4) “the harassment
    was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
    employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment;” and (5)
    there is a basis for employer liability. 
    Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1245
    .
    As the fourth element, severe and pervasive, contains both an objective and a
    subjective element, this behavior must result in both an environment “that a
    11
    reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,” and an environment that the
    victim “subjectively perceive[s] . . . to be abusive.” 
    Harris, 510 U.S. at 21
    , 114 S.
    Ct. at 370; 
    Miller, 277 F.3d at 1276
    . In evaluating the objective severity of the
    harassment, this Court looks at the totality of the circumstances and considers,
    inter alia, “(1) the frequency of the conduct, (2) the severity of the conduct, (3)
    whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
    utterance, and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s
    job performance.” 
    Miller, 277 F.3d at 1276
    (citing Allen v. Tyson Foods, 
    121 F.3d 642
    , 647 (11th Cir. 1997)).
    The conduct and comments that Hyde provides for her harassment claim
    based on a “hostile work environment” theory do not rise to the level of conduct
    that is “severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment.” 
    Harris, 510 U.S. at 21
    , 114 S. Ct. at 370. Although several stray comments by Waibel
    were directed towards Hyde, arguably indicating that her reduction in
    responsibilities was due to her pregnancy, these comments to not rise to the level
    of being “severe or pervasive,” and they did not occur until after Hyde returned to
    work after taking FMLA leave. Hyde additionally argues that Waibel’s conduct in
    the office before she went on FMLA leave, specifically ignoring Hyde or
    slamming papers on Hyde’s desk, constituted severe or pervasive conduct that
    12
    altered her working conditions. However, Hyde does not provide any evidence
    that such conduct occurred as a result of her pregnancy or taking FMLA leave, and
    such conduct was not severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.
    Finally, Hyde does not offer any evidence that would indicate that Waibel’s
    comments or conduct unreasonably interfered with her job performance.
    Therefore, Hyde’s Title VII harassment claim based on a “hostile work
    environment” theory cannot survive KB Home’s motion for summary judgment.
    Based on the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment for KB Home on Hyde’s Title VII sexual harassment
    claim because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Hyde’s claim based
    on either a “tangible employment action” theory or a “hostile work environment”
    theory.
    C. FMLA Retaliation and Title VII and FMLA Retaliatory Discharge
    Pursuant to the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), it is unlawful “for any
    employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual
    for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.” Similarly, Title VII,
    42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
    an employee because he or she “has opposed any practice made an unlawful
    employment practice by this subchapter . . . .” This includes internal complaints of
    13
    discrimination. See Rollins v. Fla. Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 
    868 F.2d 397
    , 400
    (11th Cir. 1989). Such discrimination may be proven through direct or
    circumstantial evidence. See Berman v. Orkin Exterminating Co. Inc., 
    160 F.3d 697
    , 701 (11th Cir. 1998). Statements made by a non-decision maker are not
    probative of discriminatory intent as direct evidence. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs.
    Inc., 
    161 F.3d 1318
    , 1330 (11th Cir. 1998).
    To establish a prima face case of retaliation using circumstantial evidence, a
    plaintiff may show that “(1) [she] engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) the
    employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) there is a causal
    connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Berman, 160 at
    701; see also Martin v. Brevard County Pub. Schs., 
    543 F.3d 1261
    , 1268 (11th Cir.
    2008) (per curiam) (citing Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 
    231 F.3d 791
    ,
    798 (11th Cir. 2000) (setting out elements for prima facie case of FMLA
    retaliation). If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
    employer to offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions.
    McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    , 802, 
    93 S. Ct. 1817
    , 1824
    (1973). If one is offered, the presumption of discrimination is rebutted, and the
    plaintiff must offer evidence that the reason is pretext for illegal discrimination.
    Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 
    376 F.3d 1079
    , 1087 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Tex.
    14
    Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 
    450 U.S. 248
    , 255–56, 
    101 S. Ct. 1089
    , 1094–95
    (1981)).
    Under a “cat’s paw” or mixed-motive theory of liability, “a non-
    decisionmaking employee’s discriminatory animus may be imputed to a neutral
    decisionmaker when the decisionmaker has not independently investigated
    allegations of misconduct.” Crawford v. Carroll, 
    529 F.3d 961
    , 979 n.21 (11th
    Cir. 2008). “Where a decision maker conducts his own evaluation and makes an
    independent decision, his decision is free of the taint of a biased subordinate
    employee.” Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 
    261 F.3d 1262
    , 1270 (11th Cir.
    2001). In a mixed-motive case, the plaintiff must prove that her gender played a
    motivating part in an employment decision, and the defendant must show that it
    would have made the same decision regardless of the plaintiff’s status in order to
    avoid liability. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
    490 U.S. 228
    , 258, 
    109 S. Ct. 1775
    ,
    1795 (1989) (plurality opinion). Where a defendant does so, the burden shifts back
    to the plaintiff to demonstrate that termination was motivated by the improper
    consideration. Crawford v. City of Fairburn, Ga., 
    482 F.3d 1305
    , 1309 (11th Cir.
    2007).
    Hyde argues that both withdrawal of her work assignments and her
    termination were the result of retaliation. She argues that she presented direct
    15
    evidence of the pre-termination retaliation through statements by Waibel stating
    that he took her work away “because she got F-ing pregnant” and “was tired of her
    milking the system.” She contends that her termination was the result of retaliation
    and can be established via circumstantial evidence. As to Hyde’s pre-termination
    FMLA retaliation claim, although there is direct evidence that Waibel withdrew
    Hyde’s work and reassigned her duties because Hyde chose to take FMLA leave,
    the reduction and reassignment of duties did not constitute adverse employment
    actions, but were a means of accomodating Hyde’s FMLA leave. Therefore,
    Hyde’s FMLA pre-termination retaliation claim cannot survive KB Home’s motion
    for summary judgment.
    Additionally, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on
    Hyde’s Title VII and FMLA retaliatory discharge claims. There is no evidence
    that Waibel was a decision maker in terminating Hyde. Therefore, even if Waibel
    wished to terminate Hyde for using FMLA leave, his lack of involvement in
    Hyde’s termination means that such evidence cannot establish a retaliatory
    discharge claim. Further, Hyde cannot establish a “cat’s paw” theory of retaliatory
    discharge because she has not presented evidence that any of the actual decision
    makers had any substantial input from Waibel in making their decision. Finally,
    she did not show that this was a mixed motive case because the only evidence of a
    16
    discriminatory motive rests with Waibel, and he did not participate in the decision
    to terminate her through the reduction in force (“RIF”). There is no evidence that
    her gender or status as a pregnant woman played any role in her dismissal through
    RIF. Accordingly, the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to
    KB Home and Waibel regarding her FMLA retaliation claim for withdrawal of
    work assignments is affirmed, and the grant of summary judgment on her claims
    for Title VII and FMLA retaliatory discharge are affirmed.
    D. Georgia State Law Claim for Negligent Retention
    “In a cause of action for negligent retention, an employer may be held liable
    only where there is sufficient evidence to establish that the employer reasonably
    knew or should have known of an employee’s ‘tendencies’ to engage in certain
    behavior relevant to the injuries allegedly incurred by the plaintiff.” MARTA v.
    Mosley, 
    634 S.E.2d 466
    , 469 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (citation and quotation marks
    omitted).
    The district court correctly concluded that Hyde presented no evidence that
    KB Home knew or should have known of any tendency of Waibel to discriminate
    against pregnant women. Her first complaint about Waibel to KB Home did not
    occur until after she returned from leave in August, at which point she met with
    HR to discuss the problem and was promptly reassigned to work under another
    17
    supervisor in a different department. Complaints by another employee about
    earlier animosity towards Hyde were similarly dealt with when Hyde returned from
    leave. Additionally, because KB Home was not on notice about a hostile work
    environment before Hyde went on leave, they cannot be held liable for negligent
    retention. Further, Waibel was terminated shortly after Hyde complained, albeit
    for unrelated reasons. Accordingly, the decision of the district court granting
    summary judgment to KB Home on Hyde’s negligent retention claim is affirmed.
    E. Punitive Damages and Attorneys’ Fees
    We review an award in a Title VII case for abuse of discretion and
    underlying legal claims de novo. See EEOC v. W & O, Inc., 
    213 F.3d 600
    , 610
    (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). A plaintiff may recover punitive damages
    under Title VII if the defendant “engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with
    malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
    aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
    2000e-5(k), a court in its discretion may allow the prevailing party reasonable
    attorneys’ fees.
    Because the district court’s grant of summary judgment to KB Home is
    affirmed as to Hyde’s Title VII claims, Hyde cannot recover punitive damages
    under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment
    18
    regarding punitive damages is affirmed. Because the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment on all claims is affirmed, and Hyde is not a prevailing party;
    the decision to grant summary judgment regarding attorneys’ fees is also affirmed.
    III. CONCLUSION
    Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment to KB Home and Waibel on Hyde’s Title VII
    discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims; FMLA retaliation claim;
    Georgia state law negligent retention claim; and punitive damages and attorneys’
    fees claims.
    AFFIRMED.
    19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-11755

Citation Numbers: 355 F. App'x 266

Judges: Carnes, Marcus, Per Curiam, Wilson

Filed Date: 12/1/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (21)

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Mosley , 280 Ga. App. 486 ( 2006 )

Essie Rollins v. State of Florida Department of Law ... , 868 F.2d 397 ( 1989 )

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. , 114 S. Ct. 367 ( 1993 )

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 101 S. Ct. 1089 ( 1981 )

Kourtney Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old County Store , 434 F.3d 1227 ( 2006 )

Bradley Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc. , 277 F.3d 1269 ( 2002 )

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White , 126 S. Ct. 2405 ( 2006 )

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth , 118 S. Ct. 2257 ( 1998 )

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 93 S. Ct. 1817 ( 1973 )

Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc. , 209 F.3d 1319 ( 2000 )

Belinda Hulsey v. Pride Restaurants , 367 F.3d 1238 ( 2004 )

Janice Akins v. Fulton County, Georgia , 420 F.3d 1293 ( 2005 )

Mack Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Florida, a Florida ... , 245 F.3d 1232 ( 2001 )

Delores M. Brooks v. County Commission, Jefferson , 446 F.3d 1160 ( 2006 )

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , 109 S. Ct. 1775 ( 1989 )

Webb-Edwards v. Orange County Sheriff's Office , 525 F.3d 1013 ( 2008 )

William Shannon v. BellSouth Telecommunications , 292 F.3d 712 ( 2002 )

Loretta Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc. , 376 F.3d 1079 ( 2004 )

74-fair-emplpraccas-bna-1694-71-empl-prac-dec-p-44972-11-fla-l , 121 F.3d 642 ( 1997 )

Crawford v. Carroll , 529 F.3d 961 ( 2008 )

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