Mahmood I. Alyshah v. The State of Georgia , 230 F. App'x 949 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-15332                   AUGUST 2, 2007
    Non-Argument Calendar             THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________                CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 06-00928-CV-TWT-1
    MAHMOOD I. ALYSHAH,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    THE STATE OF GEORGIA,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (August 2, 2007)
    Before BIRCH, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    This is pro se litigant Mahmood I. Alyshah’s fifth appeal from adverse final
    judgments in his many lawsuits arising out of the State Bar of Georgia’s efforts to
    prevent him from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. In one of his
    previous appeals, he challenged the district court’s dismissal of one of his
    complaints against the State of Georgia (“State”), based on Eleventh Amendment
    immunity and state sovereign immunity. See Alyshah v. State of Georgia, Case
    No. 06-15328 (11th Cir. Apr. 11, 2007) (“Alyshah I”).
    In Alyshah I, we stated the following:
    “The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution bars federal
    courts from entertaining suits against states.”           Abusaid v.
    Hillsborough County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 
    405 F.3d 1298
    , 1302
    (11th Cir. 2005). “[I]n the absence of consent[,] a suit in which the
    State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant
    is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” Pennhurst State School
    & Hosp. v. Halderman, 
    465 U.S. 89
    , 100, 
    104 S.Ct. 900
    , 908, 
    79 L. Ed. 2d 67
     (1984). . . . . “Although, by its terms, the Eleventh
    Amendment does not bar suits against a state in federal court by its
    own citizens, the Supreme Court has extended its protections to apply
    in such cases.” Abusaid, 
    405 F.3d at 1303
    . The Eleventh Amendment
    is no bar, however, where (1) the state consents to suit in federal
    court, or (2) where Congress has abrogated the state’s sovereign
    immunity. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 
    495 U.S. 299
    , 304 (1990).
    Here, the Georgia Tort Claims Act specifically preserves the
    State of Georgia’s sovereign immunity from suits in federal courts.
    See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(b). Although the State of Georgia has given
    its consent to being sued in contract or tort actions in its own state
    courts, a state’s consent to suit in state court does not constitute a
    waiver of immunity in federal court. Id.; Robinson v. Georgia Dept.
    of Transp., 
    966 F.2d 637
    , 640 (11th Cir. 1992). As for congressional
    abrogation, we have held that Congress did not intend to abrogate the
    states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in passing § 1983. Robinson,
    
    966 F.2d at 640
    .
    2
    Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting the State
    of Georgia’s motion to dismiss both the federal and state claims
    against it based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State of
    Georgia has not consented to being sued in federal court nor has
    Congress abrogated the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.
    
    Id.
     (emphasis in original).
    The same reasoning controls here. Because the State has not consented to
    being sued in federal court, nor has Congress abrogated the State’s Eleventh
    Amendment immunity, the district court did not err by granting the State’s pre-
    answer motion to dismiss both the federal and state law claims against it based on
    Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity.1 Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    In light of our conclusion that the district court properly dismissed the instant complaint
    based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, our previously filed jurisdictional question concerning
    the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is moot. Moreover, Alyshah has not raised any arguments on appeal
    regarding his facial constitutional challenge to the Georgia statutes or the district court's ruling on
    his motion to strike or motion to recuse, and, thus, he has abandoned all related claims. See AT&T
    Broadband v. Tech Commc’ns Inc., 
    381 F.3d 1309
    , 1320 n.14 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted)
    (holding "[i]ssues not raised on appeal are considered abandoned."). Finally, Alyshah’s argument
    that he is entitled to a default judgment is without merit because the State never was required to file
    an answer, and the 90-day time limit he asserts does not exist. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d), 12(a)(4)(A).
    3