Cascade Crossing II, LLC v. Radioshack Corporation , 534 F.3d 1375 ( 2008 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
_____________________________U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 18, 2008
No. 06-13571 THOMAS K. KAHN
_____________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 01-03084 CV-GET-1
CASCADE CROSSING II, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RADIOSHACK CORPORATION,
f.k.a. Tandy Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________________________
(July 18, 2008)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and GIBSON,* Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable John R. Gibson, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
This case is about the application of a statutory cap on attorneys’ fees under
O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 to a contract dispute between Cascade Crossing II, LLC
(“Plaintiff”) and Radioshack Corp. (“Defendant”). Pursuant to a written lease
agreement, Defendant leases space at a Georgia shopping mall owned by Plaintiff.
The lease agreement authorizes the prevailing party in any legal action to recover
all reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees.
In 2000, Defendant informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff’s lease with another
tenant violated an exclusivity clause in the lease agreement. Plaintiff brought suit
for declaratory judgment, back rent, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment on all claims, and the district court
concluded that Defendant had waived its rights under the exclusivity clause for
acts before November 2000 but had retained its rights after then. The district court
denied both parties’ requests for attorneys’ fees and costs, concluding that neither
party had “prevailed” in the underlying dispute.
On appeal, we concluded that Defendant had waived all of its rights under
the exclusivity clause and determined that Plaintiff was the only prevailing party
and was entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs. Cascade Crossings II, LLC v.
Radioshack Corp., 131 F. App’x 191, 194 (11th Cir. 2005). On remand,
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Defendant argued that O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 capped Plaintiff’s fees. The district
court concluded that O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 did not apply.
We again vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded because the
district court had not explained the basis for concluding that O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11
did not apply. The district court confirmed its former decision, explaining that
O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 did not apply because Plaintiff, among other things, sought a
declaration on the enforceability of part of the lease agreement and, therefore, that
this civil action was not one merely to recover past due rent.
On appeal, we faced an issue of state law—whether O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11
applies to cap the award of attorneys’ fees in this case—that we considered
outcome determinative. Setting out the background in some detail, we certified
the state law issue to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Cascade Crossing II, LLC v.
Radioshack Corp., 480 F.3d 1228, 1230–32 (11th Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court of Georgia clarified the applicable state law for us. See
Radioshack Corp. v. Cascade Crossing II, LLC, 653 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. 2008)
(holding that O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 does apply to cap the award of attorneys’ fees in
this case.
In the light of the Georgia opinion, we conclude that O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11
applies to and limits the award of attorneys’ fees and costs and, therefore,
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precludes an award of full attorneys’ fees and costs as provided for in the lease
agreement. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for
further proceedings.
VACATED and REMANDED.
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