Golfin v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
April 25, 2008
No. 07-11049 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-23197-CV-JEM
WILLIAM GOLFIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 25, 2008)
Before DUBINA, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant William Golfin, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se,
appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as barred by
the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). We granted
Golfin a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on one issue only:
Whether the district court erred by dismissing appellant’s 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254 petition as time-barred where appellant filed a petition for
discretionary review with the Florida Supreme Court but the district
court found that 28 U. S. C. [§ 2244(d)’s] limitation period began to
run 90 days after the District Court of Appeal affirmed appellant’s
conviction and sentence.
Golfin argues only that he is entitled to equitable tolling for the time he filed for
discretionary review with the Florida Supreme Court. The State responds that we
should affirm the district court’s dismissal of his habeas corpus petition because
Golfin did not address the issue raised in COA and therefore abandoned the issue.
Under our well-established procedural rules, we consider issues not clearly
raised on appeal abandoned. Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1303 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 619 (2006). Under the AEDPA, “appellate review is
limited to the issues specified in the COA.” Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d
1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1998), see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We liberally construe
the pleadings of a pro se petitioner. Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788,
791 (11th Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, we will not act as de facto counsel for a pro se
litigant. GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th
2
Cir. 1998).
Golfin did not address the issue raised by the COA; rather he argued that he
was entitled to equitable tolling. Thus, he abandoned the issue on which we
granted a COA. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.
AFFIRMED.
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