Inez H. Rakestraw v. Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JAN 10, 2008
No. 07-14280 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-03062-CV-MHS-1
INEZ H. RAKESTRAW,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SOUTHERN GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF GEORGIA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(January 10, 2008)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Inez H. Rakestraw appeals the summary judgment granted in favor of
Southern Guaranty Insurance Company of Georgia and against Rakestraw’s
complaint of breach of contract. Rakestraw argues that the district court erred
when it concluded that her injuries were excluded from coverage under the
Southern Guaranty policy. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 19, 2005, Rakestraw was injured when a 2001 Dodge Ram
pickup truck owned by Darrell Blankenship and driven by his son, Dustin, struck
Rakestraw’s vehicle. Dustin was working for his father’s business and was on his
way to pick up a piece of equipment needed for use at a job site. A fuel tank, air
compressor, and tool box had been permanently attached to the bed of the truck.
Dustin planned to use the air compressor to reinflate a flat tire on the needed piece
of equipment and then tow the equipment back to the job site.
Darrell Blankenship carried automobile liability insurance issued by Georgia
Farm Bureau Insurance Company with limits of liability for bodily injury of
$250,000. Blankenship also had a commercial general liability insurance policy
issued by Southern Guaranty with limits of liability for bodily injury of
$2,000,000. The Southern Guarantee policy expressly excluded from coverage
liability arising out of the use of any “auto”:
This insurance does not apply to . . . “Bodily injury” or “property
damage” arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or
2
entrustment to others of any . . . “auto” . . . owned or operated by or
rented or loaned to any insured.
Southern Guaranty policy, sec. I, para. (2)(g). The auto exclusion did “not apply to
. . . ‘Bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of the operation of any of the
equipment listed in Paragraph f.(2) or f.(3) of the definition of ‘mobile
equipment.’” Id. at para. (2)(g)(5). Paragraph f of the definition of “mobile
equipment” stated that “self-propelled vehicles with the following types of
permanently attached equipment are not ‘mobile equipment’ but will be considered
‘autos’: . . . (3) Air compressors . . . .”
Rakestraw sued the Blankenships to recover damages for her injuries. A
final judgment was entered in her favor in the amount of $1,224,263.89. Georgia
Farm Bureau paid $250,000 of the award, leaving an unpaid balance of
$974,263.89, plus interest. Southern Guarantee denied coverage under the
commercial policy. The Blankenships assigned to Rakestraw all their assignable
rights against Southern Guaranty. Rakestraw then filed this lawsuit against
Southern Guaranty for breach of contract and sought to recover the balance owed
on the judgment, plus interest and attorney’s fees. The district court concluded that
Rakestraw’s injuries were excluded from coverage under the Southern Guaranty
policy and granted summary judgment in favor of Southern Guaranty.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
3
We review the grant of summary judgment by a district court de novo. Twin
City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2007).
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
III. DISCUSSION
Rakestraw argues that the district court erred when it concluded that the
Southern Guaranty policy excluded her injuries from its coverage. Rakestraw
contends that the exception to the auto exclusion for “‘[b]odily injury’ arising out
of the operation of any of the equipment listed in Paragraph f.(2) or f.(3) of the
definition of ‘mobile equipment’” applied to except her injuries from exclusion.
Rakestraw argues that the district court erred when it concluded that the
“equipment listed in Paragraph . . . (f).(3)” included “[a]ir compressors” and not
“self-propelled vehicles with . . . permanently attached [air compressors].”
Rakestraw also argues that even if the exception applied only to operation of the air
compressor, the transportation of the air compressor constituted its “operation” and
the term “operation” was ambiguous. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the
district court.
Under Georgia law, an insurance policy is interpreted the same as any other
4
contract. RLI Ins. Co. v. Highlands on Ponce, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 798, 800, 635
S.E.2d 168, 170–71 (2006) (citing Hunnicutt v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 256
Ga. 611, 612, 351 S.E.2d 638, 640 (1987)). If the policy is “clear and
unambiguous” the court enforces the contract according to its terms. Schwartz v.
Harris Waste Mgmt. Group, 237 Ga. App. 656, 660, 516 S.E.2d 371, 374 (Ct. App.
1999) (citing CareAmerica v. S. Care Corp., 229 Ga. App. 878, 880, 494 S.E.2d
720, 722 (Ct. App. 1997)). “A contract is not ambiguous, even though difficult to
construe, unless and until an application of the pertinent rules of interpretation
leaves it uncertain as to which of two or more possible meanings represents the
true intention of the parties.” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Davis, 153 Ga. App. 291, 294,
265 S.E.2d 102, 105 (Ct. App. 1980) (citing Village Enters. v. Ga. R.R. Bank &
Trust Co., 117 Ga. App. 773, 774, 161 S.E.2d 901, 903 (Ct. App. 1968)).
The district court correctly concluded that the exception to the auto
exclusion applied to injury arising from the operation of the air compressor, and
not to injury arising from the operation of “self-propelled vehicles . . . with
permanently attached [air compressors].” The policy is unambiguous. The
exception to the auto exclusion included air compressors but not the self-propelled
vehicles to which an air compressor was attached. The transportation of the air
compressor did not constitute its “operation.”
5
Because Rakestraw’s injuries arose from the use of an “auto,” they were
excluded from coverage under the Southern Guaranty policy. Because the injuries
did not arise from the operation of the air compressor, the exception to the auto
exclusion did not apply. Southern Guaranty did not breach its contract when it
denied coverage for Rakestraw’s injuries.
IV. CONCLUSION
The summary judgment in favor of Southern Guaranty is
AFFIRMED.
6