United States v. Warren Lavell Jackson , 343 F. App'x 472 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                  FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-12265                 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    AUGUST 27, 2009
    Non-Argument Calendar
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 99-14021-CR-DMM
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    WARREN LAVELL JACKSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (August 27, 2009)
    Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Warren Lavell Jackson, a federal prisoner convicted of a crack cocaine
    offense, appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2)
    motion for a reduced sentence. After review, we affirm.1
    Under § 3582(c)(2), a district court may modify a defendant’s term of
    imprisonment if the defendant’s sentence was “based on a sentencing range that
    has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 994
    (o) . . . .” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1).
    However, “[w]here a retroactively applicable guideline amendment reduces a
    defendant’s base offense level, but does not alter the sentencing range upon which
    his or her sentence was based, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a reduction in
    sentence.” Moore, 541 F.3d at 1330; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). A
    reduction is not authorized if the amendment does not lower a defendant’s
    applicable guidelines range “because of the operation of another guideline or
    statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).”
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A).
    Here, Jackson’s § 3582(c)(2) motion is based on Amendment 706 to the
    Sentencing Guidelines, which reduced the base offense levels in U.S.S.G. §
    2D1.1(c) applicable to certain crack cocaine offenses. However, at his original
    1
    “In a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, we review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions
    regarding the scope of its authority under the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Moore,
    
    541 F.3d 1323
    , 1326 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 965
    (2009), and 
    129 S. Ct. 1601
     (2009).
    2
    sentencing, Jackson was subject to a mandatory minimum term of life
    imprisonment, pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A), in light of his three previous
    felony drug offense convictions. Thus, his sentencing range was not based on the
    amount of crack cocaine attributed to him under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), but on the
    statutory mandatory minimum. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b). As such, Amendment
    706 had no effect on Jackson’s sentencing range of life imprisonment.
    Jackson’s argument that his original sentence is unconstitutional under
    Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 2348
     (2000), is outside the scope
    of a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) (limiting proceedings
    under § 3582(c)(2) to cases in which a retroactive amendment affects the
    applicable sentencing range); United States v. Bravo, 
    203 F.3d 778
    , 781 (11th
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    531 U.S. 994
    , 
    121 S. Ct. 486
     (2000) (explaining that, in
    § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, all original sentencing determinations remain unchanged
    except the guideline range affected by the amendment). His arguments regarding
    the applicability of United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 738
     (2005),
    and Kimbrough v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 85
    , 
    128 S. Ct. 558
     (2007), are
    foreclosed by our precedent. See United States v. Melvin, 
    556 F.3d 1190
    , 1192
    (11th Cir. 2009); (concluding that “Booker and Kimbrough do not prohibit the
    limitations on a judge’s discretion in reducing a sentence imposed by § 3582(c)(2)
    3
    and the applicable policy statement by the Sentencing Commission”), cert. denied,
    
    129 S. Ct. 2382
     (2009); United States v. Jones, 
    548 F.3d 1366
    , 1369 (11th Cir.
    2008) (concluding that Booker does not provide a basis on which to grant a §
    3582(c)(2) motion), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 1657
     (2009).
    Thus, the district court did not have the authority to reduce Jackson’s
    sentence and properly denied Jackson’s § 3582(c)(2) motion.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-12265

Citation Numbers: 343 F. App'x 472

Judges: Tjoflat, Edmondson, Hull

Filed Date: 8/27/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024