United States v. Newton , 44 F.3d 913 ( 1994 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals,
    Eleventh Circuit.
    Nos. 92-8228, 92-8764 and 94-8376.
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    Joseph NEWTON, Eddie Gregory Batten, Robert Moss, Jr., John
    Brown, Jr., Grady D'Vaughn Reddick, Sean Jackson, Robert Jivens,
    Willie Lee Palmer, Sr., Defendants-Appellants.
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    Robert MOSS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    Grady D'Vaughn REDDICK, Defendant-Appellant.
    Dec. 22, 1994.
    As Corrected by Order Dated Jan. 30, 1995.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of Georgia. (No. CR491-176-3), B. Avant Edenfield, Chief
    Judge.
    Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    ORDER
    The court, on the panel's own motion, has reconsidered the
    opinion    heretofore   issued   in      these   cases.   Upon   such
    reconsideration it appears that passages in the original opinion
    appear to ground the judgment of the court upon an erroneous
    premise.   It is therefore ORDERED that the attached opinion is
    substituted as the opinion of the court.
    Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    HILL, Senior Circuit Judge:
    Appellants Joseph Newton, Grady D'Vaughn Reddick, Willie Lee
    Palmer, John Brown, Jr., Robert Jivens, Sean Jackson, Eddie Batten,
    and   Robert   Moss    appeal   their     convictions        and   sentences     for
    conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute
    cocaine, violating 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One).                Moss appeals his
    conviction of employing persons under eighteen years of age to
    distribute controlled substances, violating 21 U.S.C. § 861(a)(1)
    (Count Two). Jivens, Moss, Batten, Brown, and Jackson appeal their
    convictions of using a firearm during a drug trafficking offense,
    violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Three).                Reddick and Palmer,
    charged as aiders and abettors under Count One, appeal their
    convictions on substantive money laundering offenses, violating 18
    U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Counts Four, Five, Six, and Seven).
    Newton and Moss appeal their convictions for using a communication
    facility to commit a drug felony, violating 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) and
    (c) (Counts Nine and Ten).       For the reasons that follow, we affirm
    the   convictions     and   sentences    of   Brown    and    Moss   and   reverse
    Reddick's   convictions.        The     judgments     of   conviction      and   the
    sentences of Newton, Palmer, Jivens, Jackson, and Batten are
    affirmed without opinion.        See 11th Cir.R. 36-1.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In September 1991, a federal grand jury indicted seventeen
    individuals as members of a crack cocaine distribution conspiracy
    who acted under the direction of and in concert with Ricky Maurice
    Jivens.1    The conspiracy's genesis was in late 1988.           The locally
    notorious street-level crack gang routinely employed violence and
    was responsible for many homicides and aggravated assaults in
    Savannah.    To insure loyalty and to prevent members from readily
    turning on their former confederates, Ricky Jivens insisted on all
    of the principals' "getting down," that is, killing someone before
    receiving any sizeable quantity of "fronted" cocaine.             The Jivens
    organization was equally murderous in dealing with people who owed
    them money, stole from them or sought to, in Ricky Jivens' words,
    "switch out."
    The rash of violence caused the assembly of a state and
    federal    task   force   in   January   1991,   focusing   on   the   gang's
    activities. The gang's cohesiveness began to unravel when the Drug
    Enforcement Agency (DEA) task force was successful in infiltrating
    the group with undercover informants and in converting gang members
    to informants. 2     Following the arrest of Ricky Jivens and Sean
    Jackson on September 20, 1991, the DEA agents obtained a series of
    search warrants and executed a coordinated series of raids the next
    1
    Principal indictee Ricky Maurice Jivens entered a guilty
    plea to: (1) conducting a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE)
    offense, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Count Four); (2) using a firearm
    during and in relationship to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C.
    § 924(c) (Count Three); (3) a substantive money laundering
    offense, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Count Five); and (4) the
    general forfeiture allegation, 21 U.S.C. § 853 (Count Seventeen).
    Jivens was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. His
    sentencing appeal was affirmed by this Court. United States v.
    Jivens, 11th Cir., 1993, 
    996 F.2d 314
    .
    2
    One informant, Frank Brown, was utilized by the agents to
    make some recorded undercover purchases of crack cocaine from
    Robert Jivens, Levon Bazemore and Robert Moss. Immunized
    coconspirator Jerome Richardson consented to the DEA's placing
    audio and video bugging devices in a southside Savannah apartment
    the task force obtained for him.
    morning, bringing Appellants into their net.               After indictment, a
    jury trial was held in January 1992.           With one exception, the jury
    convicted Appellants on all counts.3               The district court denied
    Moss'    extraordinary       motion    for   new    trial.4       The    remaining
    Defendants either pled guilty or their trials were severed from the
    main group.
    II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
    Each of the three remaining Appellants raises many separate
    issues on appeal.5      Those issues with merit are:          (1) Moss contends
    that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial
    based on newly discovered evidence and in considering activities
    before     his    eighteenth    birthday     in    applying      the    Sentencing
    Guidelines;      (2) Brown contends that during closing argument, the
    prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of his own
    witness;         and   (3)   Reddick    asserts     that   the     evidence    was
    insufficient to support his convictions.
    III. DISCUSSION
    A. Moss' Rule 33 Motion
    Moss contends that the district court erred in denying his
    motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence pursuant to
    Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.                     He asserts
    that after trial it was ascertained that the testimony of a
    3
    The court directed a verdict of acquittal for Robert Jivens
    on Count Two.
    4
    Moss' appeal of that ruling has been consolidated with the
    direct appeal.
    5
    All issues not listed here are without merit and warrant no
    discussion.
    juvenile       witness,    identified     as   CJR,    was   in    all   likelihood
    perjurious concerning Moss' involvement in the murder of indicted
    drug dealer Antonio Anderson.            CJR testified that he heard Moss'
    voice inside the drive-by car from which the fatal bullets were
    fired.        CJR testified that Anderson was shot by two automatic
    weapons, a Tech-9 and an AK 47, from a distance of ten to fifteen
    6
    feet.       This testimony was later proved incorrect.                 After trial,
    Savannah Police Department homicide records and Georgia Bureau of
    Investigation crime lab reports were discovered in the Government's
    possession by defense attorneys preparing for another case.                   These
    documents suggested that Anderson was shot at close range, six to
    eighteen inches, and died from gunshot wounds from a .38 or .357
    pistol, not an automatic weapon.           CJR also testified that Anderson
    was shot about 11:00 p.m. when the actual time of death was shown
    by the autopsy report and Savannah homicide records to be many
    hours earlier.
    Moss contends that the Government's failure to provide him
    with copies of the reports prior to trial violates Brady v.
    Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    , 
    83 S. Ct. 1194
    , 
    10 L. Ed. 2d 215
    (1963).                    The
    Government asserts that the reports were never in the actual
    physical custody of the prosecutor.              It contends that the reports
    were       mailed   from   the   state   crime   lab   to    the   state   district
    attorney's office and inadvertently placed in a generic file
    cabinet.       The Government also asserts that, even if Moss' defense
    6
    The Government contends that CJR was not lying about the
    Anderson homicide but was merely mistaken, and that any
    impeachment of his testimony should be strictly limited to the
    murder.
    attorney had been privy to this impeaching evidence prior to trial,
    it would not have changed the verdict.        We agree.
    1. Standard of Review.
    The denial by the district court of Moss' extraordinary
    motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.          United
    States v. Champion, 
    813 F.2d 1154
    , 1172 (11th Cir.1987).
    2. Analysis.
    The    Supreme   Court   has   held   that   "suppression   by   the
    prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
    violates due process when the evidence is material either to guilt
    or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
    the prosecution."       
    Brady, 373 U.S. at 87
    , 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97.
    Evidence favorable to the accused includes impeachment evidence.
    United States v. Bagley, 
    473 U.S. 667
    , 682, 
    105 S. Ct. 3375
    , 3384,
    
    87 L. Ed. 2d 481
    (1985).      A constitutional error occurs, however,
    only if the suppressed evidence is material, i.e., only if "there
    is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
    to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
    different."    
    Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680
    , 105 S.Ct. at 3383.
    This court applies a four-prong test to decide whether a new
    trial is required because of a Brady violation.           United States v.
    Spagnoulo, 
    960 F.2d 990
    , 994 (11th Cir.1992).             To obtain a new
    trial, a defendant must show each of the following elements:            (1)
    that the Government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant
    (including impeachment evidence);       (2) that the defendant did not
    possess the evidence nor could he have obtained it himself with any
    reasonable diligence;       (3) that the prosecution suppressed the
    favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been revealed to
    the defense, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
    the proceedings would have been different.          
    Id. at 994.
    After an evidentiary hearing on the Rule 33 motion, the
    district court found that although Moss proved the first three
    elements, he failed to prove the fourth because he could not show
    that the undisclosed evidence would have made any difference in the
    verdict.    The trial judge refused to grant Moss a new trial.
    Suppression of evidence results in constitutional error "only if
    the   evidence   is   material   in   the   sense   that   its   suppression
    undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."              
    Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678
    , 105 S.Ct. at 3381.
    The Brady rule protects a defendant from erroneous conviction
    and is not designed to punish the Government.               See Jackson v.
    Wainwright, 
    390 F.2d 288
    , 295 (5th Cir.1968).          A punitive element
    is, however, often enrobed in or accompanies a Brady violation, but
    it implicates the Government's lawyer           qua lawyer and not the
    Government as a party.      Should it appear that Government counsel
    has intentionally—or culpably carelessly—concealed known Brady
    material from a defendant, the lawyer is not absolved from that
    professional misdeed merely because the concealment is found not to
    have been material in the Bagley sense.
    This record does not display intentional concealment;              the
    information in question was not in the possession of Government
    counsel. It is not clear that more diligence would have discovered
    the material.     It would have shown CJR's testimony about the
    Anderson murder to have been inaccurate in several respects.            Moss
    was not charged with Anderson's murder, but the inaccuracy would
    have been admissible for impeachment.                However, considering the
    entire record, we conclude that the omission was not material in
    the Bagley sense.         Its suppression does not "undermine confidence
    in the outcome of the trial."         The record is replete with proof of
    Moss' involvement on the four counts on which he was charged
    without regard to CJR's testimony.7          We therefore conclude that the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Moss' motion
    for a new trial.
    B. Moss' Sentencing Appeal
    Moss    contends    that   the   district     court    should    not   have
    considered acts before his eighteenth birthday in determining the
    quantity    of    drugs     attributable    to   him    under    the     Sentencing
    Guidelines.      Moss argues that "virtually all of the evidence cited
    by the Probation Officer at the sentencing hearing in support of
    his conclusion as to the quantity of drugs attributable to Moss
    7
    The jury found Moss guilty of four counts: conspiracy to
    possess with intent to distribute cocaine; employment of a
    minor; use of a firearm; and use of a telephone in furtherance
    of a drug trafficking crime. The Government introduced
    surveillance videotapes showing Moss working with members of a
    Jivens organization. In the videotapes, Moss can be seen hiding
    a firearm in a flowerpot in the yard on one occasion. When the
    police searched the apartment where Moss conducted this activity,
    the officers found guns and ammunition; in the yard, they
    discovered cocaine. In another surveillance videotape, the jury
    heard Ricky Jivens angrily denounce Moss for failing to pay
    Jivens his entire debt and threaten to cut off Moss from future
    cocaine deliveries. Next the videotape shows Jivens telephoning
    someone. It is clear from the context that he is calling Moss.
    Further, Jerome Richardson testified that Moss was a member of
    the conspiracy and that a minor know as "Little Charlie" worked
    for Moss. Therefore, based on evidence other than CJR's
    testimony, the jury could have reasonably found that the
    Government proved Moss guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all
    four counts.
    involved sources that provided their information before Moss'
    eighteenth birthday."            The district court rejected this argument
    and    adopted        the    Probation   Officer's    finding    that     Moss    was
    responsible for at least five kilograms but less than fifteen
    kilograms of cocaine base (Base Offense Level 40).                    We agree.
    1. Standard of Review.
    Sentencing issues present predominantly factual issues which
    are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.                       18 U.S.C. §
    3742(e); United States v. Cain, 
    881 F.2d 980
    , 982 (11th Cir.1989).
    2. Analysis.
    Where there is one continuous conspiracy, and the defendant
    has    straddled       his    eighteenth   birthday   by   membership      in     that
    conspiracy both before and after that significant day, his prior
    acts could be found to be the sole basis for guilt.                   United States
    v. Cruz, 
    805 F.2d 1464
    (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 
    481 U.S. 1006
    , 
    107 S. Ct. 1631
    , 
    95 L. Ed. 2d 204
    (1987).                   Nevertheless, the
    district court charged the jury that they could find Moss guilty
    only for acts that he committed after his eighteenth birthday.8
    Under a clearly erroneous standard, we determine that the district
    court was correct in sentencing Moss merely by our looking at the
    evidence against him after he turned eighteen on July 21, 1991.
    The Government introduced into evidence a July 23, 1991, audio
    tape       of   the   first    telephone   call   made   (at    its    request)    by
    undercover informant Jerome Richardson to Ricky Jivens.                     On the
    8
    Although this instruction was proposed by the Government,
    it appears that Moss received the benefit of instruction to which
    he was not entitled. See United States v. Cruz, 
    805 F.2d 1464
    (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 
    481 U.S. 1006
    , 
    107 S. Ct. 1631
    , 
    95 L. Ed. 2d 204
    (1987).
    tape, Richardson tells Jivens that the police have been questioning
    him about certain of Jivens' activities. Jivens asks Richardson if
    the police have inquired about certain individuals;                one of the
    first    names   Jivens   mentions   on   the   tape   is    "Muffie,"       Moss'
    nickname.    Richardson testified that he was at a Savannah bar in
    August 1991, with Moss.      Moss' pager went off and Moss dispatched
    a young man named Telly to get an ounce of cocaine.                Richardson
    further testified that Moss delivered $20,000 on one occasion, and
    $10,000 on another occasion, to Jivens.          In a September 18, 1991,
    videotape introduced into evidence by the Government, Ricky Jivens
    states that he is tired of Moss "shorting him" on payments.                    The
    last undercover call made from Richardson to Moss occurred after
    Ricky Jivens was arrested on September 20, 1991.             Agents directed
    Richardson to call Moss and to pose as Ricky Jivens.                   Moss told
    Richardson, thinking him to be Jivens, "[that] it was a slow day."
    When Moss was arrested that night, he was in the company of Michael
    Williams,   another   indicted   coconspirator,        and   had   a    cellular
    telephone and a pager in his possession.
    Even considering only Moss' post-eighteen criminal conduct, we
    find there is ample evidence against Moss to substantiate the
    9
    sentences for the offenses of which he was convicted.                         The
    district court was not clearly erroneous in its finding that Moss
    had a base offense level of 40 and in sentencing him accordingly.
    9
    Moss was convicted of: conspiracy to distribute cocaine,
    in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One); employing a minor
    to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
    861(a)(1) (Count Two); use of a firearm during a drug
    trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count
    Three); and use of a communication facility to commit a drug
    felony, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) and (c) (Count Ten).
    C. Brown—Vouching for Witness
    Brown argues that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for
    the veracity of a pivotal Government witness, Jerome Richardson, in
    his closing argument, citing United States v. Sims, 
    719 F.2d 375
    ,
    377 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 
    465 U.S. 1034
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 1304
    ,
    
    79 L. Ed. 2d 703
    (1984).     He contends that plain error was committed
    when the prosecutor told the jury that, in effect, a federal judge
    found Richardson credible enough to issue a search warrant.10 Brown
    10
    The prosecutor stated:
    Moving on to John Brown, Big John. The juvenile said
    John Brown used to pick Ricky up, and he knew money was
    picked up from John Brown. Jerome Richardson stated
    that a year and a half ago, before he was an informant,
    John Brown brought Jivens, Ricky, $15,000 at Waldburg
    and Lincoln. Ground zero for the Ricky Jivens' cocaine
    operation.
    Jerome Richardson said, and you saw evidence of this on
    the videos, that John Brown was the one, John was the
    one who didn't return Ricky's pages enough—promptly
    enough to satisfy the boss. And Jerome Richardson
    testified that he went to 40 C Lakeside Apartments to
    pick up the money that Ricky had directed them to go
    pick up from John Brown, a sum greater than $10,000 and
    bring back to Ricky.
    Now as Agent Snider testified, that information was the
    sole basis the agents had to go seek the search warrant
    on Mr. Brown. And a judge, state or federal, is not
    going to give a Drug Enforcement Administration agent
    or any law enforcement officer a search warrant to
    search anybody's house for no reason. They got to have
    some showing and the showing, as Mr. Snider testified
    to, was largely a narrative of what Jerome Richardson
    had related in other aspects of the case.
    And what do the agents find when they go out there?
    Drugs, cash, glassine bags, a ledger, completely
    corroborating what Jerome Richardson testified to.
    Look at the Government's "28" series exhibits. They
    show beyond a shadow of a doubt John Brown to be
    dealing cocaine and the other evidence in the case
    shows John Brown to have been dealing cocaine for and
    asserts that the effect of these remarks was to place the prestige
    and office of the judiciary behind Richardson and turn the judge
    into a witness for the prosecution.      The Government argues that it
    was merely suggesting to the jurors that DEA agents were successful
    in   obtaining   a   search   warrant   based   on   Jerome   Richardson's
    information and the resulting search confirmed that information.
    We agree.
    1. Standard of Review.
    Absent a contemporaneous objection, the propriety of the
    Government's closing argument and alleged prosecutorial misconduct
    in improperly vouching for a witness' credibility are reviewed
    under a plain error standard.      Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States
    v. Lacayo, 
    758 F.2d 1559
    , 1564 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    474 U.S. 1019
    , 
    106 S. Ct. 568
    , 
    88 L. Ed. 2d 553
    (1985).
    2. Analysis.
    Attempts to bolster a witness by vouching for his credibility
    are normally improper and constitute error.            United States v.
    Ellis, 
    547 F.2d 863
    , 869 (5th Cir.1977).         It is improper for the
    prosecution to place the prestige of the Government behind a
    witness by making explicit personal assurances of the witness'
    veracity.      United States v. Eley, 
    723 F.2d 1522
    , 1526 (11th
    Cir.1984).     We denounce lawyers who give their personal opinion
    that "I believe the witness is telling the truth."            United States
    v. Young, 
    470 U.S. 1
    , 
    105 S. Ct. 1038
    , 
    84 L. Ed. 2d 1
    (1985).
    Here we have undertaken to weigh the prosecutor's comments in
    the context of the entire trial.           We are persuaded that the
    with Ricky Jivens.    (Emphasis added.)
    incident was neither vouching nor an attempt to invoke the court as
    a guarantor of truthfulness.        When the prosecutor stated "[a]nd a
    judge, state or federal, is not going to give a ... law enforcement
    officer a search warrant to search anybody's house for no reason
    ...," this was a suggestion to the jury that the information
    Richardson gave to the court to support the warrant was confirmed
    by the search, and, lo and behold, these very articles were found.
    "The prohibition against vouching does not forbid prosecutors from
    arguing credibility ... it forbids arguing credibility based on the
    reputation of the government office or on evidence not before the
    jury."       United States v. Hernandez, 
    921 F.2d 1569
    , 1573 (11th
    Cir.1991). The remarks were designed to refer the jury to evidence
    in the case that was favorable to the Government.               
    Id. To the
    extent that the prosecutor might have been interpreted
    as saying, "The judge who issued the search warrant must have
    believed that Richardson was a credible person or he would not have
    issued a search warrant on the basis of his statement," this would
    have    been   offensive   vouching.     Brown      strains   to      reach   this
    interpretation however. The question is: what did the agents find
    when they got there?       The same things Richardson said they would
    find.    While the prosecutor teetered on the line dividing a proper
    from    an   improper   closing   argument,   his    comments      were   not   an
    explicit personal or judicial endorsement of credibility and, in
    the absence of objection, do not constitute plain error.
    D. Reddick—Sufficiency of the Evidence
    The indictment named Reddick as an aider and abettor who
    willfully assisted Ricky Jivens in the conspiracy by serving as his
    nominee.    He was also charged with a single substantive money
    laundering violation by knowingly becoming the lessee of record on
    property located at 102 Chowning Drive in Savannah to conceal
    Jivens' interest.      Reddick contends that the Government's evidence
    at trial was insufficient to support his convictions on both
    counts.    We agree.
    1. Standard of Review.
    In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is
    limited to inquiring whether, construing the evidence and drawing
    all inferences and credibility choices in the Government's favor,
    any reasonable jury could have found the defendants guilty beyond
    a reasonable doubt.       Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 
    62 S. Ct. 457
    , 
    86 L. Ed. 680
    (1942);       United States v. Van Hemelryck,
    
    945 F.2d 1493
    , 1499 (11th Cir.1991).
    2. Analysis.
    To support a conviction for conspiracy, the Government must
    prove that a conspiracy existed, that the defendant had knowledge
    of the essential aims of the conspiracy, and that with such
    knowledge, the defendant joined the conspiracy.      United States v.
    Blasco, 
    702 F.2d 1315
    , 1330 (11th Cir.1983).         To be guilty of
    aiding and abetting a conspiracy, a defendant need only "associate
    himself with the crime, participate in it as something he wishes to
    bring about, and seek by his actions to make it succeed."      United
    States v. Pepe, 
    747 F.2d 632
    , 665 (11th Cir.1984).      An aiding and
    abetting offense occurs when a defendant assists the perpetrator of
    the crime while sharing in the requisite criminal intent.      United
    States v. Martinez, 
    555 F.2d 1269
    , 1271 (5th Cir.1977).        On the
    money laundering count, the Government must show that the willful
    aiding and abetting are acts that are integral and important to the
    successful operation of a drug conspiracy. United States v. Perez,
    
    922 F.2d 782
    , 786 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    501 U.S. 1223
    , 
    111 S. Ct. 2840
    , 
    115 L. Ed. 2d 1009
    (1991).
    Government evidence consisted chiefly of the testimony of two
    witnesses, David Smith, the leasing agent, and Chris Cochran, a
    mutual acquaintance of both Jivens and Reddick.    Smith testified
    that Reddick leased the Chowning Drive house from him in November
    1990 for twelve months at $675.00 per month.        The Government
    presented evidence showing that Reddick provided false written
    statements to the leasing agent, indicating that he intended to
    live there with his wife and two children.   On the lease, Reddick
    listed his current address as 3211 Martha Street.       Smith, the
    agent, testified that he made one visit to the Chowning Drive house
    during the lease period.   At that time he was met at the door by a
    young lady with a baby.    The Government contends that the jury
    inferred this was Danielle Jones and her child by Ricky Jivens.
    Cochran testified that Jivens first asked him to rent the
    house and he agreed.    When Cochran couldn't pass the requisite
    credit check, Cochran testified that Jivens, in Cochran's presence,
    then asked Reddick to rent the house for him and Reddick agreed.
    Reddick contends, and the Government does not dispute, that Jivens
    needed to rent a house in which his girlfriend could live so that
    his "wife," Renee, would not find out.     Reddick claims that the
    evidence did not show a criminal intent, but merely an intent to do
    a favor for a friend.
    The Government introduced physical evidence that within the
    lease period Reddick also rented a boat slip and listed Martha
    Street as his residence address.     A warranty deed indicated that
    Reddick owned the home at Martha Street.     Government exhibit 29a
    was a $3,000 money order from John Brown to Levon Bazemore, found
    in a car that also contained an automobile service bill in the name
    of Grady Reddick.
    The Government argues that the same evidence establishes
    Reddick's guilt on both counts.    We disagree.
    As to the money laundering count, the record shows that
    Reddick executed the lease to conceal the identity of the lessee.
    However, there is no evidence that indicates Reddick concealed or
    disguised the source of the rental payments.      The record fails to
    show that Reddick knew that Jivens' money was obtained through
    illegal means or that Reddick profited from the transaction in any
    way.    The lease of the house as a place of abode for Jivens'
    girlfriend was not connected by any evidence to drug violations.
    Similarly there was insufficient evidence on the conspiracy
    count to prove that Reddick participated in any of the acts of
    murder, narcotics trafficking or turf warfare.     No evidence showed
    that he associated with any gang member other than Ricky Jivens
    himself. No evidence showed that he "got down," took drugs, bought
    drugs, or sold drugs.    No evidence showed that Reddick knew of the
    drug conspiracy or agreed through any act to become a member or to
    aid and abet a member.   The Government argues that it was "readily
    inferable" that Reddick was an aider and abettor to the conspiracy
    because "he was in close association" with Ricky Jivens.    It is not
    enough that Reddick knew Jivens.        It is not enough that Reddick
    leased a house for Jivens.      Association with a coconspirator is
    insufficient to prove participation in a conspiracy. United States
    v. Kelly, 
    749 F.2d 1541
    (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    472 U.S. 1029
    ,
    
    105 S. Ct. 3506
    , 
    87 L. Ed. 2d 636
    (1985).       At a minimum, the defendant
    must willfully associate himself in some way with the criminal
    venture and willfully participate in it as he would in something he
    wished to bring about.    United States v. Hernandez, 
    896 F.2d 513
    (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    498 U.S. 858
    , 
    111 S. Ct. 159
    , 
    112 L. Ed. 2d 125
      (1990).   We   conclude   that   the   Government's   evidence   was
    insufficient to convict Reddick under either count and we reverse
    his convictions.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the convictions and
    sentences of Moss and Brown, but we REVERSE Reddick's convictions.
    AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 92-8228, 92-8764 and 94-8376

Citation Numbers: 44 F.3d 913, 1995 WL 31851

Judges: Edmondson, Birch, Hill

Filed Date: 12/22/1994

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (19)

Glasser v. United States , 62 S. Ct. 457 ( 1942 )

United States v. Carlos Manuel Perez , 922 F.2d 782 ( 1991 )

United States v. Jerry Wayne Sims, A/K/A "Silver" , 719 F.2d 375 ( 1983 )

Herman Jackson, Jr. v. L. L. Wainwright, Director, Division ... , 390 F.2d 288 ( 1968 )

United States v. Sandra Hernandez, A/K/A "Cha Cha," Ronnie ... , 921 F.2d 1569 ( 1991 )

United States v. Carlos Bienuenido Cruz, Roberto Cruz, ... , 805 F.2d 1464 ( 1986 )

United States v. Gerald Spagnoulo , 960 F.2d 990 ( 1992 )

United States v. Wallace David Eley , 723 F.2d 1522 ( 1984 )

United States v. Salvador Lacayo, Jr. , 758 F.2d 1559 ( 1985 )

United States v. Antonio Hernandez, Hector Giral, Yolanda ... , 896 F.2d 513 ( 1990 )

United States v. Michael T. Martinez , 555 F.2d 1269 ( 1977 )

United States v. John Albert Kelly, D.J. Dorn, and Miguel ... , 749 F.2d 1541 ( 1985 )

United States v. Jivens , 996 F.2d 314 ( 1993 )

Brady v. Maryland , 83 S. Ct. 1194 ( 1963 )

United States v. Stanford Champion, Gene Slusser, Eldon L. ... , 813 F.2d 1154 ( 1987 )

United States v. Angelo Pepe and Thomas Miglionico, United ... , 747 F.2d 632 ( 1984 )

United States v. Ralph Reginald Cain , 881 F.2d 980 ( 1989 )

united-states-v-george-van-hemelryck-golbert-bustamante-tyrone-giraldo , 945 F.2d 1493 ( 1991 )

united-states-v-richard-e-blasco-catalino-chambrot-angel-cruz-nestor , 702 F.2d 1315 ( 1983 )

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