United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-3346.
In re Kenneth I. STRICKLAND, Debtor.
Kenneth I. STRICKLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
John Hugh SHANNON, Lauren J. Strickland, Defendants-Appellees.
Aug. 1, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. (Nos. 93-1393-CIV-T-24A, 91-14853-8P7), Susan
C. Bucklew, Judge. (No.
160 B.R. 675), Alexander L. Paskay, Judge.
Before COX and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and BRIGHT*, Senior Circuit
Judge.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Kenneth Strickland ("debtor") appeals from a district court
order finding nondischargeable his $9,430.50 debt to his former
spouse Lauren Strickland ("former spouse") and her attorney for
attorney fees resulting from the debtor's failed attempt to modify
child-custody and child-support provisions of a divorce judgment.
Reversing the bankruptcy court, the district court found the debt
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) because it was in the
nature of support for the minor child and/or the former spouse. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A 1985 state court judgment dissolved the marriage of the
debtor and his former spouse, and provided that parental
responsibility for the minor child would be shared, that the
*
Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
child's primary physical residence would be with the former spouse,
and that the debtor would pay $200 per month in child support. The
debtor later petitioned to modify the judgment so as to designate
his home as the child's primary residence, terminate his child
support payments, and require the former spouse to pay child
support. The state court denied the petition and ordered the
debtor to pay $9,430.50 in attorney fees and costs incurred by the
former spouse in defending against the petition.
Thereafter filing for bankruptcy, the debtor filed a complaint
seeking a determination that his debt for the attorney fees award
was dischargeable under
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), which provides that
a debtor cannot be discharged from any debt to a "former spouse ...
or child of the debtor ... for ... support of such spouse or child,
in connection with a ... divorce decree or other order of a court
of record." The bankruptcy court allowed the discharge, holding as
a matter of law that an obligation to pay attorney fees arising
from a post-dissolution child-custody dispute does not constitute
"support" under § 523(a)(5). The district court reversed, holding
that an award for attorney fees relating to post-dissolution
child-custody litigation involving child-support issues does
constitute support under § 523(a)(5) and therefore is
nondischargeable.
On appeal, the debtor argues that the district court
improperly held as a matter of law that the attorney fees award
constituted "support" under § 523(a)(5). He urges us to remand the
case to the bankruptcy court for a determination of whether the
award of attorney fees, in fact, constituted support for the minor
child or the former spouse.
II. DISCUSSION
Under Chapter VII of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may obtain
a general discharge "from all debts that arose before the date of
the order for relief."
11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1994). The Code does
not, however, discharge a debtor from any debt:
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor,
for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or
child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce
decree or other order of a court of record, ... but not to the
extent that—
* * * * * *
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony,
maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in
the nature of alimony, maintenance or support....
Id. § 523(a)(5).
The issue of whether the attorney fees award in this case
constituted "support" within the meaning of § 523(a)(5) is a matter
of federal law, which we review de novo. See In re Harrell,
754
F.2d 902, 904-05 (11th Cir.1985). In In re Harrell, we described
the appropriate § 523(a)(5) inquiry as follows:
The language used by Congress in § 523(a)(5) requires
bankruptcy courts to determine nothing more than whether the
support label accurately reflects that the obligation at issue
is "actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or
support." The statutory language suggests a simple inquiry as
to whether the obligation can legitimately be characterized as
support, that is, whether it is in the nature of support.
In re Harrell, 754 F.2d at 906 (emphasis in original). Because
federal law, rather than state law, controls our inquiry, a
domestic obligation can be deemed actually in the nature of support
under § 523(a)(5) even if it is not considered "support" under
state law. See id. at 905. Although state law does not control,
it does provide guidance in determining whether the obligation
should be considered in the nature of "support" under § 523(a)(5).
In re Jones,
9 F.3d 878, 880 (10th Cir.1993).
As noted, the debtor in this case filed a petition in state
court seeking to modify the minor child's primary physical
residence and the allocation of child support obligations. The
state court denied these requests in toto and ordered him to pay
his former spouse's attorney fees. Under Florida law, a former
spouse is entitled to an award of attorney fees in a modification
action such as the one filed here based on relative need and
ability to pay. See Fla.Stat. § 61.16(1) (1993); Hyatt v. Hyatt,
672 So.2d 74, 76 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996). In awarding attorney fees
to the former spouse, the state court therefore necessarily
determined that she had a greater need and/or lesser ability to pay
than did the debtor. Thus, the award of attorney fees can
"legitimately be characterized as support," In re Harrell, 754 F.2d
at 906, for the former spouse and therefore is nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(5).
Nonetheless, relying on an Eighth Circuit case, the debtor
argues that we should remand this case so the bankruptcy court can
determine the relative financial resources of the parties and/or
whether the state court adequately considered them in awarding the
fees to the former spouse, see Adams v. Zentz,
963 F.2d 197, 200
(8th Cir.1992) (holding that "[i]n deciding whether to characterize
an award as maintenance or support the crucial issue is the
function the award was intended to serve" and that "[t]his is a
question of fact to be decided by the bankruptcy court"). As
noted, however, we previously have held in this circuit that §
523(a)(5) requires nothing more than "a simple inquiry as to
whether the obligation can legitimately be characterized as
support." In re Harrell, 754 F.2d at 906. Moreover, the
"[d]ebtor's attempt to expand the dischargeability issue into an
assessment of the ongoing financial circumstances of the parties to
a marital dispute would of necessity embroil federal courts in
domestic relations matters which should properly be reserved to the
state courts." Id. at 907.
In light of the foregoing, we hold that an attorney fees
award arising from a post-dissolution custody action constitutes
"support" for the former spouse under
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) where,
as here, the award is based on ability to pay. In the absence of
special circumstances showing otherwise from the record in the
underlying proceedings, the district court properly determined that
the debt in this case is not dischargeable.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.
