NLRB v. LAMPI LLC ( 2001 )

[ PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS
No. 99-15054 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ JAN 30 2001
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 10-29531-CA
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Petitioner,
versus
LAMPI LLC,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of an Application for Enforcement
of the National Labor Relations Board
_________________________
(January 30, 2001)
Before DUBINA, FAY and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
We have for review a decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board
which found that Appellant Lampi, LLC engaged in an unfair labor practice in
violation of Sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), and (4). The Board, with one panel member dissenting, found
that Lampi violated the Act by terminating an employee, Connie Neely, because of her
pro-union activities at Lampi’s Huntsville, Alabama plant and her prior testimony
before the Board. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). Because we
conclude that there was no substantial evidence supporting the Board’s finding that
Lampi violated the Act in firing Neely, we deny enforcement of the Board’s order.
Background
At its Huntsville plant, Lampi manufactures fluorescent light fixtures of various
sizes for the consumer market. During all relevant times, Lampi employed
approximately 90 to 100 production and maintenance employees. Neely was hired in
October 1993 to assemble light fixtures. In the fall of 1994, the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 558 began a campaign to
organize Lampi’s workers. Neely was active in the unionization efforts. Lampi
management opposed the formation of a union at the plant and made remaining non-
2
union a company goal.1 On the union election day in January 1995, Neely wore 12
or more “Vote Yes” buttons on her blouse. Neely’s supervisor, Virgie McKenzie, saw
Neely’s buttons and reacted by shaking her head as if she disapproved. Lampi’s
employees rejected the union by a vote of 37 to 30.
The Union filed objections to the conduct of the election that were consolidated
with other unfair labor practice allegations, one of which involved Neely. An
administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing in March 1996. Neely testified at the
hearing that Lampi’s Operations Manager Morris Overbeck had interrogated her in
advance of the election. Neely also testified in support of the Union’s election
observer, Alice Sullivan Young, who had alleged that she was disciplined in
1
Lampi’s policy on unionization was made clear in its personnel handbook, which
provides in relevant part:
This is a non-union plant.
It is our desire to always remain non-union. Our goal is to maintain good
working conditions, treat people fairly and run our business successfully.
We feel that unions do not create jobs, increase plant effectiveness or
produce products that satisfy customers. We feel that they have the
opposite effect.
Our main objection to Unions is that they reduce team work and harmony.
Unions create a third party instead of allowing people to work together
and directly with each other. Our customers prefer to buy products from a
non-union plant as they have less fear of their supply being cut off due to a
strike.
Unions spend money to organize, thus they must recover their expenses by
collecting from your pay check. Unions attempt to gain power by
weakening rights and freedom of individual employees.
It is much better to work together to assure individual growth, security and
business success and strengthen individual rights and freedoms.
(R.2-2 at 13.)
3
retaliation for her union activities.2 Neely has conceded that no supervisor spoke to
her about her testimony after the administrative hearing. In May 1996, the ALJ found
that Lampi had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, which provides that it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed” by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). The ALJ
recommended that a new election be held. There was no union activity at the plant
between the failed January 1995 election and Neely’s termination.
Before 1996, Neely’s job performance record was generally good. She received
positive annual reviews from her supervisor McKenzie in October of 1994 and 1995.
Neely did, however, receive three warnings about her attendance and one warning
because of a safety violation in the period prior to 1996. Lampi closely monitored its
assembly employees’ efficiency, awarding bonuses to those who performed at or
above 100 percent efficiency. Prior to 1996, Neely’s efficiency numbers were
excellent, often exceeding 100 percent. However, Neely’s efficiency began to slide
early in 1996. Neely has admitted that McKenzie verbally counseled her in February
1996 to pick up her production numbers. McKenzie also began to informally counsel
2
The ALJ rejected the attack on the disciplinary warning issued to Young made by
General Counsel for the Board. Young had voluntarily left Lampi’s employ before the March
1996 hearing.
4
Neely about her falling efficiency, speaking to Neely anywhere from 15 to 20 times
about the issue from May to July 1996.
In June 1996, Lampi instituted a new policy that required assembly workers to
maintain a 90 percent efficiency level to avoid discipline. In order to temper the
harshness of the new rule, Lampi established June as a grace month during which an
80 percent efficiency rating would suffice. Neely’s efficiency rating for June was 87
percent. But she began to have more serious problems in July. On July 18, 1996,
Neely received two warnings, one for attendance problems and one for affixing
incorrect Universal Product Codes (UPCs) on two lamps. Operations Manager
Overbeck testified that Lampi considered the mislabeling of the lamps to be a serious
infraction.3 Neely’s efficiency numbers were also down sharply in July, to just under
69 percent.
In early August 1996, Overbeck reviewed the July efficiency numbers of the
assembly workers. He marked three employees for discharge: Ginger Laudermilk
(47.88 percent), Belinda Lowe (83.15 percent), and Neely (68.95 percent). Overbeck
then met with McKenzie to discuss Neely’s performance. McKenzie informed
Overbeck that she could determine no reason for Neely’s drop in efficiency and that
3
In fact, another employee, Belinda Lowe, was suspended for making a similar
mistake with a larger number of lamps.
5
Neely did not seem concerned about the problem. They also noted Neely’s prior
attendance warnings and the warning garnered for the UPC label mistake and
concluded that the proper course was to terminate Neely’s employment. Overbeck
and McKenzie then discussed the issue with Lampi President Heike Holderer, who
also agreed that Neely should be terminated because of her poor overall work
performance.
On August 5, 1996, Neely was called into McKenzie’s office. McKenzie and
another supervisor, John Hoffman, were present. McKenzie informed Neely that she
was terminated, effective immediately. Neely asked to retrieve her toolbox. Hoffman
informed Neely that she would not be able to return to the work area, but he would
retrieve her tools. When Hoffman left the room, McKenzie asked Neely whether she
had spoken to “Alice” lately. Neely understood McKenzie to be referring to Alice
Sullivan Young, the former union election observer, and responded in the negative.
McKenzie then told Neely that she was sorry about the firing but reminded Neely that
she had been warned that something was going to happen. Neely interpreted this last
remark to refer to a February meeting in which McKenzie had informed Neely and
others that they would need to increase their production or go work elsewhere.
Within a few days of Neely’s firing, she and former co-worker Belinda Lowe
were featured on a segment of a local television station’s news broadcast. Neely and
6
Lowe said that they were fired because of their involvement with the Union. Neely
informed the reporter that Lampi management had told her that she was a “great
employee” and then “the next thing you know” terminated her. Lampi President
Holderer was also interviewed on the program, saying that Lampi did not “particularly
like unions” and was “against them.”4
The Union filed a charge with the Board on August 16, 1996, alleging that
Lampi had improperly terminated Neely in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4).5
The General Counsel filed his complaint in March 1997. Hearings before an ALJ
were held in May and July of 1997. In February 1998, the ALJ filed his report,
finding that Lampi had violated the Act by firing Neely because of her union activities
and prior Board testimony. The ALJ recommended that Neely be offered full
reinstatement and paid her lost earnings. On November 30, 1998, the Board, with one
member dissenting, adopted the ALJ’s recommendations and ordered Lampi to
reinstate Neely and make her whole for her lost earnings.
4
The report did note that Lampi’s position was that Neely and Lowe were fired after
they had been written up numerous times for violating company policy and their terminations
had nothing to do with their union support.
5
Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Section 8(a)(4)
provides that it is an unfair labor practice to “discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee because he has filed charges or given testimony” regarding alleged unfair labor
practices. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4).
7
8
Issue on Appeal
The single issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s
finding that Lampi terminated Neely because of her support of the Union, in violation
of Sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (4) of the Act.
Standard of Review
We treat the Board’s factual findings as conclusive if “supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). Substantial
evidence is “‘such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.’” BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1372, 1375 (11th Cir.
1997) (quoting Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 735, 745 (5th Cir. 1979)).
While we give proper deference to orders of the Board, “this court will not simply act
as its enforcement arm.” Id.
Contentions of the Parties
Lampi contends that there was no substantial evidence before the Board that
anti-union animus was a motivating factor in Neely’s termination. Lampi also argues
that the record clearly indicates that it had ample legitimate business reasons to
discharge Neely and would have done so absent her union activities and prior Board
testimony. The General Counsel contends that the record amply supports the Board’s
position.
9
Discussion
There are three phases of proof present in a case where an employee has
allegedly been discharged because of his or her union activities. First, the General
Counsel must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s
protected activity was a motivating factor in the employment decision. See NLRB v.
McClain of Georgia, 138 F.3d 1418, 1424 (11th Cir. 1998). This showing will
establish a Section 8(a)(3) violation unless the employer demonstrates that it would
have terminated the employee regardless of the protected activity. See id. The
General Counsel may then present proof that the proffered reasons for the termination
were pretextual, either by showing that the reasons did not exist or were not relied
upon in the decision. See id.
Our analysis must begin with whether there was substantial evidence before the
Board to support a finding that Lampi’s decision to terminate Neely was at least
partially motivated by her union involvement. The evidence of anti-union animus
relied on by the Board was: (1) Lampi had attempted to improperly influence the
January 1995 union election; (2) Neely had testified against Lampi in the
administrative hearing held in March 1996; (3) the decision finding that Lampi
violated Section 8(a)(1) was handed down just 11 weeks before Neely’s termination;
(4) Lampi management posted a note on its bulletin board informing employees that
10
it planned on appealing the ruling; (5) Lampi President Holderer had told the
television reporter investigating Neely’s claims that Lampi management “did not
particularly like unions” and was “against them”; and (6) McKenzie asked Neely if
she had seen “Alice” lately on the day Neely was fired.
We conclude that the evidence before the Board was not sufficient to support
its finding that Neely’s firing was motivated by her protected activity. As an initial
matter, the Board violated the express language of the Act in relying on Holderer’s
statement to the television reporter and Lampi’s announcement that it planned to
appeal the prior ruling to support a finding of animus. Section 8(c) of the Act
expressly prohibits the use of an employer’s lawful communication of its opinion of
unions or unionization as “evidence of an unfair labor practice” as long as the
expression of opinion is not coercive, does not contain threats of reprisal or force, or
does not promise benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). Neither Holderer’s statement nor the
posted announcement was coercive or made threats or promises. The Board was
therefore not free to infer anti-union animus from Holderer’s statement that Lampi
was “against” unions or the announcement that Lampi would appeal the ALJ’s ruling
11
on the allegations stemming from the election. See BE&K Construction Co., 133 F.3d
at 1376.6
Cobbling together a finding that Neely’s termination was motivated by her
union activities required the Board to impermissibly lay inference upon inference.
First, the Board inferred, without any evidence in the record, that Lampi management
carried a grudge against Neely stemming from the events leading up to the January
1995 election. This, of course, ignores the fact that Neely received positive
employment reviews in the year following the election. The lingering animus against
Neely was further inflamed, in the Board’s view, by Neely’s testimony at the
administrative hearing held to resolve issues surrounding the election. Again, there
was no evidence that Lampi management retaliated or even mentioned her testimony
after the hearing.
The final link in this flimsy causal chain is McKenzie’s question about whether
Neely had seen “Alice” lately. The ALJ undertook an extensive analysis of the
meaning of McKenzie’s question, identifying three potential interpretations. The first
potential interpretation formulated by the ALJ was that the question meant that “‘[t]op
management nailed you for supporting the Union, and especially for testifying against
6
The same would hold for the policy on unionization included in Lampi’s
employee handbook, which the Board apparently did not rely upon in concluding that anti-union
animus triggered the firing.
12
them’” in the administrative hearing. (R.3 at 699.) The second potential
interpretation recognized by the ALJ was that McKenzie was informing Neely that
“‘[y]es, you supported the Union and testified against us, and I get a kick out of this
opportunity to rub your nose in the fact that a big union supporter like you is being
fired, but regardless of all that, you would have been fired today anyhow because of
your poor efficiency in July.’” (Id.) The third and final potential interpretation
posited by the ALJ was that the question meant “‘I saw Alice at the mall last week and
she asked about you. Have you talked with her lately?’” (Id.) The ALJ and later, the
Board, concluded the most logical interpretation of McKenzie’s question had to be the
first. The ostensibly simple question of whether Neely had seen “Alice” lately was
therefore, in the ALJ and Board’s view, a furtive attempt to let Neely know that “top
management,” not McKenzie, was responsible for deciding to discharge Neely and
that decision was driven by Neely’s support for the Union and prior Board testimony.7
We conclude, as did the dissenting Board member, that this interpretation of
McKenzie’s question was both unfounded and speculative.
Even when viewed in a generous light, the evidence relied on by the Board
simply does not meet the substantial evidence standard. The combination of Lampi’s
7
We note in passing that there was no evidence presented that Neely interpreted
McKenzie’s question in a manner similar to the ALJ.
13
prior anti-union behavior, the timing of Neely’s termination and McKenzie’s question
about “Alice” could not be deemed substantial evidence that Neely was fired because
of her union activity and prior Board testimony. Because the evidence before the
Board was insufficient to link Neely’s protected activity with her termination, we
decline to enforce the Board’s order.
Even if we assume arguendo that the General Counsel presented a prima facie
case that Neely was fired in violation of the Act, there was insufficient evidence
presented to support the Board’s finding that Lampi’s proffered reasons for
terminating Neely were pretextual. To the contrary, the record supports Lampi’s
contention that it terminated Neely for cause. The record clearly shows that Neely’s
performance declined precipitously in the period prior to her termination. McKenzie
verbally counseled Neely 15 to 20 times about her poor performance in the period of
May through July. McKenzie testified that Neely simply did not seem to care about
her falling efficiency numbers. Neely was also disciplined twice in June 1996 for
excessive absenteeism and a failure to place the correct UPC on several lamps.
Neely’s efficiency numbers for June were 87 percent, below the 90 percent standard
14
set by Lampi.8 Her July numbers were significantly worse, falling below 69 percent.
Lampi terminated Neely in August because of her overall poor work performance.
The Board found that Lampi’s proffered reasons for Neely’s termination were
pretextual because: (1) Lampi’s employee handbook did not provide that a failure to
meet the 90 percent efficiency standard would automatically result in termination; (2)
other employees who failed to meet the 90 percent standard in July were not
terminated; and (3) the disciplinary warning issued to Neely for her UPC error did not
inform Neely that she would be terminated for another “severe offense.” As with the
evidence supporting the Board’s finding of anti-union animus, we conclude that the
evidence before the Board was insufficient to support its finding of pretext. The
record is clear that Lampi was greatly concerned about efficiency numbers and
disciplined those employees who failed to meet the 90 percent standard. In fact,
Lampi fired two other employees, Lowe and Laudermilk, in August 1996 for, inter
alia, failing to meet production levels. That the employee handbook did not provide
that termination was automatic for failing to meet the standard does not alter the fact
that Lampi was justified in terminating an employee whose efficiency numbers were
8
Neely’s performance in the months previous had been similarly borderline. After
starting 1996 with a strong 124 percent efficiency number in January, Neely’s efficiency rating
was 88 percent in February, 95 percent in March, 89 percent in April, and 91 percent in May.
15
unsatisfactory.9 The Board suggests that Neely was unfairly singled out because
three other employees who failed to meet the 90 percent standard in July were given
written warnings instead of being fired. However, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that these three employees had either been verbally counseled 15 to 20 times
about poor efficiency in the preceding months or had shown an utter lack of concern
about their falling production numbers, as Neely had. Therefore, these three
employees are not appropriate comparators for Neely.
The record also does not support the Board’s conclusion that because Lampi
failed to warn Neely that she could be terminated for the next “severe” offense
following her UPC mistake, it did not consider Neely’s poor performance to be
worthy of termination. Neely acknowledged during the administrative hearing that
McKenzie had informed her that a failure to keep up her efficiency numbers could
lead to termination. Moreover, McKenzie verbally counseled Neely many times that
she needed to increase her production numbers and found that Neely seemed not to
care about her falling efficiency. The record therefore supports Lampi’s contention
that it was concerned about Neely’s performance. Moreover, the record is clear that
9
Lampi fired Neely pursuant to Policy 2.2.9 of the employee handbook, which
provides, in part that: “[a]n employee can be disciplined for carelessness, unsatisfactory work, or
neglect of duty.” (R.2-2 at 4.) It further provides that punishments may include anything from
verbal counseling to termination. The handbook does not, however, require that a set number of
warnings or other punishments be imposed before terminating an employee under Policy 2.2.9.
16
Neely was made aware of the potential consequences of her poor performance several
months in advance of her termination. Accordingly, we conclude that there was
insufficient evidence in the record to support the Board’s finding that Lampi would
not have terminated Neely absent her union activities or prior Board testimony.
Conclusion
Because the Board’s factual findings were not supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole, we deny enforcement of the Board’s order.
ENFORCEMENT DENIED.
17