John B. Hampton v. City of South Miami , 186 F. App'x 967 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 05-14816 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JULY 25, 2006
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-22323-CV-ASG
JOHN B. HAMPTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF SOUTH MIAMI, a Florida municipality,
CHARLES D. SCURRY,
ORLANDO MARTINEZ,
JEANETTE NAVARRO,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 25, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John B. Hampton, an African-American male, appeals from the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of South Miami (“the City”) as to
his claims for breach of contract and the covenant to perform in good faith, under
Florida law, and race discrimination, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and the
Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”).1 On appeal, Hampton argues that, in
connection with the entry of summary judgment, the district court improperly
made factual findings relating to credibility and disputed evidence and failed to
draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of him. After careful review, we
affirm.
In the complaint, Hampton alleged that he was terminated because of his
race and in retaliation after he spoke to the Mayor of the City and a City
Commissioner about (1) misuse of City personnel to maintain private vehicles at
Public Works Director Orlando Martinez’s direction, and (2) discriminatory
practices against African-American employees within the Public Works
Department. The City’s reasons for firing Hampton included his failure to disclose
on his job application that (1) he had been arrested for having a suspended license
and for missing commercial markings on his truck; (2) prior to his resignation from
1
After a de novo review, we find no error in the district court’s disposition of Hampton’s
retaliation claims and, accordingly, affirm on the basis of the district court’s well-reasoned analysis.
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his prior job at the City of Coral Gables, he was recommended for termination after
he admitted depositing a stolen check into his own account; and (3) he previously
had been employed by United Parcel Service (“UPS”). In his complaint, Hampton
alleged that the foregoing reasons were pretextual and that the true reason for his
termination was discrimination and retaliation based on race.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion for summary
judgment, viewing all evidence and factual inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th
Cir. 1994). “Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence shows ‘that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’265 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
On appeal, Hampton first argues, in connection with the entry of summary
judgment on his breach-of-contract claim and attendant covenant to perform in
good faith, that the City Code provides for discharge of permanent City employees
only for lack of “good behavior, the satisfactory performance of work, necessity
for the performance of work, and the availability of funds.” Hampton contends
that City Manager Charles D. Scurr disregarded the Code and instead followed
Director Martinez’s recommendation to fire Hampton for a reason (the job
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application omissions) not found within the Code. Hampton asserts that the
following issues should have been submitted to a jury: (1) whether his failure to
disclose two arrests on his application constituted misconduct because the arrests
were for non-moving traffic violations; (2) whether his failure to disclose the
events preceding his resignation from his position at the City of Coral Gables
constituted misconduct because his record indicates only that he voluntarily
resigned; and (3) whether his failure to disclose his previous employment by UPS
constituted misconduct because the City job application form requested only ten
years of history. We disagree.
Under Florida law, “in the absence of language in the employee manual
expressly providing that the manual constitutes a separate employment agreement,
or the parties’ explicit mutual agreement to that effect, policy statements in the
employment manual do not constitute the terms of a contract of employment.”
Quaker Oats Co. v. Jewell, 818 So. 2d 574, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
Moreover, in Florida, “[a]n employee may be terminated at will, without a showing
of cause, where the employment contract between the parties is indefinite as to the
period of employment.” Linafelt v. Bev, Inc., 662 So. 2d 986, 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
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Here, the City’s personnel policies and Code did not contain language
expressly providing that they constituted a separate employment agreement.
Moreover, even if we may infer an employment contract from the policies and
procedures embodied in the Code and personnel manual, because “no definite
period of employment” was included for Hampton, under Florida law he could be
terminated at will. Accordingly, we discern no error in the entry of summary
judgment on the breach-of-contract and covenant-to-perform-in-good-faith claims.
Turning to Hampton’s discrimination claims under Title VII and the FRCA,
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).2 “Where, as here,
a plaintiff predicates liability under Title VII on disparate treatment and also claims
liability under sections 1981 and 1983, the legal elements of the claims are
identical.” Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1433 (11th Cir. 1985). We apply
the analytical framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
2
Federal case law interpreting Title VII is applicable to cases arising under the FCRA.
See Florida State Univ. v. Sondel, 685 So.2d 923, 925 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see also Wilbur
v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 393 F.3d 1192, 1195 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting in a retaliation case that the
FCRA is patterned after Title VII and no independent analysis of the claim under the FCRA is
necessary).
5
U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dep’t of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248(1981) when a Title VII plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence to prove his case.
Durley v. APAC, Inc., 236 F.3d 651, 655 (11th Cir. 2000).3
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff first must show an
inference of discriminatory intent, and thus carries the initial burden of establishing
a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
The plaintiff’s successful assertion of a prima facie case “creates a rebuttable
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against her.” E.E.O.C. v.
Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing U.S. Postal
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983)). If the plaintiff
3
Hampton may prove a prima facie claim of discrimination through (1) direct evidence,
(2) circumstantial evidence, or (3) statistical proof. See Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d
1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990). We have “defined direct evidence as evidence, which if believed,
proves the existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption.” Bass v. Bd. of County
Comm’rs, Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1112 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations and emphasis
omitted). Because statements of discriminatory intent must be made by a person involved in the
challenged decision to constitute direct evidence of discrimination, “remarks by non-decision
makers or remarks unrelated to the decision-making process itself are not direct evidence of
discrimination.” Id. at 1105.
We are unpersuaded by Hampton’s argument that a racial slur made by Director Martinez
constituted direct evidence of discrimination and disparate treatment, which precluded summary
judgment. Because Scurr was the decision maker here and Hampton points to no direct evidence
relating to Scurr, the slur by Martinez, a non-decisionmaker, does not constitute direct evidence of
discrimination. Id. Moreover, on this record, we cannot find that Scurr acted as a “mere conduit”
for Martinez’s racial animus as it was undisputed that Scurr relied on Police Chief Cokes Watson’s
independent report and Hampton’s predetermination hearings and did not rely solely on Martinez’s
“biased recommendation.” See Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.
1999).
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successfully demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
employer to produce evidence that its action was taken for a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason. See Joe’s Stone Crab, 296 F.3d at 1272. “Should the
employer meet its burden of production, the presumption of discrimination is
rebutted, and the inquiry ‘proceeds to a new level of specificity,’ in which the
plaintiff must show that the proffered reason really is a pretext for unlawful
discrimination.” Id. at 1272-73 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56). “Although
the intermediate burdens of production shift back and forth, the ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against the
employee remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id. at 1273.
After assuming that Hampton met his initial prima facie burden, the district
court proceeded to the second step of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry and held that
the City articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its employment decision
-- namely, that Hampton’s employment application included falsifications and
omissions. At the third step of the inquiry, to establish pretext, Hampton had to
demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the
employment decision . . . [The plaintiff] may succeed in this either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer’s proferred explanation is unworthy of credence.
7
Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005)
(alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, Hampton was
required to produce sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable finder of fact to
conclude that the City’s articulated reasons were not believable. Id. He could do
this by pointing to “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions” in the proferred explanation. Id.“[T]o avoid summary judgment [the plaintiff] must introduce significantly
probative evidence showing that the asserted reason is merely a pretext for
discrimination.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir.
1993) (citation omitted). A reason is not pretext for discrimination “unless it is
shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.”
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
After our own careful review of the record, we can find no error in the
district court’s analysis and conclusion that Hampton did not satisfy his burden at
the third step of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry. Indeed, in its thorough and well-
reasoned opinion, applying this Court’s settled case law on the subject, the court
considered and rejected virtually every argument raised in this appeal. On the
basis of the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned analysis of Hampton’s
discrimination claims, we affirm.
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AFFIRMED.
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