United States v. Dioselis Fuentes-Nodarse , 606 F. App'x 475 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-11723
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cr-10028-JEM-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DIOSELIS FUENTES-NODARSE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(February 18, 2015)
Before JULIE CARNES, FAY and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Dioselis Fuentes-Nodarse appeals his sentence of 37 months’ imprisonment
for conspiracy to encourage and induce aliens to enter the United States
unlawfully, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (v)(I), and failure to
obey an order to heave a vessel, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2237(a). After a
thorough review of the record, we affirm.
I.
Fuentes-Nodarse and his cousin Ledian Acosta-Gonzalez were indicted for
conspiring to encourage and induce aliens to enter the United States unlawfully
and failing to obey an order to heave a vessel. 1 Fuentes-Nodarse ultimately
pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count. 2 At the change-of-plea hearing, Fuentes-
Nodarse admitted that in early September 2013, he and Acosta-Gonzalez traveled
from Las Vegas, Nevada, to the Florida Keys, where they met a man named
“KAPLRO” and agreed to smuggle people from Cuba to the United States in
exchange for more than $2,000. Fuentes-Nodarse would receive half of the funds.
That same night, Fuentes-Nodarse and Acosta-Gonzalez loaded a boat with
fuel drums and enough food and water to feed approximately 30 people and headed
1
Acosta-Gonzalez was also charged with resisting a customs and border protection officer. He
proceeded to trial, after which he was acquitted of resisting an officer and convicted of the
remaining charges. He was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment.
2
We note that, although Fuentes-Nodarse’s plea agreement contained a waiver-of-appeal
provision that would have precluded this appeal, the government does not seek to invoke the
waiver. In fact, neither the government nor the appellant even mention the waiver provision in
their briefs. Accordingly, we will address the merits of the appeal. See United States v. Valnor,
451 F.3d 744, 745 n.1 (11th Cir. 2006) (addressing the merits where the government did not seek
to enforce the waiver-of-appeal provision).
2
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south toward Cuba. Fuentes-Nodarse was in the bow of the boat. Although they
were traveling at night, when they were about one and a half miles offshore, they
turned off the boat’s navigation lights and continued their journey.
Agents from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) then activated their
boat’s lights and siren, and issued verbal commands for the men to stop. Instead,
the two engaged in evasive maneuvers, and at one point, Acosta-Gonzalez turned
the boat to collide with the CBP vessel. During the attempt to evade CBP,
Fuentes-Nodarse “lay prone in the bow [of the boat] in [an] attempt to keep it on
plane.” The CBP agents fired warning shots and ultimately disabled the boat by
discharging a 12-gauge shotgun.
Based on this admitted conduct, the probation officer calculated Fuentes-
Nodarse’s offense level to include a 10-level increase under U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.1(b)(5)(A) because a firearm was discharged, and a 2-level increase under
§ 2L1.1(b)(6) because the offenses created a substantial risk of death or serious
bodily injury. Fuentes-Nodarse’s advisory guidelines range was 37 to 46 months’
imprisonment. Fuentes-Nodarse objected to the enhancements, but the district
court overruled the objections and sentenced him to a total of 37 months’
imprisonment. This is Fuentes-Nodarse’s appeal.
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II.
Fuentes-Nodarse raises two arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the
district court erred when it applied a ten-level increase under § 2L1.1(b)(5)(A)
because a firearm was discharged by law enforcement, and not by either defendant.
Fuentes-Nodarse notes that he did not personally induce the discharge because he
was not the driver of the boat while it fled from law enforcement. Second,
Fuentes-Nodarse argues that the district court erred when it applied a two-level
increase under § 2L1.1(b)(6) because his codefendant was in control of the boat
when it took dangerous evasive actions to avoid being apprehended.
We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its
interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States
v. McQueen, 670 F.3d 1168, 1169 (11th Cir. 2012). We may affirm the district
court on any ground supported by the record. United States v. Hall, 714 F.3d
1270, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013).
III.
Section 2L1.1 provides the base offense level and the specific offense
characteristics for smuggling unlawful aliens. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(a), (b). Relevant
to this appeal, § 2L1.1(b) provides that “[i]f a firearm was discharged, increase by
6 levels, but if the resulting offense level is less than level 22, increase to level
4
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22.”3 Id. § 2L1.1(b)(5)(A). Neither § 2L1.1 nor its Application Notes specifies
who must discharge the firearm. But § 1B1.3(a) provides:
[S]pecific offense characteristics . . . shall be determined on the basis
of the following:
(1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully
caused by the defendant;
...
that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in
preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid
detection or responsibility for that offense[.]
Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).
Fuentes-Nodarse’s arguments are without merit. Although the Guidelines
do not define “induce,” in McQueen, we explained that “induced”—as it is used in
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)—means “brought about, produced, or caused by the defendant’s
conduct.” 670 F.3d at 1170-71. We then concluded that, under § 2L1.1(b)(5)(A),
a defendant can be held accountable for law enforcement’s discharge of a firearm
when the defendant “induced” that discharge by fleeing despite law enforcement’s
use of lights and sirens. Id. Noting that these discharges “were measured
responses to [the defendant’s] continued criminal conduct,” we explained that a
defendant induces the officers to discharge a firearm because “a ‘reasonable’ alien
3
Here, Fuentes-Nodarse’s offense level was 12, thus he received a 10-level increase to offense
level 22.
5
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smuggler who flees from law enforcement on the high seas would foresee the use
of illuminated warning shots to gain compliance.” Id. at 1171.
Here, Fuentes-Nodarse’s arguments that § 2L1.1(b)(5)(A) only applies when
a firearm is discharged by a participant in the criminal activity, and that the
enhancement should not apply in this case because the discharge was a volitional
act of the CBP agents are foreclosed by McQueen.
Moreover, although the defendant in McQueen was the driver of the boat,
we see no reason the guidelines increase would not apply to a defendant, like
Fuentes-Nodarse, who participated in other ways in the conduct leading to the
gunfire. Fuentes-Nodarse admitted that he remained in the bow to help keep “it on
plane” while he and his cousin attempted to evade CBP. This active participation
in the boat’s flight further justifies the enhancement under § 2L1.1(b)(5)(A). 4
IV.
Section 2L1.1 provides for a sentence enhancement where the offenses
created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6).
“[A] defendant’s base offense level and specific offense characteristics are
determined, in part, from his offense of conviction, plus all relevant conduct.”
United States v. Zaldivar, 615 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2010). Relevant
conduct, under the Guidelines, “includes ‘all reasonably foreseeable acts and
4
Because we conclude that the enhancement was proper under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), we need not
address whether it was proper under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
6
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omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.’” Id.
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)).
“Whether a co-conspirator’s act was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant
so that it qualifies as relevant conduct is a question of fact reviewed for clear
error.” United States v. Valarezo-Orobio, 635 F.3d 1261, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011).
What is “‘[r]easonably foreseeable’ has never been limited to actions that were
expressly agreed to by the co-conspirators.” United States v. Cover, 199 F.3d
1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted), superseded by regulation on
other grounds as recognized in United States v. Chavers, 416 F. App’x 863, 866
(11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished). Rather, “an act is reasonably foreseeable if it is a
necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that an enhancement under
§ 2L1.1(b)(6) applies where the boat used to smuggle aliens traveled on the open
seas, at night, at a high rate of speed and without navigation lights, especially when
that boat employs evasive maneuvers and intentionally strikes another vessel.
Moreover, because it was reasonably foreseeable that Acosta-Gonzalez
would attempt to flee from law enforcement, and because Fuentes-Nodarse is
accountable for the reasonably foreseeable acts of others in furtherance of the
jointly undertaken criminal activity, the district court properly applied a two-level
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enhancement under § 2L1.1(b)(6) for creating a substantial risk of death or serious
bodily injury.
AFFIRMED.
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